611.82/5–2753: Telegram

No. 478
The Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State 1

secret
priority

1433. Secretary and senior officers his party conferred with Prime Minister for two hours and half yesterday afternoon and had further conversation with president Bayar at dinner given by latter in evening.2 Foreign Minister and other Foreign Office officials present on both occasions. Minister Finance and Minister Defense present at dinner.

In afternoon meeting Prime Minister set forth at some length his views on various points. He expressed view Soviets and satellites have advantage against free nations because uniform program directed by one power. He felt it important, therefore, that we concentrate efforts on greater unification free nations. Re Suez Canal issue, Prime Minister and Turks did not consider question exclusively one between Egypt and United Kingdom. Solution of vital concern to other countries, including Turkey, and question one which concerns NATO strategy in general. Turks convinced United Kingdom acting as guardian of key position in defense of free nations and not merely defending United Kingdom interests.

Prime Minister felt problem could be solved without adversely affecting Egyptian national aspirations if Egyptian Government could understand that presence foreign troops no longer constituted infringement of sovereignty. Turkish Government considered it of vital importance that canal zone defenses be maintained and that zone not be evacuated unless or until suitable alternative arrangements made. Prime Minister believed evacuation should not even be considered until expiration Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and then not until arrangements made for defense of canal area. He believed interested countries should give consideration immediately to defense arrangements to be effected after expiration of treaty.

With respect to Middle East defense, Prime Minister stated Turkish Government has reached conclusion there is no present hope of Arab participation in Middle East Defense Organization. He therefore, felt new defense arrangements must be undertaken. Prime Minister referred to weakness and instability of Arab states and lack of military power both now and for years to come. He considered main reason for seeking their cooperation not, therefore, [Page 928] primarily to utilize existing military power but to prevent growing subversion by Communist propaganda and internal disturbances. Prime Minister emphasized conclusion that Turkey is backbone of Middle East defense by reason of social and political stability, determined attitude vis-à-vis Soviet threat and serious efforts expand already strong forces. (When Secretary later expressed surprise at Turkish disposition go ahead without Arabs, Prime Minister emphasized Turks would welcome Arab collaboration. In absence Arab willingness participate however, Turks felt that if we proceed with defense plans this may become incentive to them to join.)

Referring to tripartite pact,3 Prime Minister noted importance of Yugoslavia’s geographic position in defense southeastern flank NATO. Although terms of tripartite pact limited, Prime Minister felt its conclusion represented large step forward in direction Yugoslav collaboration with West. Turkey and Greece could have gone much further in undertaking more definite commitments with Yugoslavia but did not do so because of certain misgivings on part of United States and other NATO countries and complications of Italo-Yugoslav dispute over Trieste. Prime Minister felt that Yugoslavia now anxious for closer relationship with Western countries and believed our objective should be to bring Yugoslavia into NATO, or, if this proves impossible, to integrate it in some other way into NATO system. Alternatively, consideration should be given to increasing scope and effectiveness of three-power pact. Turks feel if Soviet pressures against Yugoslavia should be relaxed there is danger she might drift into state of neutralism in absence effective steps strengthen ties with West.

With reference to North African problems, Prime Minister expressed view they should be considered from same angle as Suez problem, i.e., as constituting strategic areas vital to defense of free world and not simply as colonial problems. He developed idea that since all NATO countries deeply interested multilateral approach through NATO should be considered.

Re possible four-power conference with Soviet Union,4 Prime Minister expressed skepticism of any concrete results. On contrary, feared such meeting might give rise to unfounded hopes in various countries and disrupt unity Allies.

Prime Minister devoted considerable time to justifying military and economic aid to Turkey to support NATO force goals recommended [Page 929] by SHAPEHAFSE study group5 and urged increase Turkish military program fiscal year 1954 by transfer from Title I to Title II.

Secretary then commented on Prime Minister’s presentation. Re Prime Minister’s reference to Soviet advantage in unity of program and direction vis-à-vis free world, he pointed out such single control also point of weakness, since those subject thereto become themselves incapable of independent resourceful action in case of emergency.

On Suez problem, Secretary expressed agreement with Prime Minister’s view that matter is of international, not purely British and Egyptian, concern. Each of us should strive in own way and without concerted pressure to bring this viewpoint home to Egyptians as he had endeavored while in Egypt. However, we must recognize that if base held by force against hostility Egyptian people it would be of little value to us.

On MEDO, Secretary expressed view that while Arab participation perhaps not now possible, we should not ignore Arabs in plans for Middle East defense. Encouragement should perhaps be given to certain states like Iraq which have better appreciation of situation and which may be prepared take defensive measures against Soviet danger.

