Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–3154

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State ¹

confidential

Washington, March 31, 1954.

Subject:

• Suggested US initial public reaction to Soviet note of March 31 proposing that US take part in “All-Europe Security Treaty” and that Soviet Government would be prepared to consider subject of Soviet participation in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Discussion:

We have only Bohlen’s very brief summary of the note which he has been informed will be issued in tomorrow’s Soviet press.² This means that it may be on the Soviet radio as of midnight, Soviet time, which is 4:00 p.m. today in Washington. There are already some fragmentary stories in the news tickers concerning this note. Under the circumstances we can expect a barrage of questions from the press during the course of the next 24 hours and should therefore give urgent consideration to the nature of our initial official reaction to the public.

The Soviet move is well timed in terms of French indecision over EDC and the current outcry over the H-Bomb tests,³ and also represents an attempt on the part of the Soviets to knock the props out from under two of our main arguments at Berlin against the Soviet European security proposal—that is, the omission of the United States from the project and the incompatibility of the project with NATO.

We should bear in mind that this Soviet move may find a favorable reaction in some non-communist quarters in Western Europe, with a consequent need for us to formulate our initial reaction in such fashion as not to appear that it is the United States which is standing in the way of all good things.

Recommendation:

It is therefore suggested that our initial reaction should be along the following lines:

(1) We do not yet have the full text of the note, which is a very long one, and are basing our views on Ambassador Bohlen’s very brief summary.

(2) Similar notes have been delivered by the Soviets to the British and French Ambassadors in Moscow, and we shall, of course, be exchanging views with our allies on the questions raised.

(3) The division of Europe has come about as a result of Soviet domination over its Eastern European satellites. With regard to the Soviet European collective security treaty, with or without U.S. participation, the Soviets are really asking the Western European states to give up EDC as a price for joining the pan-European system. Since the main threat to European security has arisen from the Soviet power system imposed on Central and Eastern Europe, their proposal is a completely one-sided proposition as long as the Soviets continue to maintain their monolithic empire in Eastern Europe. An all-European collective security system will have a genuine foundation only when the peoples of Eastern Europe have re-acquired their national freedom. It is the Soviet Union which precludes the achievement of this goal by its imperialistic power structure in Central and Eastern Europe.

(4) The North Atlantic Treaty is based on the mutual trust which exists among its signatories. It would otherwise be a piece of paper without real significance in international life. In considering the Soviet proposal for discussions with regard to the question of Soviet participation in this treaty, we must do so against a background of a long record of Soviet disregard and violation of agreements. What justification is there for giving up our defensive posture and “clasping this evil to our breasts”? Last April 16 President Eisenhower made it clear that the test so far as revival of mutual confidence between us and the Soviet Union is concerned would be the attitude displayed by the Soviet Government in respect of such vital and concrete international issues as Germany, Austria, Korea and Indochina.⁴ At the Berlin Conference we found to our regret no disposition on the part of the Soviet Government to permit a solution of the German and Austrian problems in accordance with the will of the peoples involved and the interests of European security. We shall soon see at Geneva whether the same attitude will prevail concerning Korea and Indochina.

(5) Reference might be made to the obvious Soviet timing of their proposals in connection with the EDC question.

(6) It may also be desirable to point out that one feature of the Soviet collective security system for Europe would be the recognition of the East German puppet regime as an independent state.

1. Drafted by Thurston.
2. See editorial note, supra.
3. Documentation on U.S. hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific during early 1954 is in volume ii .
4. Regarding President Eisenhower’s address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Apr. 16, 1053, see footnote 4, p. 372.