787.00/2–1951: Despatch

The Chargé in Iraq ( Tenney ) to the Department of State 1

confidential
No. 843

[Here follows section IV which is a continuation of the review of Iraqi political development and political attitudes (sections I, II, and III) presented in despatches 821 and 822 of February 12 (787.00/2–1251). Despatch 821 reported on Nuri al-Sa’id’s efforts at the Arab League Meeting, January 23, to secure the alignment of the Arab States and the Arab League with the West. Despatch 822 reported on Sa’id’s efforts since early November 1950 to impress on the Iraqi public the necessity of arranging for “joint defense” of the Arab states. The despatch also presented a review, as seen from Iraq, of the principal points of interest in the Arab League meeting of January 20–February 3.]

V. The Government Stresses Iraq’s Defenselessness and Need of United States Military Assistance

The general international tension and threat of global war following Chinese Communist military successes in Korea in December and January, and especially the unpleasant necessity for Iraq to come out openly in support of—or opposition to—the United States resolution condemning Chinese Communist aggression, revived in Iraq an acute awareness of the country’s defenselessness and a keen desire on the part of Iraqi political and military leaders to get military assistance from the Western powers (compare the Embassy’s despatch No. 424, October 23, 1950, p. 5).2

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense (Shakir al-Wadi and Ahmed Rawi) explained at length to the Embassy that the Government [Page 547] was afraid that if Iraq provoked the Soviet Union by following the U.S. line against the Chinese Communists, the Soviets might retaliate through stepped up subversive action in Iraq especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Government stressed that the Iraqi Army must have additional arms and equipment in order to deal with the situation on the Iraqi border if a Soviet inspired insurrection should occur in Iranian Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan (or if Mulla Mustafa should return to Iraq backed by Russian arms) and in order to maintain internal security if the U.S.S.R. should take active steps to increase subversive activity in Iraq (compare the Embassy’s despatch No. 829, February 17, 1951,3 which transmits a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office, with the help of the Ministries of Interior and Defense, regarding the factors which make it necessary that Iraq’s armed forces be strengthened).

Foreign Office Undersecretary (before the final vote on the U.S. resolution on Chinese aggression) summarized the Government’s view-point as follows:

a)
The Government believes that the vote on the Chinese aggression resolution is a turning point in the sense that a vote for the U.S. resolution will be (and will be so considered by the Iraqi public) a definite alignment of Iraq against the Soviet sphere, and that it will “align Iraq with the Western powers” in the event of a third World War.
b)
Iraq is afraid that the Russians will regard an Iraqi vote for the resolution as a hostile act and that if Iraq so votes the U.S.S.R. will take action against Iraq probably in the form of greatly expanded subversive activities here.
c)
Therefore the Government feels that if Iraq is to take the risk of acting in such a way as to anger the Russians and thus run the danger of a greatly stepped up subversive campaign, Iraq must have some assurance of military and economic aid from the United States (since Britain cannot supply it).

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense have both taken the line in discussions with Embassy representatives that Britain, which has treaty responsibility for the defense of Iraq, is unable to defend the area or even to supply sufficient arms to enable the Iraq Government to build up the army and the police force sufficiently to maintain internal security should war break out, or should disturbances occur in Northwest Iran. Therefore, they say, the Government must turn to the United States as the only power in a position to supply the needed equipment.

The reasons underlying the Government’s desire to increase the strength of its armed forces may be summarized as follows:

It is a principle of Iraqi political life that the Government can maintain order and security in the outlying Kurdish mountain regions and [Page 548] in the southern Arab tribal districts only when it is “strong”. The Government’s strength depends in the last analysis on its armed forces,—the army and the police—and their ability to take quick effective action when disturbances break out. Growing realization that Iraq is in fact defenseless should war break out between the Soviet Union and the Western powers is one of the causes for the widespread feeling in unthinking (or anti-Western) nationalist and leftist circles that Iraq should remain neutral in the event of war and should make public declaration of such a policy. The weakness of Iraq’s armed forces and the feeling that the country and its government do not have the strong military backing of a first class military power able to cope with a Russian attack (such as Britain used to be but is not now under the present alignment of world forces) also has the effect of reducing the Government’s ability to keep the respect of and maintain order among unruly tribesmen or discontented urban elements. Why should the Kurdish mountain chieftain or the Euphrates tribal sheikh, who has, or thinks he has, grievances against the Government remain respectful and submissive if he believes the Government is likely to be swept away?

