740.5/2–852
Foreign Minister Schuman to the Secretary of State 1
In reply to your message of Feb 42 I am sending you this ltr to which I wish to give a personal character in order to be able to express myself completely freely.
Your concerns are the same as mine. The French Govt will do all that depends on it to reach results acceptable for all before the Lisbon conf.
I know that Chancellor Adenauer is sincerely attached to the Eur policy which he defends courageously against a more and more vehement opposition. Although he was able to win fairly easily at the time of the vote on the coal-steel community he appears to have underestimated the resistance encountered in the Fed Rep to the participation of Ger to Western def, and that not only in the parliamentary opposition but also within the groups of the majority and in public opinion. To the extent that Fed Govt has made known the state of the negotiations, the projs which have been drawn up at Bonn as well as those studied in the Paris conf have been made the object of heated criticism.
Although the Chancellor was present in Paris at the conf held at the end of Dec he preferred contrary to all expectations and without giving any plausible reason not to be present on Jan 26 and 27.3 His absence was announced several days before the incident re the Saar.
In order to overcome this growing hostility, the Chancellor is naturally anxious to obtain from the Allies a maximum of concessions of all kinds without measuring the reactions which these fresh claims (pretentions) are capable of provoking in the Allied countries. Ger intends to be paid the highest price for the mil assistance which we have asked of her.
It wld be neither just nor prudent to yield to such pressure. We must confine ourselves to the limits and to the schedules (delais) which we have fixed for ourselves.
The principal conflicts which have arisen during these last few days are the fol: They are also those on which you have made observations.
[Page 27]1. Limitations on manufacture of arms (security agmts).
On February 5 the Chancellor refused to enter into any agmt as well as to make any declaration which wld have the value of a commitment. According to him, the confidence which one must have in him and in the Ger of today and tomorrow constitutes sufficient guarantees. The principle of the equality of rights must free Ger from any special restriction from the moment when she adheres to the def community.
2. NATO. For the same reason, Ger Govt has officially announced that it reserves to itself the right to adhere to Atlantic Pact. At a given moment Ger might thus be brought to invoke a refusal of her demand (to adhere to NATO) in order to justify her exit from EDC.
The debate and adoption of proposed treaty in French Parl have for this reason become remarkably more difficult.
3. Saar. You must know that three weeks ago already the Chancellor without warning us announced officially that in March he wld present before Council of Eur a complaint re violation of rights of man. On other hand, existence of Saar and its present status cannot be neglected with respect to def community; it will indeed be nec that people of Saar be associated therewith and bear their share of sacrifices. Therefore Saar prob was before us once more in any case. It wld therefore be to ignore the true sit if one were to try to impute to my govt the responsibility for having, at an inopportune moment, raised a needless difficulty.
In order to cut short a fraudulent agitation, I had recalled as early as Jan 28 to Secy of State Hallstein that French Govt has always proclaimed that definitive status of Saar can be determined not only by peace treaty but through a special treaty prior to peace treaty; that in these conditions we are ready to examine any proposals which the Fed Govt may wish to make to us, that we are anxious to see settled a quest which weighs upon Franco-Ger relations. On Feb 4 one of Francois-Poncet’s associates was approached by a personal associate of the Chancellor to the same effect and it was in reply to this approach that we, through same channel, authorized our HICOM to confirm our attitude which is favorable to an exchange of views and to define views without involving our Allies. All that is important for the present is for the Chancellor to be able make use of fact that negotiations in near future are possible between two countries most directly interested without prejudice to rights of Allied govts and of population of Saar itself.
Under these conditions a quadripartite declaration appears to me neither nec nor useful. We must in no case make with re to Saar the mistake of again putting ourselves in position of petitioners vis-à-vis Ger experience has proved to us how unmeasured are her demands when she has impression that we need her to get out of a difficult position.
What must one deduce from all this?
In first place one must deduce that to yield under Ger pressure wld not be to save our Eur policy but to compromise it definitively because French Parliament wld refuse to follow us: because it wld be to abandon to Ger direction of this policy; because it wld be dangerous to increase tension in Eur without any advantage for our common def.
[Page 28]On contrary it is nec that unity of three Allies become firmer vis-à-vis a Ger which can congratulate herself on the unhoped for results which she has obtained in two years—the Chancellor recently recognized this before his Parliament—vis-à-vis a Ger which wishes in one fell swoop before any peace treaty before the settlement of the serious probs which are still to be discussed with her, to snatch from us all that we can only grant her in prudently measured stages and with indispensable counterparts.
Furthermore, most recent news received from Ger prove that sangfroid which we are showing is producing immediate results. Our policy with re to Ger must be just and reasonable and concerned with establishing itself on basis of reciprocal confidence. But this cannot be achieved either through force or threat nor under pressure, but thanks to a cooperation which at no time will be able to do without patience and firmness.
Very faithfully yours,
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The source text constitutes telegram 4850, Feb. 8, from Paris (eyes only for the Secretary, repeated to London eyes only for Gilford and Spofford and to Bonn eyes only for McCloy) together with the following introductory paragraph of explanation:
↩“Fol is free translation ltr from Schuman to Secy Feb 7 and delivered us this morning. We are informed no copy has as yet been sent to Eden, although Schuman may decide to do so.”
- Ante, p. 19.↩
- Regarding the meetings under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 594.↩