Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

747C.00/9–1454

No. 380
Position Paper Prepared in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

confidential
SD/A/C.1/448

[Washington,] September 14, 1954.

The Cyprus Problem

The Problem

The Greek Government has proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the Ninth General Assembly the item entitled “Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus”.¹ Submission of this item by Greece, despite the vigorous opposition of the United Kingdom and despite our repeated advice against doing so, confronts the United States with the necessity of taking a position a) on admitting the item for Assembly discussion, and b) on the substance of the case which Greece will attempt to make.

United States Position

1. The United States should abstain in any vote on inclusion of this matter in the agenda.² In this connection it should be made plain that while the United States does not wish to oppose the principle of freedom of discussion in the Assembly, it does not believe that attempted action on this problem by the General Assembly would have constructive or helpful effects.

2. If the problem is included in the agenda, the United States should endeavor to keep the discussion as brief and restrained as possible, enlisting the aid of other friendly delegations to that end. Any statement of United States views should rest on the assertion that the best method for development of increased self-government in Cyprus lies in direct discussions between the British Government and representative Cypriot leaders. If necessary, in connection with particular proposals which may be advanced, the United States Delegation should warn against the danger of overstepping the limits set by Article 2/7 of the Charter.³

3. The United States should privately urge the British and Greeks to adopt as reasonable and restrained an attitude as possible, and should advise them to avoid direct attacks on or criticism of each other.

4. As to the General Assembly’s competence to deal with this matter, the United States should be guided by the following principles:

a) Mere discussion of this problem by the General Assembly does not involve the question of competence;

b) The problem of competence does come into play in connection with particular proposals or resolutions and we believe that at this point there is grave danger of overstepping the limits of Article 2/7 on “domestic jurisdiction”.

5. In line with the position stated in the preceding paragraphs, the United States should endeavor to avoid Assembly action which might make the situation more difficult.

Comment

Pressure has been building up for several years for presentation of the Cyprus issue to the General Assembly by the Greek Government. Since 1950 the publicity and the propaganda toward this end have been intensified. Greek nationalist feeling has been strongly aroused at home, while the Greek Orthodox Church hierarchy in Cyprus—and even the Cypriot Communist Camp—have raised a mounting clamor for “Enosis” (union with Greece). In 1950 the Greek Church held an unofficial “plebiscite” of the Greek Orthodox population in Cyprus, with the reported result that about 95% of group polled registered a desire for union with Greece.

In the face of this mounting campaign in Cyprus and in Greece, the United Kingdom has firmly resisted these pressures and has, from time to time, applied strong measures to discourage sedition or incitement to disorder in Cyprus. Early in August the British announced the intention of working out and applying a new constitution for Cyprus.⁴ Their earlier offer of a more liberal constitution in 1948 was rejected by the Cypriots; announcement of the present British plan has also aroused initial opposition among Cypriot nationalists, the Orthodox Church hierarchy in the island, and among the Communists. While the United Kingdom has undertaken limited programs of economic development and improvement for people of the island, its recent conduct of local political affairs has exposed it particularly to criticism from the anti-colonial nations, and from the Soviet bloc, as well as from the Greek Government.

Last December the Greeks made it clear in the General Assembly that, unless the British would at least discuss with them the possibility of giving the Cypriots a chance to decide their political status, Greece would feel compelled to bring this matter before the General Assembly. At intervals throughout the present year the Greeks have attempted to raise the matter privately with the British but have met with stern rebuffs.

The British position is that Greece is simply asking for a bit of British territory. With its military evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone, the United Kingdom places very great strategic importance on full and unquestioned control of the island of Cyprus which they now intend to develop as a major base for their Middle East position. Finally, they insist that the affairs of Cyprus are strictly within the “domestic jurisdiction” of the United Kingdom, and that therefore it is entirely improper to bring the matter before the United Nations. The British have informed us that they regard the Cyprus issue as the “touchstone” of the coming Assembly session and that, if the Assembly proceeds to deal with this question or attempts to interfere in any way with their administration, the United Kingdom may have to reconsider its policy of “cooperation” with the United Nations in the entire field of non-self-governing territories affairs. They have repeatedly stressed the importance they attach to obtaining full support of their position by the United States.

