611.82/6–1853: Telegram

No. 479
The Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State

secret

1509. I have become increasingly concerned at coincidence number of factors which could affect extremely close relations between US and Turkey. Before departing Turkey1 I consider it incumbent upon me to review these factors, since I believe it to be in our national interest to take every possible measure to avoid such a development.

Underlying occasional pin-pricks in US–Turkish relations is fact that responsible leaders of Turkish Government and Turkish public opinion appear to be disturbed over lack of consistency in US foreign policy. They note frequent contradictory statements by civilian and military officials and members of Congress and are increasingly [Page 932] concerned that US may lose or deliberately abandon its position of leadership in anti-Communist world. This concern reflected in some measure in talks President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes with Secretary on May 26.2

At same time, while Turks most appreciate substantial US aid in past, they have been led rightly or wrongly to believe, as numerous Embtels have reported, that NATO commands favor large increases in Turkish military program and onus for failure of this to come about has attached largely to US.

Aside from such general considerations affecting our relations with Turkey, our failure to invite Turkish President or Prime Minister to visit US (which they have clearly indicated to us they wish to do) or to indicate formally that such invitation is in prospect, undoubtedly has had adverse effect. This situation pointed up by announcement that King and Queen Greece have been invited to make state visit to US. Turks have also shown sensitivity over fact that in Secretary’s speech3 only passing reference was made to Turkey in contrast with other Middle East countries, and the Turkish leaders were only ones not specifically mentioned.

Another factor is that Turks have always demonstrated great interest in consultations with US on matters of common concern. Turks have sought our views on all important issues as they arose and usually before Turkish position taken; they have almost invariably followed our lead when it has been given. They feel, however, that we have not been equally forthcoming with them, and that we have not taken great interest in matters vital to them, i.e., the tripartite pact, with adverse results.

At same time prestige of other countries, particularly Britain and Germany, seems to be increasing in Turkey. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were visibly impressed with British leaders they met in London during their visit last fall and for the coronation, and with spectacle of national unity which the coronation represented. Visit of Admiral Mountbatten to Istanbul with major units British Mediterranean Fleet July 27–Aug 3 is being further utilized to build up British prestige. Rapid resumption of Turkish-German commercial relations and natural friendship which exists between Turkey and Germany have increased German prestige here. These developments are of course to be welcomed; however, they would tend greatly to magnify any coincident decline in our own prestige.

[Page 933]

There is, of course, no easy formula for meeting problem outlined above. Some steps become immediately obvious: (a) carefully implement policy of consultation with Turkish Government on all matters of mutual interest on the world as well as the NATO and Middle East levels, (b) pursue NATO procedures in such a manner that Turks are not led to expect special end-item assistance from NATO or more American aid than can be made available to them, (c) beyond this, convey to Turkish Government in near future some definite indication of our desire to invite President, or alternatively Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, to visit US at earliest practicable date (re my letter March 26 to Byroade 4). I also believe it to be psychologically important to hasten announcement of my successor in Turkey since long delay in filling vacancy may be interpreted here as evidence we now attach less importance to this post than to other missions to which appointments have been announced.

Without overemphasizing important foregoing in US–Turkish relations, I believe we should lose no opportunity maintain and strengthen our ties with Turkey in all fields—political, military and economic. At time when so many other countries show tendency to relax common defense efforts, it is particularly important that we manifest in every practicable way our appreciation of continuing Turkish determination move ahead with own defense effort and close collaboration with US and other NATO countries.

McGhee
  1. McGhee left Turkey on June 19.
  2. For a report on this conversation, see telegram 1433, supra.
  3. For text of Secretary Dulles’ “Report on the Near East”, delivered over radio and television on June 1, see Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, pp. 831–835.
  4. Not found in Department of State files.