CFM flies, lot M 88, “London-Lisbon Meetings”
Mr. Eden opened the meeting by saying that the points that still seemed to be at issue included the EDF and the Saar, which were primarily of concern to other governments; and the questions of war criminals, security controls, and financial arrangements, on which there were peculiarly US–UK differences. He felt that nothing could be profitably done on the financial questions, but proposed that the meeting discuss the other issues. This was agreed.
Mr. Eden then reported on his discussion with Chancellor Adenauer earlier that morning. Mr. Adenauer was quite willing to wait until Monday for quadripartite talks, although he was very anxious to move forward and get as much settled as possible. Adenauer feels that each delay is making political capital for the USSR and he is greatly disturbed by the propaganda advantage which will accrue [Page 46] from the East German proposal.2 However, Mr. Adenauer seemed relatively confident that progress could be made and indicated that Mr. Schuman had told him that the French Government would get a majority vote in the French Parliament.3 Adenauer was most anxious for a private talk with Schuman, which both the US and UK support.
There was brief discussion of the parliamentary situation in Paris, with Mr. Eden and Mr. Acheson indicating that, according to their Ambassadors in Paris, the Government would probably win the vote of confidence and would stay in office no matter how small its majority.
1. European Defense Force
Mr. Eden said that the British Cabinet had already approved the idea of giving the French a guarantee against German secession, and it had been agreed Thursday night that Mr. Schuman would produce a draft of what he wanted. Mr. Eden indicated that Chancellor Adenauer would accept this so long as the declaration appeared to apply to all governments, and not just to Germany. In fact, Adenauer felt that the declaration might be quite valid against possible communist control of some member government.
Mr. Acheson said then that in the draft report of the deputies on EDC–NATO relationship4 we wished to propose that the phrase “continued existence of integrity of the NATO or the EDC is threatened” be added at the end of paragraph 9(b) as a problem requiring joint consultation. Mr. Eden accepted this proposal. In response to a question, Mr. Acheson confirmed that what we had in mind was a mutual application of this provision.
On the question of a guarantee against secession, it was agreed that a working group would attempt to draw up a draft to have available just in case the French draft did not prove to be acceptable. Sir Pierson said that he thought that the points that should be covered were: (1) Support for the principle of the EDC; (2) our intention of maintaining troops in Europe; and (3) a declaration to uphold the decisions of the court created in the EDC treaty.
On the second point Mr. McCloy pointed out that we had to be very careful about the phraseology since the statement on troops should not cut across the security guarantee. All we desired was to have the troops kept in Germany as a guarantee against secession, [Page 47] without explicitly stating this. Mr. Eden added that he thought a preamble for such a declaration might well set forth our purpose as having been the establishment of an army, which the US and UK support and that the two Governments would view with alarm any development which destroyed this army.
Mr. Acheson said that the French Assembly resolution asked for a guarantee against anybody’s breaking out of EDC, specifically in the form of having US and UK troops kept in Germany. This was all right, but it should not be stated as a direct relationship. He then read the US draft of such a possible declaration,5 which Mr. Eden thought was most satisfactory.
Mr. Byroade pointed out that there were three separate areas in which we might do something in regard to a guarantee. One was through the proposed revision in the Deputies’ report; a second was a possible statement; a third was in further action on the domestic front. He thought that in the latter area it might be possible to do more than could be included in the statement. Mr. Eden inquired as to when we intended making the statement itemized as the second area of action, and Mr. Byroade replied that we had intended issuing it at the time the EDC and the contractual agreement was signed but before ratification. Mr. Eden expressed the view that this was too far away since the financial question might well delay us for some time. Lisbon was a difficult place at which to make the statement, and he therefore proposed doing it in London.
Mr. McCloy felt that there was some disadvantage in getting it out too soon, and Sir Ivone suggested that we might wait to see what was accomplished here in London before making a decision. He thought it would be impossible to get the agreement of the French on industrial controls unless we had this statement, but it was agreed that the French could be told that the statement was coming and perhaps this problem could be obviated.
It was agreed that the working group preparing the draft would make further recommendations to the Ministers as to the best time for issuance.
