781.00/8–2251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 1
secret

956. Dept shares Emb’s concern recent polit developments reported urtel 859 Aug 212 and hopes your remarks Venizelos urtel 890 Aug 223 will have salutatory effect. While not too hopeful Venizelos will influence Palace, perhaps he can be persuaded not lend himself to latter’s machinations.

Agree you shld seek earliest opportunity discreetly and tactfully reiterate informally to King dangers not only to institution of monarchy, but also stability of country with subsequent possibility nullifying effect of Amer program in Greece, all of which inherent Palace intervention current electoral campaign. While Emb best able determine approach King, might be propitious have talk on grounds that monarchy post-war period has been stabilizing influence and any action taken jeopardizing this position wld have serious consequence [Page 503] to Grk nation. Re urdesp 197 Aug 74 as concomitant might be useful Emb take up this subj again with Pipinelis.

Dept believes most important fact US seriously concerned this matter shld not become known publicly. Wish not lend any color frequent commie charge US intervention and domination Greece or arouse Grk animosity undue intervention internal affairs. Latter particularly important in view Emb’s estimate Papagos prospects as result coming elections and his oft-announced position necessity Grks conduct own affairs. Dept’s view any representation made this matter for present shld be informal and anything resembling démarche or formal statement should be avoided.

Since Palace intervention increasingly common knowledge Greece, public knowledge US disapproval Palace participation politics might contribute undermining prestige monarch and might be considered US tacit approval for Grks raise “issue of regime.” Similarly, because present Palace polit activities almost entirely anti-Papagos public knowledge US anxious Palace eschew politics this time most probably be construed US support Papagos. Any talks King or Venizelos this matter shld make abundantly clear US impartiality as to consideration but Palace intervention politics inadvisable regardless direction that activity.

View foregoing considerations, Dept considers preferable not discuss this matter Amb Politis or prompt any press comment at this time. Such action might be reserved and employed only if sitn becomes much worse.

Your comments foregoing wld be appreciated.

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Ben F. Dixon of GTI, cleared by Edmund J. Dorsz, Deputy Director, GTI.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Ante, p. 498.
  4. Not printed: it reported on a conversation between Memminger and Panayotis Pipinelis, former Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs and occasional counselor to the King, during the course of which Memminger sought to win Pipinelis’ support for a policy of Palace neutrality during the election campaign. Memminger told Pipinelis, inter alia, “in as nice a way as I could that we in the Embassy had long had great respect for his ability, intelligence and candor, and that we felt confident he would counsel caution in what might well develop into a very hot political campaign. He got the idea on the first bounce and assured me that he would.” (781.00/8–751)