Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199
No. 487
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian,
and African Affairs (Jernegan)
Subject:
- The Balkan Pact and the Turk-Pakistani Pact
Participants:
- The Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes
- Secretary of State
Also Present:
- Feridun C. Erkin, Ambassador of Turkey
- Etem Menderes, Minister of Defense
- Nuri Birgi, Acting Secretary General of the Foreign Office
- Orhan Eralp, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Avra Warren
- NEA—Mr. Jernegan
Prime Minister Menderes requested the Secretary’s views on the Balkan Pact and the Turk-Pakistani Pact.1 With regard to the Balkan Pact, the Secretary said that we sympathized strongly with the development of this arrangement but we considered the timing of any move to convert it into a military alliance should be very carefully considered. We attached great importance to the strengthening of the defenses of Southern Europe and the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the defense system. At the same time, we had to recognize that Italian emotions were strong in relation to the question of Trieste. There was danger that emotion would cause Italy to do something foolish. It was for this reason that we had been working so hard to bring about a solution of the Trieste question, and the Secretary believed it was now closer to settlement than at any time since the end of the war. Progress, however, had been slow. It had taken us four months to arrive at an understanding with the Yugoslavs and we must anticipate at least a month of discussion with the Italians.
The Prime Minister said he fully understood these considerations. The members of the Balkan Pact had been proceeding cautiously. Their next step would probably not be taken for another month. Nevertheless, he thought it might contribute not only to an increase in defensive strength but also to a settlement of the Trieste [Page 946] question itself if further steps were taken to create a real Balkan alliance. The Italians should realize that this was really to their own advantage.
With respect to the Turk-Pakistani Pact, the Secretary said he considered this one of the most encouraging developments in the past several months or even perhaps in the past few years. It was in line with the thinking he had developed during his visit to the Middle East a year ago, when he had decided that Middle East defense must be based upon indigenous arrangements among the states of the northern tier. He emphasized that any such arrangement could be effective and lasting only if it arose from the genuine convictions of the people of the area. It could not be forced upon them from outside. He was convinced that Turkey and Pakistan were the two nations in that region which had a true appreciation of the Soviet danger, a willingness to act to meet that danger, and the necessary martial spirit. He hoped that in time they would be joined by Iran and Iraq.
Since both the Prime Minister and the Secretary had luncheon engagements the conversation was suspended but it was agreed that they would arrange an appointment to continue it at some time before the Prime Minister’s departure.2
- For documentation on the Balkan Pact, see Documents 306 ff.; for documentation on the Turkish-Pakistani Pact, signed Apr. 2, 1954, see vol. ix, Part 1, pp. 433 ff.↩
- A record of Dulles’ conversation with Menderes on June 4 is infra .↩