110.24 AR/6–453

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs ( Jamison ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs ( Cabot )1

secret

The principal purpose of my visits to our Embassies in several South American countries following the Jurists’ Meeting in Buenos Aires2 was to discuss with the members of the respective Embassy staffs military relationships with the governments concerned, and particularly the military grant-aid program and its implementation. Having been involved in the development of the grant-aid program since Defense first proposed it early in 1951, and having watched it grow during the period when most of the basic agreements were negotiated, I was anxious to get as much information as possible to attempt an evaluation of the present state of its effectiveness, as well as to endeavor to find out what kinds of new headaches might develop for us during the subsequent stages of implementation. We are giving careful attention to certain of the specific problems which appeared, but I should like to summarize a few of the general impressions obtained during the course of visits to six countries involved in the program, varying from Uruguay, [Page 154] where the Agreement has not yet been ratified, to Peru, where greatest progress has been made in implementing the Agreement:

(1)
Now that we are at the stage of implementation of the program, the most important immediate question is whether the countries concerned demonstrate that they are able to create and maintain the specific units of their armed forces specified in the military plans, utilizing the training and equipment received from the United States in a way which will insure that the units are in a position to make a contribution to hemisphere defense if war should come. Much of the equipment consists of types which are relatively complex and which challenge the ability of relatively poorly trained and otherwise ill-prepared personnel. In practically all of the Embassies I discussed this question with either the attachés or with the chiefs of our training missions. Except in Ecuador, where the Chief of our Army Mission still feels that anti-aircraft equipment offers a greater challenge to the Ecuadoran soldier than he should be required to meet, I found no disposition to hold that the Latin American military personnel would not be capable of developing the techniques needed to handle the equipment. In Lima, Carl Breuer 3 and I attended a dress rehearsal held for the benefit of General Elmore 4 and other U.S. officers by an anti-aircraft unit, which has already received a considerable amount of U.S. equipment. Although I was not able to judge the fine points of the performance, it seemed to me that it was pretty uneven and that the battery would probably have been destroyed before the guns got into operation. However, Colonel Hill of Army G–3 in the Pentagon, for whose judgment I have great respect, said that, given the period of training, he believed that the unit had made considerable progress. In any event, there can be no question that it will be necessary for our MAAG and mission groups in these countries to continue to maintain constant vigilance to see to it that the equipment provided, and the men to use it, are utilized in a way which will insure that the matériel is not allowed to repose in a state of disrepair or disintegration.
(2)
It will also be necessary to maintain a constant follow-up to insure that the other governments take steps required of them to keep these units in good shape. This involves such things as recruitment and training of additional personnel required, provision of storage facilities for equipment, development of adequate housing for personnel, and maintenance, where possible, of supporting units. For example, in Lima the Peruvian Army has undertaken to enlarge the cuartel now housing the anti-aircraft unit mentioned above, (which, incidentally, is named “Coronel O’Donovan”) so that it will be adequate to take care of a unit of full battalion size. I was told that although our Mission Chief had been informed that this would be done quickly, no actual progress had been made. Again, the Air Force program contemplates the creation and maintenance of fighter and light bomber squadrons in certain countries. In some cases this means utilizing existing aircraft, while in others most of the planes will be furnished by the United States. In either case, ground crews and other supporting units are necessary. It was the view of the Air Attaché in Bogotá5 that the Colombian government was as [Page 155] yet showing no disposition to take the steps necessary to create these supporting units. In Ecuador there may be grave question of the ability of the Ecuadorian government to provide adequate storage and housing facilities. Although none of these problems appeared to have reached a stage of crisis, I am sure that the missions and the MAAGs will have plenty of work to do, and I believe we may anticipate that problems will develop which will be brought to our attention either by the Pentagon or by the other governments for action at the diplomatic level.
(3)
Although we have consistently maintained, with the support of our Embassies, that the major part of the work normally performed by the MAAGs can and should be done by existing or enlarged Training Missions, there is one aspect of the resulting situation which may cause difficulty. Since the Training Missions are technically at the service of the Defense Ministry of the local government, and are at least partially paid for by that government, they may be called upon to perform functions which will limit their usefulness in implementing that grant-aid program. For example, the Colombian Navy now has a program under way for building and sending naval boats up the Orinoco River to supply the Army and to assist it in subduing the guerrillas in the llanos. This has required a considerable diversion of funds by the Colombian Defense Ministry from the creation of a training center to be used as part of the Naval grant-aid program. Furthermore, the Colombian Navy has requested our Naval Mission to lend its assistance to the development of this program, which is unrelated to the tasks involved in the grant-aid program. Since the Naval Mission cannot serve two masters, I understand that it has proceeded as requested by the Colombians, and the development of the Training Center has been postponed. (Incidentally, I was told that it is anticipated that the Training Center in Colombia will be used not only for training Colombians, but also for Ecuadorans and Venezuelans, and that this has been agreed to in principle by all three governments. If so, I believe this will make a new stage in inter-American military collaboration, but I doubt that we shall very soon get to the place where Ecuadorans will be training in Peru and vice-versa.)
(4)
Political Impact of the program. Negotiation of military assistance agreements involving preparation for possible participation in collective defense of the hemisphere, undertaken at the instance of the United States, in which military equipment given by the United States plays an important part, was seized upon by the communists and the extreme nationalists as an issue which they used and perverted on every possible occasion. I believe this danger was anticipated when the program was launched, but some of us have had moments of doubt as to whether the military and political gains would be sufficiently great to counteract this fact. In general, I did not find any disposition to view with alarm the political repercussions of the program. In Chile, the country where local opposition was perhaps loudest and where the Military Agreement figured as an issue in the presidential campaign, I discussed this specific question at some length with Mr. Stewart,6 Public Affairs Officer. It was his view that this was only one of many issues which the communists and nationalists were prepared to use, and that if we [Page 156] were to be guided in our policy by not taking positions on the grounds of possible opposition from those sources, we would be foreclosed from undertaking any positive programs whatsoever. In Uruguay, another country where opposition has been virulent, I had an opportunity to discuss the program with Ambassador Mora and, very briefly, with the member of the Colorado faction who is shepherding the Agreement in the Chamber of Deputies. I did not find them disposed to view the program in any other light than as a positive effort on our part to strengthen the system of continental defense. In Ecuador, where the press still belabors the governments despite recent repressive measures, and where I believe the type of our equipment assistance is most open to question, the Minister of Defense was working hard to insure that the required Ecuadoran contribution for local currency would be immediately forthcoming.

