Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–2454

Statement by the Secretary of State to the North Atlantic Council Closed Ministerial Session, Paris, April 23, 1954¹

Paris, April 23, 1954

I welcome this opportunity to contribute to a clearer understanding of the US official thinking regarding nuclear weapons, including both atomic and hydrogen weapons of all descriptions. Our attitude can best be explained in terms of the relation of these weapons to the free world system of defense against the Soviet threat.

The primary purpose of the United States, like the rest of the free world, is to deter aggression and prevent the outbreak of war. In our opinion, nuclear weapons have a vital role to play in achieving this purpose.

I

The principal danger² lies in the great concentration of military power within the Soviet Bloc combined with the known imperialistic, aggressive intent of the Soviet rulers.

The Communist Bloc comprises a vast array of people and military forces of all types centrally located in the Eurasian land mass. This great concentration of military power poses a threat³ around a periphery of 20,000 miles. Red forces could strike in any one of many directions against any one of many countries. Such attacks could never be deterred if the aggressor were assured in advance that his attack would be countered only at the place and by the means which he selects. Under such circumstances, he would be almost sure to win, and to win without endangering assets which he does not wish to expose.

The free world would have great difficulty in matching the non-atomic military strength of the Soviet Bloc man for man. Such an effort would⁴ impose critical strains upon the economic, social, and fiscal orders of many of the free nations and expose them to serious instability and unrest within their own borders.

It is known that the Soviet Union possesses atomic weapons and has trained its military personnel for their employment. In the event of general war, we must assume⁵ that the Soviet rulers will make use of atomic weapons with maximum surprise of which they are capable whenever they consider it to their advantage to do so. Since the free world rejects any resort to “preventive”⁶ war, the enemy would enjoy the military advantages which accrue to the side initiating the attack, particularly a surprise attack.

II

We believe that the risk of Soviet aggression by means of open war⁷ will be minimized to the extent that the free world combines to maintain⁸ a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate⁹ retaliatory strength. Within this collective framework, it is a basic policy of the United States to develop and maintain a military strength—land, sea and air¹⁰—with emphasis on the capability of inflicting effective retaliatory damage by¹¹ striking power. Under existing conditions, and¹² having due regard for the necessity of maintaining a strong, stable economic foundation, the security posture of the free world can be adequate only if based on the integration of effective atomic means within our overall capability.

Obviously, it is indispensable that the free world possess and maintain a capacity for instant and formidable¹³ retaliation. I emphasize the word “capacity”. Without that, the free world might be totally dominated by the power possessed by the Soviet rulers, a power the use of which is not inhibited by any moral considerations. Such power, in such hands, is restrained only by a fear of retaliation, and by a fear that its aggression would lead to its ultimate defeat and the collapse of its¹⁴ dictatorial system. Therefore, our capacity for retaliation must exist, in a state of constant readiness,¹⁵ as a neutralizing force, until the day may come when the awful possibilities of massive destruction can be done away with by effective international control of atomic energy with suitable safeguards.

III

Current NATO force programs fall short of providing the conventional forces estimated to be required to defend the NATO area against a full-scale Soviet Bloc attack. In reaching the decision to level off force build-ups, and to concentrate on qualitative improvements, we and our Allies have placed great reliance upon new weapons to compensate in part for the numerical disparity between NATO and Soviet forces.¹⁶ Current NATO military planning presupposes freedom to use atomic weapons in the defense of the NATO area in the event of Soviet Bloc aggression. The United States has accepted the current force programs and the NATO emergency plans as compromise measures on the premise that atomic weapons in substantial quantities would be available for the support of its presently programmed forces. Without the availability for¹⁷ use of atomic weapons, the security of all NATO forces in Europe would be in grave jeopardy in the event of a surprise Soviet attack. The United States considers that the ability to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons is essential for the defense of the NATO area in the face of the present threat.¹⁸

In short, such weapons must now be treated as in fact having become “conventional”. As I have said, these weapons are vital to the common defense of us all. Our main effort must be to see that our military capability is used to achieve the greatest deterrent effect. In order to achieve this, it should be our agreed policy, in case of [either general war or local] war, to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the enemy whenever and wherever it would be of advantage to do so, taking account of all relevant factors. These include non-military, as well as military, considerations.

