110.13 MU/9–454: Telegram
No. 257
The Secretary
of State to the Department of
State
top
secret
priority
priority
Manila
, September 4, 1954—7
p.m.
Dulte 2. Eyes only for Under Secretary from Secretary. Reference: Tedul 5.1 See some difficulties in proposal regarding Murphy but concur subject to your consideration of following:
- 1.
- Can proposed “cover” be used without giving rise to serious complications regarding EDC and NATO?
- 2.
- Will British share in this effort? If they make joint representations with us at Rome and Belgrade through a special emissary, would that destroy “cover”? If they fail to do so, would inference be drawn that British are not seriously behind the proposed joint US–UK compromise proposal?
- 3.
- Would Murphy go first to Rome or to Belgrade, and if representations are to be made consecutively, would either accept without knowing other’s position?
- 4.
- Assume Murphy would not go to Belgrade until Riddleberger had returned, as otherwise Riddleberger’s position might be impaired.
- 5.
- With reference to being less sympathetic toward economic and military aid, I agree in principle but believe we should have at least in our own mind idea as to how in fact this would be implemented without hurting us as much as them. I particularly have in mind that with the unsettlement caused by French EDC action and German reaction,2 we are not exactly leading from strength at this juncture.
No doubt these are all matters you have thought about. I agree that we should make some supreme effort to try to settle this matter before October as anniversary of our October 8 proposal could be an unhappy date.
Dulles
- See footnote 2, supra .↩
- Reference is to the French Parliament’s rejection of the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community on Aug. 30. For documentation on this subject, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 871 ff.↩