750G.00/3–2754

No. 178
Prime Minister Scelba to the Secretary of State 1

My Dear Secretary of State: While the Treaty for the European Defense Community is being presented to the Parliament for ratification, I feel that it is my duty to express to you with all frankness the views of my Government on this question, as well as on the question of Trieste, also with reference to the statement which I made on March 22nd to the Foreign Press Association and which was acknowledged by you in your press conference on the following day.

1.
The Italian Government is firmly convinced that E.D.C. has an essential function, as a basic element of the defense of the free world, and that an early ratification of the Treaty by the Parliaments of the participating countries is of supreme importance. However, the Italian Government deems it necessary to present to its Allies certain objective considerations and to point out the risks which will arise in the parliamentary debate and in the country, should such debate take place before the settlement of the problem of the Free Territory of Trieste or, at least, before the implementation of the October 8th decision.
2.

The majority of the Italian public opinion favors E.D.C. but, by the very force of the circumstances, is bound to consider the problem of the ratification in connection with the situation which now exists at the eastern border.

The Italian public opinion fails to be convinced that E.D.C. will become an effective defense against all the most serious dangers of armed aggression directed towards free Europe, while it had bitterly to realize that the Yugoslav rulers, merely by oral threats, have succeeded in inducing the two major Atlantic Powers to withhold the implementation of the decision so categorically announced to the world on October 8th of last year. The Italian public opinion fails to understand how the Allied Powers are unable to induce the [Page 394] Belgrade Government not to oppose the implementation of the above said decision, as it is evident that the present Yugoslav regime has indeed no free choice between East and West and depends so largely on the economic and military aid received from the United States and Great Britain.

3.
In the parliamentary field, the failure to settle the problem of Trieste would force the Government to fight on two fronts for the ratification of E.D.C.: towards the right and towards the left. This means that, for the ratification, the Government should count merely upon the parties of the present coalition, which in the House have a majority of only 15 votes. On the other hand, it is obvious that, in view of the importance of E.D.C. of its fifty-years-commitment and of the constitutional problems involved, all those who, in Italy and abroad, fully appreciate the purport of such a decision should spare no effort in order that the ratification of E.D.C. be approved by the largest possible majority, with the support also of political and parliamentary forces not included in the present governmental coalition.
4.
Furthermore, if it is taken into account that even within the governmental majority there are some prominent personalities who, in clear conscience, have expressed in the past the conviction that the solution of the Trieste problem should precede the ratification of E.D.C., one cannot discard the hypothesis that even the majority provided for in the Parliament by the four governmental parties might be further reduced or even become uncertain when the ratification of E.D.C. is discussed.
5.

The failure of the Allies in implementing the solemn decision of October 8th will continue to offer to the social-communist opposition the best possible propaganda weapon. The extreme left will conceal the real reasons of its fundamental opposition to E.D.C. behind the screen of the Trieste question, by exploiting the high emotional impact of that question on all sections of the Italian public opinion. It will also accuse the Government of weakness in front of the Allies and will accuse the Allies not to take into any account Italy and its national interests.

This would be the best possible gift by the Allies to Italian communism! Indeed the communists, in their falsely patriotic allegations, would not remain isolated. They would, on the contrary, take advantage of the repercussions necessarily arising from those allegations, both among the rightist parties and in the feeling of the entire country, which is disappointed by the lack of a solution of the Trieste problem between 1948 (date of the Tripartite Declaration) and today. This disappointment is aggravated by the situation of the Italians living in Zone B, under Yugoslav temporary occupation. Their condition, already recognized by the Allies in 1948 as [Page 395] unbearable has further worsened since then and has originated a continuous exodus of Italians, forced to escape the persecution of the Yugoslav communist dictatorship.

In such a situation, the arguments of the democratic parties in favor of E.D.C. would have little effect on public opinion. Those parties, in fact, would be weakened by their failure to obtain from the Allies justice for Italy, solidarity for Italian democracy and the fulfillment of formally taken commitments.

6.

The implementation of the decision of October 8th could modify basically the psychological, parliamentary and political situation and could perhaps also mark a decisive turning point in the development of Italian internal politics.

In fact, as soon as this obstacle to the participation in E.D.C. were removed, the majority of the Italian public opinion would align itself with the Government in favor of the ratification.

In the Parliament, the Government could count upon the totality of the votes of the four center parties, upon the support of their most prominent personalities, upon the votes of the monarchist group, and perhaps also upon the votes of the M.S.I., or at least upon the abstention of this party. Even the socialists of Nenni’s party would be caught unmasked and seriously embarrassed, because, if (as it can be foreseen) they maintained their opposition to E.D.C. even after the demand for a just settlement for Trieste had been met, they would be forced openly to admit their subordination to the communists. The embarrassment created by this situation might even compel a considerable number of socialists to mitigate somehow their attitude, thus further accentuating the isolation of the communists. This is just what the communists endeavour to avoid by all means.

Moreover, if the communists, following orders from Moscow, tried to apply and to carry out to the extreme extent the already threatened filibustering in order to prevent the ratification of E.D.C., the Government, strengthened by the support of a large majority in the Parliament and in the country, would feel authorized to adopt measures even of the utmost severity. The Government fully understands, and is in a position to make the public opinion realize that, under the present circumstances, the United States and the United Kingdom cannot implement the Tripartite Declaration of March 20th, 1948 for the whole Free Territory of Trieste. The Italian Government asks for that which is possible, namely that the Allies execute what they are actually able to execute: the commitment taken by the decision of October 8th to transfer “de facto” to Italy the administration of Zone A, thus establishing, moreover, the premises for the attainment of a peaceful and concerted final solution of the whole problem. Furthermore, if [Page 396] in order to facilitate their position towards the Yugoslavs, the Allies deem it useful that Italy formally commit itself not to take recourse to any act of force in order to modify the “de facto” situation thereby created between Italy and Yugoslavia in the Free Territory of Trieste, the Italian Government, as far as it is concerned, is ready to take such a commitment.

These are, Mr. Secretary of State, the conclusions which I have reached after mature consideration. I wanted to express them to you in the most friendly intent of cooperation. As you have certainly gathered from what I have been saying, it is a question of objective difficulties and not of insufficient conviction or determination on the part of the Italian Government. Allow me to emphasize that it would be a serious mistake not to take this into account or to consider Trieste (which stirs the emotion of all the Italian nation) as a marginal problem, or even worse, as an argument artificially created by the Italian statesmen in order to avoid heavier responsibilities. The truth is exactly the opposite. Therefore, it is largely up to the Allies to give to the Italian Government the possibility of being in a position to obtain in the Parliament a quick ratification of E.D.C. as well as to consolidate democracy in Italy.

Trusting that you will give consideration to this letter, having in mind the common aims which have inspired me in writing it, I beg you to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the expression of my most cordial feelings.

Mario Scelba
  1. This letter was delivered by Ambassador Tarchiani to Secretary Dulles on Mar. 30; the source text is a rough translation provided by the Italian Embassy. According to a memorandum of their conversation, Tarchiani emphasized that Trieste was the key to the present political problem in Italy. Dulles replied that he would give the letter careful study and would reply in writing. He also asked Tarchiani to assure Scelba that he fully realized that the Trieste question was not a “marginal problem.” Dulles asked Tarchiani to report that the London talks had resulted in some progress and that the United States and the United Kingdom might shortly be able to inform the Italian Government concerning them and to consult the Italian Government. (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, “March, 1954”)