The United States has on several occasions this year strongly advised the Greek Government not to raise the Cyprus question in the General Assembly. The most recent step of this kind was a personal message from Secretary Dulles to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered on July 28.⁵ The Greek Foreign Minister replied that Greece could not possibly back down on raising this issue.⁶

Greece bases its complaint principally on Article 1, paragraph 2, as well as Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter, using as its major theme the issue of “self-determination”, a principle which the anti-colonial nations have for several years been attempting to define by United Nations pronouncement in a manner which could be used to call into question established territorial settlements and treaty rights in many parts of the world. In view of our practice of not opposing the principle of freedom of discussion in the General Assembly, it would be difficult for us to deny that the Assembly has the power under Article 10 of the Charter to discuss questions such as the Cyprus problem. At the same time we are keenly alive to the harm to Allied unity which could be caused by all but the most restrained discussion of this sensitive issue since the British regard mere discussion as interference in their internal affairs. While the United Kingdom will without question make the “domestic jurisdiction” argument at the very outset (in connection with inclusion in the agenda), the United States should use this argument sparingly and mainly in connection with the dangers of particular draft resolutions.

So far as is presently known, the Greeks would hope to obtain at least a general expression of sympathy by the General Assembly for application of the principle of “self-determination” in the political affairs of Cyprus. Because of a substantial Turkish minority in Cyprus (15–18%), and because of the proximity of Cyprus to the Turkish mainland, Turkey is strongly opposed to Assembly consideration of this problem or interference of a character likely to encourage any change in existing sovereignty. For this reason, anything but the most careful and restrained discussion of the problem in the Assembly is likely to revive and accentuate old Greek-Turkish antagonisms and damage the solidarity achieved to date in the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Any untoward Assembly action on this problem could seriously worsen British-Greek relations and to that extent weaken the fabric of solidarity in the NATO system. At the same time, the Government of Marshal Papagos has staked its prestige at home and abroad on obtaining an airing of its views on Cyprus at this Assembly. A negative United States vote on the procedural matter of inclusion in the agenda might lead to a serious weakening of our influence in Greece, even though their government is fully aware that we do not agree with and cannot support their substantive demands. While an abstention will not please the British, they are now mainly interested in obtaining our help to defeat any harmful or unwise action by the Assembly.

While the maintenance of control over Cyprus in the hands of a stable and friendly power is of strategic importance to the United States as well as to the United Kingdom, our dislike of General Assembly involvement in the problem of Cyprus is based principally on political grounds which the British and the Greeks both understand. We do not attach the same importance as do the British, from the strategic point of view, to the retention of Cyprus under British control, but there are obvious, strong political reasons for our desire not to see British sovereignty over the island disturbed in any way under present conditions.

1. Reference is to the letter from Papagos to Hammarskjöld, Aug. 16. (U.N. Doc. A/2703)

2. The Secretary’s staff meeting notes, 9:15 a.m., Tuesday, Sept. 14, read in part as follows:

   “UN Voting on the Cyprus Question

   “4. Mr. Key noted that the UK no longer had any strong feelings about our vote on the Cyprus question. The Secretary said that his inclination therefore was to abstain from this vote.” (Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75, “Notes 195–264, SM N–264”)

3. It reads: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” For the text of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in San Francisco, June 26, 1945, see TS No. 993, or 59 Stat, (pt. 2) 1031.
4. Reference presumably is to Hopkinson’s statement before the House of Commons, July 28. ( H.C Debs., 5th series, vol. 531, col. 504)
5. Document 375.
6. Reference is to the personal message from Stephanopoulos to Dulles, handed to Cannon, Aug. 3; see Document 378.