2. The Saar
Mr. Acheson said that on the Saar question the US favored having Schuman and Adenauer issue a formal statement in London that they agreed to work out together the question of the Saar as soon as possible and that this had been discussed with Acheson and Eden, who had indicated their strong support and willingness to join in the statement at the appropriate time.
As to the substance of the problem, Mr. Acheson felt we faced a difficulty between the French desire for a statement of economic union [Page 48] and a German desire for a guarantee of political freedom within the Saar. Perhaps the best solution was not to get into the substance at this time.
Mr. McCloy said that Adenauer did not insist on a substantive statement now, but before he signed anything he would want firm assurances on political freedom. Sir Ivone pointed out that the French had created difficulties for themselves by bringing the Saar into the Council of Europe and that in fact the French position today was not one of making concessions but only of asking the German Government to commit suicide today rather than five years later. Schuman has promised free elections, but the Saar Constitution prohibits parties favoring union with Germany.
Mr. Acheson said that there were two distinct elements in the problem: One was the right of self-determination; and the other was the kind of political freedom in the Saar. These two may be linked but are not necessarily so. What the French feared was Anschluss. The possible solution would be to secure a guarantee of autonomy for the Saar, which could be coupled with support for the economic union of the Saar with France, and a French guarantee of internal political freedom. Mr. Eden said that he liked this idea very much and Sir Ivone said that it might well be acceptable to the Germans.
3. War Criminals
Mr. Eden opened the discussion by saying that there were two points of difference between the United States and the United Kingdom on the war criminals. The first was on the composition of the tribunal. The proposal favored by the United States was a court composed of one representative each from the United States, United Kingdom and France plus an equal number of Germans. The United Kingdom had greater difficulty with this, since the court could never make any decision unless you assumed one of the Germans voted with the Allies or one of the Allies voted with the Germans. The alternate proposal favored by the British was to add a neutral member. They considered this necessary even though they realized that the tribunal was not really a neutral function.
The second difference was over the authority of the tribunal. Whether it should have the power to make recommendations to governments or the power of decision. The British favored the latter solution.
Mr. McCloy said that the US position on neutral membership had a historical background. During the last war we had failed to get any neutral support on the war criminal problem. For us to turn to neutrals now would possibly be an admission of error in the earlier trials. This we did not think we could do and, as we understood it, the French were also strongly opposed.
[Page 49]In response to a question from Mr. McCloy, Mr. Eden said that, if the Germans accepted the United States position, he would be quite willing to go back to his Cabinet for new instructions. He felt quite sure, however, that the present British position was the least the Germans would accept and for that reason it was the only one that had been put up to the Cabinet. If his analysis of the German position was wrong, he was quite willing to propose a change in his own.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick pointed out that it was difficult to find a neutral acceptable for the job in question and wondered how it would be to offer the Germans one of the smaller Allies such as the Belgiums or Dutch as Chairman of the Tribunal. It was agreed that the United States position would first be proposed to the Germans and failing on this Sir Ivone’s proposal would be offered.
Mr. McCloy said that we were opposed to giving full power to a tribunal. If we did we ran the risk that the entire war criminal program might be washed out by a single vote in which one of the allied members was soft and supported a German clemency proposal. In our constitutional procedures we retained the right to review pardon cases and he felt it would be difficult to accept the British position from a legal standpoint. Mr. Byroade added that the British proposal might create difficulties with our Congress. Mr. McCloy pointed out the third problem at issue, as to whether the court sat in small panels or with its full membership. Sir Ivone said that they felt this could be worked with if the major problems could be solved.
Mr. Eden said that the British lawyers felt there was no difficulty about giving the tribunal power to make final decisions. He agreed that the possibility of having a majority decision empty the jails was of some concern but he was not sure what could be done about this type of problem in any case.
