. . . . . . .
With regard to Finland, it is in our interest that she maintain her
independence. Although the Finns value highly their independence and are
intensely anti-Soviet, this country’s freedom of action in its foreign
relations is drastically curtailed by its proximity to Soviet power and
by various treaty obligations which Finland has been forced to
undertake. The key to U.S. policy is to avoid any steps which would
threaten the delicate balance of Finnish-Soviet relations and call forth
drastic Soviet measures inimical to Finnish independence.
. . . . . . .
[Attachment]
NSC
Staff Study on the Position of the United
States With Respect to Scandinavia and Finland
Our relations with Finland differ from those with Scandinavia because
of Finland’s special relationship to the Soviet Union. Finland [Page 756] is not a Soviet satellite.
It is a constitutional democracy with unrestricted internal
sovereignty wherein the democratic freedoms are guaranteed by law.
Although there is a strong Communist Party in Finland, it has had no
positions in the Government since 1948, and there does not now
appear to be a likelihood of the Party’s taking over Finland by
internal coup. Nevertheless, Finland’s freedom of action in its
foreign relations is drastically curtailed by its proximity to
Soviet power and by various treaty obligations which Finland was
forced to undertake after the war. Our basic objective is therefore
limited to the maintenance of Finland as an independent and
democratic state; because it would be extremely dangerous to
Finland, it is not in our interest to make any attempt to
incorporate Finland into a Western bloc.
In view of their position and Soviet sensibilities, the Finns must be
very circumspect in their dealings with the West, even though the
overwhelming majority of Finns, as in the past, identify themselves
with the West. By the same token, we must be careful not to take any
action which would disturb Finland’s relations with the USSR. These
delicate relations preclude Finland’s participation in the ERP, the NAT, and make impossible our extending any military
assistance or the development of Finnish defense. This situation has
not, however, prevented our giving moral support through
informational and cultural exchange, or economic support through
carefully allotted credits and the maintenance of Finland’s
traditional pattern of trade predominantly with Western Europe and
the Western Hemisphere, all of which we have been or are seeking to
do.
We have, however, a particular problem arising from Finland’s trade
with the USSR and the Soviet bloc. Though decreasing, this trade is
expected to constitute 20–25% of the Finnish total during the next
few years. Some of the items Finland traditionally supplies to the
Soviets include scarce or strategic materials, for which Finland
receives in return other strategic commodities. While it would
appear that both for political and economic reasons there is no
immediate possibility for Finland to eliminate or substantially
reduce the export of strategic items in its trade with the Soviet
bloc without serious consequences, we should continue to impress the
Finns with our concern over this trade. However, although a careful
case-by-case review should be made in order to minimize any
contribution which U.S. exports to Finland might make to the
Eastward flow of strategic items from Finland, the United States
should continue to export available materials which are necessary to
Finland’s economy.
Unofficial Soviet sources have expressed the thesis that the Baltic
is a closed sea. However, there has been no indication that [Page 757] the Soviet Government
proposes to promulgate this as an official doctrine. A closure would
be unacceptable to the United States, to the riparian states
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany), and to other Western states
which have important interests in the area. Recent Soviet attempts
to extend territorial waters in the Baltic have been protested by
Sweden and Denmark and these two countries continue their study of
means to resist this encroachment. Sweden’s traditional neutrality
policy is not reflected in any tendency on the part of the Swedish
Government or public opinion to accept Soviet encroachments in the
Baltic; on the contrary, there has been a strong Swedish reaction
against Soviet attempts to extend its territorial waters, and it is
regarded as a very healthy exercise that Sweden continue to wrestle
with this problem.
A unilateral declaration by the USSR would not in itself effect the
closure of the Baltic. However, such a declaration coupled with the
use of or display of force aimed at enforcing the declaration could
result in closure of the Baltic. If these steps involve military
action against merchant or public vessels or aircraft of the NAT powers in or over the Baltic, or
armed violation of Danish sovereignty or UK occupational
jurisdiction in Germany, the provision of Article V of the NAT could be invoked.
In our desire to support Finnish independence by the limited means
available, we should avoid any steps which would threaten the
delicate balance of Finnish-Soviet relations and call forth drastic
Soviet measures inimical to Finnish independence. In this
connection, so long as Finnish exports of strategic items to the
Soviets remain limited, we should in so far as supply considerations
permit, and after careful scrutiny on a case-by-case basis, refrain
from restrictive action on any exports whose denial would weaken the
Finnish economy or which might prompt Soviet action endangering
Finland’s independence.
. . . . . . .