Secretary expressed real gratification of United States at conclusion tripartite pact. He stated he could not indicate United States position on further steps to integrate Yugoslavia with NATO, but held open mind on views expressed by Prime Minister. Secretary noted several practical considerations which, although not necessarily insuperable obstacles, must be taken into account, including Italo-Yugoslav relations; attitude Scandinavian States; and public opinion in United States.

Secretary noted with interest Prime Minister’s suggestion that North African as well as Suez questions be opened to negotiation as international and not merely national problems. He thought it important in one way or another to divorce question of security, which concerned us all, from colonial issues. French have been extremely reluctant accept international approach in these problems for fear security considerations would not be divorced from colonial aspects. This is why they also oppose United Nations consideration of Laos question. French might possibly take different view regarding NATO consideration of North African problem in belief NATO would be sympathetic to their position.

[Page 930]

Regarding possible Four-Power meeting with Soviets, Secretary noted strong public opinion support therefor. He assured Prime Minister that we were fully alert to possibility Soviet purpose really to spread such confusion in Europe that European Defense Community and German integration in European Defense Community might be prevented. Secretary could not predict whether there would be a Four-Power meeting, but gave assurance that if there were United States representatives would be very much on their guard.

Mister Stassen reviewed MSA program, emphasizing that it would be carried out in accordance with Secretary’s foreign policy leadership. He made clear fiscal year 1954 program only recently presented Congress and commitments not possible before Congress acts. It may be two months before Congressional action taken and another month needed thereafter to relate world-wide program thereto. He emphasized that meanwhile Turks should not count on any particular amount. In considering this program we would have very much in mind progress made and determination shown by Turkey, as well as views expressed by Turkish Government.

Mister Stassen noted conclusion reached by President Eisenhower that United States defense expenditures and overseas programs must be somewhat reduced to assure sound United States economic and financial position, having in mind need to maintain strength over period of years to meet any existing threat. He commented that it is unlikely Congressional action will make it possible grant as much economic assistance to Turkey as last year. A number of European countries will receive no economic aid whatsoever. He expressed hope Turks could achieve proper export-import balance to avoid building up problems for future.

In concluding conversation Secretary paid tribute to Turkish awareness of fundamental problem confronting free world and staunchness in facing it.

In discussion in evening after dinner given by President Bayar, Secretary elaborated on United States efforts move forward in collective defense measures against threat of Soviet aggression around the world. He stated United States view present Soviet moves merely tactical and do not represent any basic change in Soviet policy. While we must keep open mind, we must not accept Soviet declaration at face value until proved by their actions. We must seek conserve our strength for long period ahead. In reducing our expenditures for own defense effort and foreign aid we are not fooled by Soviet tactics, but are seeking place ourselves in position to maintain defense effort over long period without endangering our economy.

[Page 931]

In response to Secretary’s request, Bayar then expressed his views on over-all defense problem and Middle East defense in particular. President stated Turks share United States views on continuing nature Soviet intentions gain world mastery although Soviet tactics are to compromise when necessary. Turks therefore continuing own defense preparations within limits their potentialities and hope other NATO countries will not relax their efforts.

President reviewed situation Arab States ad policy Arab League, noting extreme nationalism and current knotty problems such as Israel, Egypt and independence of several Arab countries. He expressed doubt Arabs would side with West even if these problems solved. Arabs appear unaware of greater danger from Russia. Under these circumstances President expressed view MEDO could not now be set up, and asserted that in event of war “we should feel free to conduct our strategy as situation dictates”.

Regarding Suez issue President asked how could NATO consent to evacuation of British troops in the absence of a government sympathetic to NATO cause.

Secretary stated he greatly appreciated President’s frank expression of his views. He added that although immediate situation gloomy we still hoped Arabs could gradually be brought into association with us.

McGhee
  1. Transmitted in two sections and repeated for information to Tripoli for Dulles.
  2. Dulles visited Turkey, May 25–27. For memoranda of his conversations with Bayar and Menderes at Ankara, May 26, see vol. ix, Part 1, pp. 137 and 148.
  3. Regarding the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed at Ankara on Feb. 28 by representatives of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, see Document 328.
  4. Regarding Churchill’s proposal to the House of Commons on May 11 for a four-power meeting, see Document 595.
  5. Telegram 1269 from Ankara, Apr. 15, reported the main conclusions of the SHAPEHAFSE study group, which envisaged increases in Turkish forces contingent upon raising FY 1954 assistance by $400 million. (782.5/4–1553)