Mr. Acheson asked whether it might be possible to work this point out through a formula by which unanimous decisions of the tribunal were final but other decisions would serve only as recommendations to governments. Mr. Eden immediately accepted this proposal and said he thought the French would like it. Sir Ivone added that it would probably be acceptable to the Germans. It was agreed that this proposal would go to the working group for final drafting that afternoon at which time the proposed United States–United Kingdom answers to the points in dispute would be presented to the French. It was hoped that an agreed paper could be presented to the Ministers for final review in the morning. With reference to the French concern over the war criminals held in France, it was agreed that the French should be assured that the proposal on the tribunal does not apply in any way to the Germans in France and that any further difficulty on this point with the Germans should be worked out by the French and German governments.
[Page 50]4. Security Controls
Sir Ivone noted that Mr. Schuman had agreed Thursday night6 to accept a unilateral statement by Mr. Adenauer on this subject but that in his opinion Adenauer would not make the statement. His position was that Germany had gone into EDC and through it had accepted security limitations. He was now unwilling to give a further guarantee to an EDC country, although he would be quite willing to give an equal assurance to the United States and the United Kingdom if they desired.
Mr. Acheson read the present working group draft on a proposed declaration7 and Sir Ivone said that it might be worth proposing to the Germans but would not be accepted. He noted that the phrase on para-military force created a real difficulty for the Germans. He thought it would be possible to work out any formula that could be expressed entirely through the EDC. Mr. Roberts pointed out that it would not be possible to interpret the para-military force problem in this way and apply it equally to the French through EDC and further noted that the resolution before the French Assembly specifically includes the necessity for reassurance of the subject of police force. He said this would be a really difficult point. The French position was not one of logic but one of emotion.
Mr. Byroade noted that there were two difficult points at issue. One was caused by the reference to police in the French resolution and the other by reference to civil aircraft in the German Bundestag resolution. Mr. Eden said he had a very real problem with his Parliament on the civil aircraft issue.
With reference to Mr. Eden’s point, Mr. Acheson said that, the real security guarantee on the aircraft issue could only be secured through the EDC framework and not through a separate requirement on civil aircraft. The issue was not whether Germany produces civil aircraft but that the productive capacity for civil aircraft could be converted into manufacturing military aircraft. So long as Germany remains in the EDC it would not be allowed to make this conversion into military production. The control that we desired to establish was [Page 51] therefore against secession from EDC and not necessarily against civil aircraft.
Mr. Eden noted, however, that if the Germans were to walk out of the EDC they would be further along with their aviation industry and therefore that much more dangerous.
Sir Ivone and Mr. Roberts noted that the same situation could develop if the Germans were to violate the spirit of the security agreement and manufacture civil aircraft. They further pointed out that the Germans need so few aircraft that authorization of civil production would not produce much of an industry. They also pointed out that Germany had an economic problem which probably made it impossible for them to go into this business and in fact they would have to purchase civil aircraft abroad.
Mr. McCloy felt that Adenauer could simply not afford, from the standpoint of German opinion, to make the guarantee the British wished. Mr. Eden said he realized this problem but that he had a situation with his own Cabinet and his own Parliament that made it impossible for him to not have some reassurance on this point. He wondered whether anything could be accomplished by having a private talk with Adenauer on this subject.
Mr. McCloy and Sir Ivone thought this might be very helpful and that Adenauer might be persuaded to make some kind of informal statement that Germany did not intend because of economic problems to develop the civil aviation industry.
Mr. Roberts confirmed Mr. Byroade’s feelings that at the ministerial level the French might be willing to drop their insistence on a guarantee against propellants. He also noted that Mr. Schuman had indicated the other night that a prohibition on research would not have to be included.
5. EDC–NATO Relationship
Mr. Acheson said there was a point in dispute in Paragraph 9b of the Deputies’ report on the EDC–NATO relationship, (D–D (52) 35 4th Rev.) which he would like to take up. It was immediately agreed that there was no necessity for having the vote in both Councils unanimous but that the second and third sentences were useful. It was also agreed that the proposed US terminology on “continued existence of integrity of the NATO or EDC is threatened” should be added to the third sentence.
Sir Pierson said that the real issue was whether the two Councils as a whole had to call a meeting or whether any one member could call a meeting. The British did not disagree at all with our proposed new language. Mr. Acheson said that what we sought was a compromise [Page 52] whereby all minor issues would require the unanimous vote of one or the other Council but on major threats any one member could call a meeting.