For these reasons the Government is most anxious to build up the strength of its armed forces and to seek United States participation, with Britain, in some form of multilateral military arrangement for the defense of the area.4

VI. Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Jordanian Relations

1. Iraqi-Syrian Relations.

The only development of importance in Iraqi-Syrian relations during the period under review was Prime Minister Qudsi’s visit to Baghdad (November 18 to 23). During his five day visit, the principal political matters discussed by Qudsi and Prime Minister Nuri Said were (a) the question of military cooperation with the West; (b) the Arab League’s Collective Security Pact; (c) the relations between Syrian and Egypt and (d) Iraqi-Syrian relations and the question of Saudi Arabian interference in Syrian affairs.

The Iraqis seem to have been pleased with results of Qudsi’s visit, believing that Nuri Pasha was successful in explaining Iraqi viewpoints on inter-Arab and international affairs,—and to a certain extent winning Qudsi’s approval of them.

[Page 549]

a) The Defense of the Middle East and Military Cooperation with the West.

Nuri Pasha expounded his thesis that Iraq especially, but Syria and Saudi Arabia as well, are dangerously exposed to Soviet invasion in the event of global war, and that therefore the Arab States should seek the military cooperation of Britain and the West in the defense of the Middle East.

b) The Collective Security Pact.

Nuri Pasha asked Qudsi to inform the Egyptian Prime Minister (on his forthcoming visit to Cairo) that Iraq could not sign the Egyptian version of the Collective Security Pact; that Iraq insisted that the Pact be made more practical by providing for a Chiefs of Staff committee and that the Commander in Chief of the combined Arab armies should be either chosen on merit, or [be] a national of the state or the territory on which war occurs.

c) Egyptian-Syrian Relations.

Qudsi (according to Iraqi sources) assured Nuri Pasha that at future Arab League meetings Syria would not follow the Egyptian lead, but would take an independent line, considering each question on its merits.

d) Iraqi-Syrian Relations and the Question of Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian Interference in Syrian Affairs.

According to Iraqi sources, Qudsi did riot raise the question of interference in Syrian affairs with the Iraqis (because, the Iraqis maintain, the Syrians are quite aware Iraq has not interfered since Hennawi’s downfall),5 but he did inform Nuri Pasha that he had urged the Saudi Arabians to “stop subsidizing intrigues in Syria”.

2. The Iraq–Syria Union Question 6

As regards the question of Syro-Iraqi union, the Iraq Government’s attitude remained the same, during the period under review, as it has been for the past year. The Iraqis take the line that the question as to whether or not Iraq and Syria should unite is now up to the Syrians; Iraq has made its position in favor of union clear—it can do nothing more until the Syrians come to a decision as to whether they desire union with Iraq.

At the time of Qudsi’s visit, the Undersecretary of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the reporting officer that Qudsi was certain that both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were engaging in intrigues in Syria, hoping eventually to arrange for the return of [Page 550] Shukri Quwwatli,7 since they believe Quwwatli would take a stronger stand against the union of Syria and Iraq than the present Syrian regime.

3. Iraqi-Jordanian Relations

a) King Abdullah Visits Baghdad.

In the period under review there have been no noteworthy developments in relations between Iraq and Jordan. King Abdullah came to Baghdad twice (in October and November) to visit his ailing niece Queen Aliya, and a third time, in December, for her funeral.

During his October visit King Abdullah, in a press interview, stressed the need for the “unity of Iraq, Jordan and Syria”, and in November (at the time of Prime Minister Nuri Said’s address of November 14 pointing out the impossibility of neutrality for Iraq) he expressed his approval of Nuri’s stand against neutrality, telling newspapermen that “neutrality, whether armed or not, is of no avail”.

b) Nuri Said Visits Amman.

In January, on his way to the Cairo Arab League meeting, Nuri Said visited Amman to discuss with King Abdullah the forthcoming League meeting, and also to ask the King if he would permit denationalized Iraqi Jews to move by road from Iraq across Jordan to Israel. Nuri had hoped to be able to arrange for the transport of large numbers of Jews by bus to Israel (in an effort to speed up the emigration operation), but King Abdullah wisely refused, realizing that the movement of large numbers of Jews across Jordan would probably cause serious incidents endangering internal security.

E. Paul Tenney
  1. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, and Tel Aviv.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Despatch 1061, April 10, from Baghdad transmitted a list of military equipment recently released to Iraq by the British Government and commented that although these items would undoubtedly make the Iraqi Army a more effective internal police force, they would not satisfy the needs of the Iraqi Government if it were to be encouraged to play its part in any defense of the area. The despatch closed with the words: “It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the time is here when material military assistance must be rendered to Iraq if the will to resist is to be encouraged.” (787.5/4–1051)
  5. Col. Sami al-Hinnawi, who led a successful military coup in Syria in August 1949, was in turn removed from power by a military coup on December 14, 1949.
  6. For documentation concerning U.S. policy toward the possibility of a Syro-Iraqi union in 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1201 ff.
  7. The regime of Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli was overthrown in a coup d’état of March 30, 1949, by Col. Husni Za’im.