740.5/2–152: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council ( Spofford ) to the Department of State 1
niact
Depto 922. Ref Paris 4583, Jan. 30 to Dept;2 limit distribution accordingly. Various aspects of Schuman’s msg are seriously disturbing. [Page 14] Alphand gave me advance notice of it Monday evening, saying it had been sent without consultation with those who had been working on EDC matters; including Alphand. He took most serious view of effect of reassertion of controls on prospects of EDC agrmt and said move represented ascendancy of “cross current” in Fr Govt which does not support EDC, and that he was on point of resigning when he learned of msg after it had been sent.
It is possible to take two views of Schuman’s ltr. If it is merely statement of Fr extreme position as basis for obtaining US support in tripartite and later in quadripartite talks with Adenauer, it may be dealt with in usual way. If, on other hand, it does represent some second guessing on Fr policy of Ger rapprochement or ascendency of those who have not supported Schuman’s policy in the past, we are in for real trouble and the entire US policy on Ger rearmament is jeopardized.
There are three points that are of direct concern here. We have been regarding the Brussels decisions on controls as largely obsolete as a practical matter, altho legally still on the books, and in discussions on NATO–EDC relationships and possible Lisbon action this connection have felt that formally or informally position wld have to be taken that EDC, linking Ger inextricably to west, obviates necessity for negative limitations such as 1/5 ratio and most of mil clauses. Hard to see how Fr can seriously propose having it both ways in view course of negots over past twelve months.
Argument that Ger inclusion NATO wld appear to change defensive character of treaty has been effectively answered by Dutch and others many times with query as to what this implied as to nature of EDC. This angle might be considered in connection with draft reply.
Schuman statement that objections of Fr Parliament wld continue for “foreseeable future” presumably made primarily for record, but nevertheless disturbing. Now that Ger have openly raised questions of NAT membership, as it was inevitable that they wld do at some point, negative Fr policy of following public opinion may deal major blow to whole defense effort. Is it impossible to get Fr to take positive lead vis-à-vis their public opinion along line Ger membership in NATO essential for greater assurance against revival Ger militarism that EDC can give.
Unclear at this juncture and at this distance how dilemma posed by Schuman msg can be solved within time limit set by Lisbon schedule.