Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–652

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Schuman ¹

secret

February 4, 1952.

Dear Mr. Schuman : Your letter of January 29² reached me when I was depressed and discouraged about recent developments on Germany. I read it eagerly, as I do all your letters, but my discouragement deepened. The central question for all of us revolves around the Lisbon meeting. For better or worse these meetings of NATO register the momentum of this great association. It has been marking time while underlying and historic decisions are being made elsewhere. Ottawa and Rome have passed without mark of progress. The world cannot and should not be asked to face another postponement of hope—which is failure.

The negotiations at the Paris Conference and at Bonn had seemed to me encouraging. The problems were great—those presented by the Benelux and those, though lesser ones, presented at the Bonn talks. I was cheered and encouraged by your resilience and leadership at the essential points in the Paris Conference. Now I am deeply troubled.

As you know, I am not one to doubt my friends, or shrink from issues, but I have the gravest doubts about the utility of a conference like Lisbon until I am sure about both the position of my friends and the nature of the issues—

To be specific:

• First. I agree that the Germans must agree in the contract with us on the support to be provided for Allied troops. There is no difference on this point.
• Second. On security controls. We backed the proposal of a French-German negotiation of this problem. This did not succeed. I would prefer to support a solution by EDC. If this is not acceptable we will support a tripartite insistence on an agreement prohibiting to the FedRep the items agreed at Brussels, less heavy weapons, or a binding declaration by the German government to the same effect. Our suggestion to add civil aircraft we have reconsidered and withdraw. We think any contractual agreement should be reviewed by mutual consent after EDC is in operation. Since this matter is now again in the High Commission I hope you will instruct Mr. Francois Poncet, as I am instructing Mr. McCloy, to pursue it vigorously along one of the above lines in order that a solution may be found before we meet in London.
• Third. The Saar. This matter bids fair to upset great and far-reaching plans. No one is more aware than I of the forces which produce this sort of a problem at the worst possible time. The response is not to complain but to surmount the difficulty. In my judgment the problem created is serious. It relates to what is said in your debate and in Adenauer’s. This can make or break decisions of vast importance. Because of the timing of the debates it seems imperative that some action be taken now which will remove the question from current discussion or at least lessen present tensions. You and Adenauer are in a much better position than I to determine what can and should be done before the debate starts in the Bundestag. We have given much thought and offer these suggestions for your most earnest consideration:

  (A) That you should again make a declaration concerning the intention of your government not to prejudice the ultimate decision about the Saar.

  (B) That France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic and the United States issue without delay a joint declaration of their determination to initiate discussions, at an early date to bring about a satisfactory and final solution of the Saar problem. Mr. Bruce is available to help draft the joint declaration.

• Fourth. Germany and NATO. We have understood your Parliamentary difficulties on the question of German membership in NATO. We have tried to be helpful. I think we have been. Our attitude has been that the decision is one for the future and should not be allowed to complicate the difficult enough problems of the present. Therefore, it should not be decided now. It is my understanding that Professor Hallstein did not request decision at this time on the question of German membership in NATO, but rather that any immediate solution should be an interim one. I believe this is a sound approach. Thus, we would not expect an affirmative decision from the French government on the question of German membership in NATO. Equally, what is done and said now, should not prejudice a future solution.

I do not believe that it will be possible to obtain a German contribution to defense or to bring about a cooperative attitude on the part of the Federal government if German membership in NATO is to be rejected as an ultimate solution. I am of course prepared to accept an interim arrangement such as the one proposed in the Council of Deputies in London, and I believe that we can persuade Chancellor Adenauer to go along with such an arrangement provided it is plain that the ultimate solution will not be prejudiced thereby.

I do not agree that future German membership and obligations in NATO are inconsistent with or would free Germany from the obligations assumed in the contractual agreements and in the EDC Treaty. Nor do I see why German membership in NATO affects the defensive character of NATO any more than it affects the defensive character of the EDC. Furthermore I do not see the necessity to discuss German membership in NATO at this time. If I may indulge in the vanity of quoting myself: “I do not believe that the way to solve a difficult question is to inject one which is presently insoluble”.³

Beyond these specific matters I have a deeper worry. The President and I have done everything in our power to support and strengthen the brilliant and constructive leadership which you and the French government have given to the creation of a European community. This has been true from the very first moment when you talked with me in Paris in 1950 about the idea which became the Schuman Plan. When the French government put forward the idea of a European Army, we turned from the ideas which we had had on the method of obtaining participation in European defense and gave the French proposal wholehearted support. We have believed and still believe that your leadership points the way to results which will be more far-reaching and inspiring than any of us can now realize. Only last week I said to the press that French leadership had made more progress in the solution of Europe’s problems in two years than had been made in centuries.

