750G.00/10–1954: Telegram

No. 301
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the United Nations1
secret

211. Department’s reaction unfavorable to Brilej proposal SC be asked take formal action on Trieste agreement.2 While SC approval might give settlement color of UN moral and political authority we believe it would involve great risk undesirable political repercussions without achieving definitive change in legal status of area. Believe we have done all that is necessary or desirable at present by keeping SC fully informed. As stated Deptel 389 to Belgrade3 question timing and nature of further report and any possible subsequent steps in SC can be considered later.

In our view Soviet letter of October 12 to SC,4 whatever its motivation, already places definitely on record approval of settlement by country from whom objections were to be expected. We question advisability further testing quality of that approval by contemplated SC action which might involve other disadvantages referred to above.

Please convey foregoing view to Yugoslav Del, and in your discretion Italian and UK Dels.

FYI Italian Embassy has raised matter with Dept taking same line as Guidotti, fearing move now would be premature switch from current Italian Government line that settlement is provisional. We have, in response Italian Embassy inquiry, given them gist [Page 584] foregoing position.5 Dept now has USUN’s 266 re latest talk with Brilej.6 End FYI.

Dulles
  1. Drafted by Mangano and cleared with Ward P. Allen, Barbour, Thurston, Yingling (L/EUR), and Key (IO). Repeated to Belgrade and London and pouched to Paris, Rome, and Moscow.
  2. Reference is to the proposal Brilej made on Oct. 15 to the U.S. Delegation and described in telegram 262, supra.
  3. In telegram 389, Oct. 16, the Department of State reported that it had no intention of seeking or stimulating Security Council consideration of Trieste. In answer to a query Bebler had made to Wallner on Oct. 13 as to whether the absence of discussion or debate in the Security Council for a period of time following the Council’s notification regarding the settlement would amount to the Council’s acceptance of the settlement, the Department said that this interpretation appeared rather far-reaching and probably unwise as a possible precedent. Rather than put forward such an interpretation in a presentation to the Yugoslav Parliament on Oct. 20, as Bebler had considered doing, the Department suggested that Bebler focus on the attitudes toward the settlement of the permanent members of the Security Council concerned, as distinguished from the Council itself.
  4. See Document 299.
  5. Not further identified.
  6. Not printed.