IV

The United States intends, of course, to consult with its Allies and to cooperate with them fully to this end. That is the essence of collective security. Consultation is an important means for insuring that our military strength, in case of any aggression, shall be used to the best advantage for the common defense. By the same token, we must make sure that the methods of consultation serve that common purpose and do not themselves stand in the way of our security. Under certain contingencies, time would not permit consultation without itself endangering the very security we seek to protect. So far as feasible, we must seek understanding in advance on the measures to be taken under various circumstances. In these ways, our joint capacities will be best calculated to deter aggression against any of us and to protect us in case it should occur.

V

Free people have always depended, for their security, upon the greater resourcefulness which freedom generates.¹⁹ There is an inherent incompatibility between freedom and the methods available to despots.²⁰ If the people of the free world were to renounce the use of their actual and potential superiority in terms of new weapons and means for their application with greater mobility and flexibility, then they would have abandoned the principles which throughout the ages have enabled those who had freedom to prevail against the brute power of a despotic system.²¹ With the very survival of the free world in jeopardy, it would be suicidal for the free peoples to renounce a major part of their military capability, unless compensating safeguards were assured.²²

Self-imposed military inferiority is an invitation rather than a deterrent to war. If the nations of the free world were collectively to adopt a policy that atomic weapons would be used only in retaliation for their use by the enemy even though the enemy started a war of aggression, and if such a policy became known in the Kremlin, the value of our formidable²³ retaliatory capability as a deterrent to war would largely disappear.²⁴ Such an action on our part would offer a strong temptation²⁵ to the USSR to initiate wars²⁶ on the expectation that they²⁷ would be fought strictly on Soviet terms.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the United States believes that in any war forced upon us by the Soviet Bloc, we and our Allies must be free to use atomic weapons against appropriate elements of the enemy’s military power where it is to our military advantage to do so.²⁸ We must be enabled to strike an aggressor where it hurts. And this by no means involves exclusively the use of atomic power.

This is the only formula which gives good assurances against aggression, because it means that an aggressor cannot calculate to gain by his aggression more than he could lose. Indeed, if an aggressor is allowed in advance to limit his losses by gaining for his most valued assets a sanctuary status, then aggression would be encouraged.²⁹ An aggressor glutted with manpower and occupying a central position would always be able to calculate on gaining from each local aggression more than he would lose. He would be relieved of the economic burden of defensive measures to protect his sources of power. He could concentrate on offensive means.

To deny these privileges to an aggressor does not however mean that every local war must automatically be turned into a general war. Nor does this mean that because atomic weapons are used locally they would be used indiscriminately for the bombing of civilian populations. The United States has never entertained such concepts.

As we all agree, our primary goal is to deter aggression and prevent war. To achieve this, the Soviet Union must recognize that the free world is able and ready to use its full power to defeat any such aggression if it should occur. In our judgment, this is the surest way to prevent the outbreak of a general war, which would be a disaster for all if it occurred. The deterrent will be effective, however, only so long as the free world maintains its strength and its determination and courage to use that strength effectively. The possession of a will, if need arises, to use strength is as important as possession of strength.³⁰

If we can meet these tests, and I am convinced that we can, then mankind has good hope of escaping general war with all its attendant consequences.

VII

Until nuclear weapons can be brought under effective control, the course I have outlined seems to be the only hopeful one. Meanwhile we do not intend to slacken our efforts to bring about such control of nuclear weapons, under safe and acceptable conditions. President Eisenhower’s plan for allocating fissionable material for peacetime purposes is one approach which we are exploring with complete³¹ dedication, in the hope of thereby creating a new atmosphere and new relationships which will open the way to effective controls in the military field. We are prepared to explore any measures on condition that this does not in fact increase the peril to the free nations.³²