We believe all this here in America for the best of all reasons—because it is true.

We have all been on the right track in developing a “European” policy as a corrective to the imbalance of which you write. Only in such a policy can we find the path to future cooperation with Germany and to future security. We here hold these ends as fundamental. They must not be permitted to fail. We must all continue to press for them. We have an enormous direct interest in bringing about a wise and constructive conclusion of the occupation of Germany, in securing the future against a possible German aggression and in strengthening the West against the never-ceasing menace of the Soviet Union.⁴

What I plead for is this:

(1) To do what is necessary to insure a constructive outcome of the debates preceding Lisbon in the French Chamber and in the Bundestag—that is, reduce irritations and avoid injecting unnecessary problems.

(2) To reach agreements before and in London so that the contractual arrangements and the EDC can be concluded in accordance with their basic concepts.

(3) To have Lisbon mark accomplishments by

(a) Approving reorganization of NATO machinery;

(b) Admitting Greece and Turkey;

(c) Considering and acting upon recommendations of the TCC;

(d) Approving the establishment of EDC and its relation to NATO;

(e) Noting with approval contractual relations with Germany.

Here at home the disillusionment of American opinion which would come if we falter at this critical moment and lose what seems almost within our grasp would be very far-reaching. The administration would have little chance of saving policies and programs on which all of us have worked for years and which are right. What developments would come out of this frustration I do not know, but they would not be good.

We have put our hands to the plow and we cannot look back. Either we must guide the events we have set in motion to the goal we have chosen, or they will move themselves, we cannot tell where.

I am sending a copy of this message to Mr. Eden.

Dean Acheson

1. The source text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 2078, Feb. 6, from Paris which merely explained that this was the final text of the letter handed by Ambassador Bruce to Foreign Minister Schuman on the evening of Feb. 4. The original draft of this letter was transmitted in telegram 4527, Feb. 2, to Paris (repeated to London and Bonn). Telegram 4527 lists Acheson as the drafter but is signed by Bonbright. In his telegram 4698, Feb. 3, from Paris. Bruce recommended certain revisions in the draft letter, and telegram 4537, Feb. 3, to Paris, drafted and signed by Bonbright and cleared by Acheson, refined and approved the revisions. Differences between the original draft and the text printed here are indicated in footnotes 3 and 4, below. The circumstances of the delivery of this letter are described in telegram 4718, Feb. 4, from Paris, infra. A copy of the letter was also delivered to Eden on Feb. 5. Telegrams 4527, 4698, and 4537 are included in files 740.5/2–252 and 740.5/2–352.
2. Ante, p. 7.

3. As originally drafted and transmitted in telegram 4527 to Paris (see footnote 1, above), this paragraph read as follows:

   “For this reason, and also on the merits of the question, I do not agree that future German membership in NATO is inconsistent with or would free Germany from the obligations assumed in the contractual agreements. Nor do I see why German membership in NATO affects the defensive character of NATO any more than it affects the defensive character of the EDC. Furthermore, I don’t see why we have to argue this question now. If I may indulge in the vanity of quoting myself: ‘I do not believe that the way to solve a difficult question is to inject one which is presently insoluble.’”

   Bruce’s proposed revisions in telegram 4698 from Paris (see footnote 1, above) would have added the following sentences after the first sentence printed here:

   “We have consistently assumed in connection with our enthusiastic support of your negots to consititute a European Defense Community that this community wld be of an enduring character, that its member states wld observe their obligations to it, and that no member state wld have the right to secede from it. If you consider that further safeguards against the violation of such solemn treaty obligations are necessary I shld be happy to consult with you and Mr. Eden at our forthcoming meeting in London with a view to ascertaining what might be done to give you satisfactory assurance in this regard.”

   In its telegram 4698 to Paris in reply, the Department of State was not prepared to extend the assurance proposed by Bruce. (740.5/2–352)

4. As originally drafted and transmitted in telegram 4527 to Paris (see footnote 1, above), this paragraph was followed by two additional paragraphs. At Bruce’s suggestion they were omitted. They read as follows:

   “In embarking on this course, we have all chosen between two opposing concepts. One is that we should accept Germany as an equal participant in a European Community. The other is that we should continue long-term inequalities through the imposition by the Occupying Powers of certain restrictions on the Germans.

   “The first holds infinite promise. The second has over and over again been proven the road to failure”