Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–2652: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State ¹

top secret

Paris, August 26, 1952—11 p.m.

Polto 208. Limit distribution. I spent nearly 2 hours Aug 26 alone with Lord Ismay and Merchant. Without making any ref whatsoever then or later to the paper he had mailed Van Vredenburch from England,² Lord Ismay plunged into a description of a background assessment paper which he desired to prepare for the benefit of the perm reps in connection with the AR. He said when he had completed the draft he wished to go over it informally with me prior to distribution. In outlining his thoughts for this paper Lord Ismay said that the first point he wld make is that the Russians are not reckless adventurers but cold calculating men. Consequently, they will not strike unless they are sure to win and the North Atlantic Alliance has now acquired teeth which give them pause. From this he draws the conclusion that if we do not slacken our efforts or fail in our res, war is not inevitable but can be averted. This requires, however, an increased and a sustained def effort and in planning it we must make sure that we do not in the process lose the cold war by straining our econ and social fabric.

Secondly, in his paper he will combat the insidious view, which incidentally he says is held in certain high governmental quarters in the UK that we shld concentrate on the def of Eur and somehow end the peripheral wars in Kor and Indochina. Lord Ismay said this point of view must be scotched “for we all know what happened when they called the Roman Legions home.”

Finally, NAC shld recognize that it is in effect the Cab of the North Atlantic Alliance and that one of its responsibilities is to develop from a polit point of view and refine the directives to the mil commanders. He then elaborated a thought he has expressed to us before that the present def plans must be modified along lines of putting more in the shop window and less in the back of the store, on the basic assumption that if war comes the crucial battle will be fought in the first 6 weeks during which period retaliation wld have a chance to make its weight felt. Lord Ismay believes that this wld require a substantial revision of the composition of forces with a concentration on immed mobilizable reserves and an increased emphasis on air.

I was impressed and encouraged by the fact that Lord Ismay’s attitude was not one of discouragement and that he is increasingly conscious of the role of leadership which he must play in the council.

I read him excerpts from my report to the Pres³ and explained in great detail to him the reasons why we believe so strongly that in the interest of all of us the AR must be completed and ready for the Mins by Dec 15.⁴ I drew on our experience in the TCC⁵ to confirm the reasonableness of achievement provided all of us and particularly the internatl staff played their part. I also discussed with him frankly why a ministerial mtg before Dec wld be out of the question for the US. On the first point Ismay seemed somewhat surprised but impressed; on the latter he indicated a complete understanding and sympathy. He urged me to raise this point at the closed NAC meeting Aug 28 and to circulate in support of it a short paper to the other perm reps giving the underlying reasoning. Both I shall do.

At one point in the discussion I asked Lord Ismay if he thought it wld be helpful were I to go to London and with Gifford to see the PM and Eden in an effort to impress upon them our point of view and encourage them to reverse the note of pessimism toward NATO’s achievements which still seems to run in the Brit press. Ismay indicated that a talk with Eden in this gen connection might be helpful.

In leaving I raised the question of consultation in NAC re Ger and expressed regret that in light of our willingness to participate in such discussion it had not eventuated that the first round cld have been held prior to receipt of the latest Sov note.⁶ I told him that the US was willing to go ahead and wld have no objection if he informally brought subj up on Aug 28 since initiative had been left in his hands at previous council discussion this subj.⁷ He indicated that he wld probably do so and I told him we were mtg with UK and French perm reps later in day on this subj.

Draper

1. Repeated to London.
2. On Aug. 22, Draper had reported that Lord Ismay had sent Van Vredenburch a paper based on his conclusion that the Lisbon goals were impossible to attain. Van Vredenburch attempted to dissuade Ismay from circulating the paper and the Department of State instructed Merchant to do the utmost to prevent the paper from being released. On Aug. 24, Draper reported that Ismay had agreed to withdraw the paper. (Telegrams Polto 193 and 198 from Paris, Aug. 22 and 24, and telegram Topol 114 to Paris, Aug. 23; 740.5/8–2252, 8–2452, and 8–2252) No copy of Ismay’s paper has been found in the Department of State files.
3. No copy of a report of this nature has been found in the Department of State files.
4. Regarding the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in December, see the editorial note, p. 348.
5. For documentation on the work of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), see Foreign Relations, 1951. vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff., and pp. 203 ff. herein.
6. For documentation on the Soviet note of Aug. 23, which outlined the agenda for a proposed four-power meeting, see volume vii .
7. Draper reported on the Council meeting on Aug. 28 in Polto 228 from Paris, Aug. 29. (740.5/8–2952)