Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

MID files, lot 57 D 15, “Costa Rica—Political 1954”

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Central America and Panama Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland)¹

secret

[Washington,] November 18, 1954.

Subject:

• Imminent Attempt to Overthrow Figueres Government

1. Current information indicates that the plan to overthrow Figueres, formulated but aborted last summer and then postponed until mid-November, is now about to be put into effect.

(a) The participants are the same: the Costa Rican opposition to Figueres headed by ex-Presidents Calderon Guardia and Picado,² with covert assistance or tacit consent of present “outs” Echandi, Ulate, and perhaps Castro Cervantes—all spearheaded by activist Roberto Tinoco, aging revolutionary; Somoza of Nicaragua, who has furnished safe haven for training of Costa Rican irregulars and very likely arms; Perez Jimenez and Estrada of Venezuela, who have supplied funds and very probably arms, via Nicaragua and Panama. The assistance of Trujillo of the Dominican Republic is not visible, but would be consistent. The help of Castillo Armas of Guatemala is doubtful, but participation by individual members of his “Liberation Army” still sitting out at Chiquimula, is not unlikely—we have positive evidence that the unanimous impression existed among these stalwarts last June that after they overthrew Arbenz they would knock off Figueres.

(b) The form of action is now different. Instead of “invasion” from abroad, which ran athwart of U.S. opposition in July–August, the affair will be purely domestic. The infiltration of irregular forces back into Costa Rica, after training northward, is reported imminent. If proof of the nature of the present operation were needed, it can be found in the glee of Foreign Minister Otañez of Venezuela over the prospective fall of Figueres as “result of internal conditions … accomplished by Costa Ricans” (Embtel Caracas 146 [147], November 17).³

(c) This “internal” action can well be considered by the plotters as obviating hostile reaction from the Department of State, and any resulting assistance to Figueres under inter-American treaties; it could also insulate the movement against OAS action, at least for the time needed to do the deed, which may be 24 to 48 hours. The lesson was learned last summer that the overthrow of Figueres could not be accomplished by a military operation from outside the country, in which governments of one or more neighboring countries would necessarily be accused of intervention, and the revised plan would subtract this overt feature of foreign military action.

2. The imminence of putting this plan into action, possibly on the week end November 20–21, would be suggested by the following factors:

(a) Assistant Secretary Holland will be either in flight to Rio or occupied at Rio⁴ during these days, eliminating him from the decisive role he played last July.

(b) The American Government is represented at San José by Chargé Stewart and Ambassador Woodward will not arrive until the latter part of the coming week, the effectiveness of U.S. on-the-spot representation will be accordingly reduced during this period.

. . . . . . .

(d) The beginning of the dry season right now in Costa Rica makes both land and aerial operations feasible.

(e) Since the Figueres regime is weak militarily and is devoid of air defense, the sooner action is taken the better, before any additional military equipment (particularly airplanes currently under consideration) is arranged.

. . . . . . .

3. Prospectus of success of the movement is fairly high.

(a) Division, tensions and confusion within the Figueres regime are considerable. Cohesive and determined action, on a sufficient scale, might be hard to muster over a week end. Figueres’ personal custom of spending the week end at La Lucha is a favorable factor for the plotters, who might even endeavor to assassinate Figueres on the road or at the finca itself, which is very lightly guarded.

(b) The real key to any visible struggle would be in air power. The revolutionaries can probably count on availability of two or more war planes of the P–47 type which were sufficient to bomb and strafe the resistance out of Guatemala’s armed forces. Adventurer pilots, such as Jerry DeLarm, U.S. citizen, are still in the area and will fight anybody for pay. Without a single plane to put in the air against them, the Figueres forces could probably not resist.

(c) The organization of opposition to Figueres in Costa Rica is broad, determined and well financed. It represents the power of the conservative class of the country which views with horror, as a threat to its own existence, three and a half years more of Figueres in power. As land holders, this group can afford facilities in the interior to irregular forces.

4. The United States position should be determined in advance on the following recommended basis:

(a) There is no basis for United States action unless inter-American obligations are invoked in the face of armed intervention by one state against another. In the present case, however, this possibility will probably not arise, as steps have been taken to avoid it.

(b) Although it is our policy objective to foster democratic representative government in Latin America and to oppose political change by force, we cannot adopt a position of policing this continent against internal disturbances and changes of government.

(c) The above interest in our policy objectives also implies that we maintain cordial and friendly relations with a liberal democratic government, such as that of Figueres, because of the effect on relations with other such governments, such as Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. However, these objectives should not require that we anticipate a crisis or volunteer our assistance unilaterally.

(d) Costa Rica has not asked for U.S. assistance and has not made any move in the inter-American system. Until Costa Rica does so, there is no justification for the United States to move on its own, with the resulting harmful effects on relations with the governments desirous to see Figueres overthrown, such as Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala.

(e) Effective action at this time by the United States, to deter the “internal” revolution, could only be in the form of force, such as a sweep over Costa Rica by a half dozen U.S. fighter planes and their landing at San José airport. In the present shortness of time, arrangements for this purpose would have to be effected on Friday, November 19. It would not be unwise to make inquiries as to the availability of this or similar military show of force, should a Costa Rican request come over the week end.

1. Addressed also to Deputy Assistant Secretary Sparks, Ambassador-designate Woodward, and Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs Newbegin.
2. Teodoro Picado Michalski, President of Costa Rica, 1944–1948.
3. Not printed (617.18/11–1754).
4. Assistant Secretary Holland was scheduled to attend the Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy of the American Republics as the Fourth Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (commonly referred to as the Rio Economic Conference), which convened at Quitandinha, Brazil, Nov. 22, 1954; for documentation on the meeting, see pp. 313 ff.