1. The source text was enclosed with a covering memorandum from Merchant to Under Secretary Smith, dated Apr. 24, 1954 in which Merchant stated that the source text was “slightly revised from the text which the Secretary carried with him from Washington after his luncheon meeting with Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford on the day of his departure. The changes, however, are editorial and were informally approved by General Gruenther the evening before delivery of the statement.” Merchant added that despite requests from the United Kingdom and other country delegations for copies, none had been given out other than that left with Ambassador Hughes on a strict “eyes only” basis. He concluded that Dulles had “followed the text closely with an occasional interpolation in order to avoid the appearance of reading from a prepared paper.” The source text is titled “Proposed ‘talking Paper’ for Use in Clarifying United States Position Regarding Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons During Course of NATO Meeting in Paris on 23 April 1954,” It bears the date “4/22/54”. A copy of an earlier version of this paper, dated April 20 and apparently the text of the statement which Merchant said the Secretary carried away from Washington, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 240. There are, in fact, substantial differences between the two texts and these differences are noted in footnotes below. Brackets in this document are in the source text.
2. Original text reads: “The principal threat to the peace of the world …”.
3. Original text contains the phrase “at any and all points”.
4. Word “might” substituted for “would” in original text.
5. Phrase “we must assume” reads “we may expect” in original text.
6. Quotation marks added from original text.
7. Phrase “by means of open war” added from original text.
8. Phrase “combines to maintain” reads “maintains” in original text.
9. Original text contains added phrase “defensive and offensive” following word “adequate”.
10. Phrase “a military strength—land, sea and air—” reads “a strong military posture” in original text.
11. Original text contains word “offensive” following word “by”.
12. Words “Under existing conditions, and” not in original text.
13. Original text contains word “effective” rather than “formidable”.
14. Passage “and the collapse of its” reads “and destruction of the” in original text.
15. Phrase “in a state of constant readiness” added from original text.
16. Original text contained the further phrase “thereby materially reducing the risk”.
17. Original text contains word “and” in place of “for”.

18. The following two paragraphs regarding the conventionality of nuclear weapons and consultation regarding their use were substantially revised from the original text, which reads as follows:

    “Accordingly, the United States has concluded that such weapons must be treated as in fact having become ‘conventional’. If, unhappily, war should not be deterred but should actually occur, either in terms of general war or a local war, then it should be our collective policy to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the enemy whenever and wherever it would be of military advantage to do so.

    “This policy contemplates prior consultation with our Allies in regard to all military emergencies whenever time permits. Certainly the United States intends to act in full and intimate cooperation with its Allies whenever possible. This is the essence of collective security. However it must be recognized that any nation, even though a member of a collective security organization, might be forced by circumstances affecting its survival to take immediate independent action.”

19. Original text contains added phrase “to preserve their freedom”.
20. This sentence not in original text.
21. In original text, phrase “against the brute power of a despotic system” reads “against the despots able to organize their subjects in terms of brute power”.
22. In original text, passage “suicide for the free peoples to renounce a major part of their military capability, unless compensating safeguards were assured” reads “suicidal not to apply its full military capability in its defense”.
23. Original text contains word “effective” rather than “formidable”.
24. In original text phrase “would largely disappear” reads “would be largely neutralized”.
25. In original text “would offer a strong temptation” reads “would constitute an invitation”.
26. In original text word “wars” reads “general war”.
27. In original text word “they” reads “it”.
28. Original text continued to end of this paragraph as follows: “and that we must be enabled to strike an aggressor where it hurts”.
29. From this point to the end of the following paragraph concluding with the sentence “The United States has never entertained such concepts”, the original text reads: “for an aggressor glutted with manpower and occupying a central position would always be able to calculate on gaining from each local aggression more than he would lose. To deny this privilege to an aggressor does not however mean that every local war must automatically be turned into a general war, or that because atomic weapons are used locally they would be used indiscriminately for the bombing of civilian populations. The United States has never entertained this concept”.
30. This sentence not in original text.
31. Original text from this point to the conclusion reads: “dedication. We are prepared to explore any other measures on condition that this does not in fact increase the peril to the free nations”.
32. At the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 6, 1954, Secretary Dulles reported very briefly on his remarks delivered to the Thirteenth Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council and added that subsequent to the delivery of his remarks he had received a letter from Eden discussing the statement. (Memorandum of Discussion of the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 6, 1954; Eisenhower Library, Whitman file)