Mr. Eden said that he liked this idea and thought it would be acceptable to the French and Germans. He expressed the hope that the language might be revised to be clearer.
Mr. Acheson said there was a final point at issue in Paragraph 10 with respect to the question of whether or not the treaty text had to be attached to the report. As he understood it, the treaty would not be in final form but the Council at Lisbon would have a report from the Paris Conference defining the provisions of the treaty. The United States felt that the Council could approve the treaty based on the report, leaving the Deputies the task of verifying later that the treaty text conformed to the report. This would make possible immediate council approval without further delay.
Mr. Eden said this was entirely satisfactory provided the Paris report set forth a satisfactory statement of principles. The British would be quite happy to accept the report provided it covered the treaty in specific terms. Mr. Acheson then mentioned the draft resolution prepared by the United States and said that Mr. Spofford would communicate this to the Deputies in Lisbon.
It was agreed that no statement or communiqué would be given to the press but that the press would be orally informed along the following general lines:
Following the informal meeting which Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden were able to have with Mr. Schuman on Thursday night, the British and French Foreign Ministers had a meeting together this morning to discuss further questions with respect to the German contractual settlement and were looking forward to being able to meet again with Mr. Schuman on Sunday. The meeting adjourned at 12:45 p.m.8
- There is no indication on the source text, but Barnes was presumably the officer responsible for preparing these minutes. The information set forth above is derived from the source text. The characterization of this meeting in Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 615, is presumably based upon these minutes. A 400-word summary account of the meeting was sent to the Department of State in telegram Secto 10, Feb. 17, from London. (396.1 LO/2–1752)↩
- This is perhaps a reference to the letter of Feb. 13 from East German Prime Minister Grotewohl to the four powers occupying Germany requesting an early conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany; for the text, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, p. 79. Full documentation on the United States attitude toward East German proposals for German unity is presented in volume vii .↩
- The French Parliament was at this time considering resolutions regarding a European Defense Force and German participation therein. Regarding this parliamentary action, see telegram 4989, Feb. 14, from Paris, p. 613.↩
- Acheson was presumably referring at this point to document D–D (52) 35, 4th Rev., not printed; for the text of the Deputies report as ultimately approved by the Foreign Ministers, see document D–D (52) 35 (Final), Feb. 20, p. 247.↩
- The draft paper read by Secretary Acheson at this point has not been found.↩
- See Acheson’s memorandum of conversation, dated Feb. 15, p. 40.↩
- The proposed draft under reference here cannot be further identified. American, British, and French officials below the Foreign Minister-level apparently held a series of meetings in London during the period of the Foreign Ministers meetings. These appear to be the “official level” meetings proposed by the British in early February and referred to in the editorial note on p. 35. No reports have been found of any of these “official level” meetings or “working groups”, but one of their finished papers, designated “MOG” (“Meetings on Germany?”), is included in the section of supplementary papers to the London meetings; see p. 97; also see footnote 3, p. 55 and footnote 3, p. 58. A later draft of the paper read at this point by Acheson is printed as Appendix A to document MOG/3 Final, Feb. 16, p. 99.↩
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In telegram Secto 8, Feb. 16, 9 p.m., from London, one of a number of telegrams from London intended to provide background information for the guidance of the press, Kirkpatrick informed Leverich as follows regarding an Acheson press briefing in London that presumably followed the morning bipartite meeting:
↩“Secretary gave selected press group off-the-record background EDC, Saar, NATO problems in line with US positions. Authorized them explain without attribution following position arising out of Paris story of US–UK guarantee against secession from EDC: While Secretary unable give new guarantee sought by French Assembly, resolution requesting guarantee appears consistent with action already approved by Congress on MSA and troops for Europe. No further comments on requested guarantee possible this time but subject one which might be considered by Congress when contractual treaty with Germany presented.
“Secretary expressed hope NATO would be able approve general lines EDC treaty on assumption London talks will have cleared away basic disagreements.” (396.1 LO/2–1652)