Although communist and nationalist propaganda has had some effect in delaying legislative approval of the agreements in certain countries, the degree of success in obtaining such approval in all but Uruguay has also demonstrated the ineffectiveness of such efforts to turn the issue against the United States. On a number of occasions highly advertised “mass demonstrations” have fizzled completely, and even in Uruguay the Colorado majority voted to press for ratification in the face of determined efforts to tie the question to the “wool tops” issue.7

In the long run, I believe that the question of whether the program will result in political gains outweighing the disadvantages of intensified anti-American propaganda will depend upon whether practical military results are forthcoming. If it could be assumed that there will be no requirement for a Latin American military contribution in the event of war, or that the Latin American countries are incapable, even with our assistance, of making a manpower contribution to collective hemisphere defense, then it would seem to have been disadvantageous and unwise to have offered hostile elements an opportunity to stoke the fires of Yankeephobia. I do not believe either of these assumptions is warranted. Furthermore, it seems to me that, from the political and psychological viewpoint, we have made considerable progress in creating greater awareness, at least among political and military leaders, of the collective responsibility for continental defense. Whether this takes effect and is extended depends to a very large extent upon whether the military potential for participation is actually developed to the place where it can be used effectively. On the basis of my discussions and relatively brief observations, I believe that, although there are many obstacles yet to be overcome, the prospects for constructive gain are good.

In Venezuela, which is not participating in the grant-aid program, there are special problems revolving principally around the necessity for insuring that a country which is prepared to pay for military equipment [Page 157] and whose strategic importance is paramount, is not given a priority position behind that of the grant-aid countries.

  1. Addressed also to Mr. Woodward.
  2. Reference is to the second meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, which was held in Buenos Aires, Apr. 20–May 9, 1953; for documentation concerning the meeting, see Annals of the Organization of American States, 1953 (Washington, 1953), pp. 148–174.
  3. First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Lima.
  4. Brig. Gen. John A. Elmore, USA.
  5. Lt. Col. Rex. T. Barber.
  6. Charles Allán Stewart.
  7. For documentation relating to this subject, see pp. 1535 ff.