745.00/7–3053

The Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Tibbetts ) to the Department of State 1

secret
No. 542

Subject:

  • Central African Federation.

1. The Order in Council Containing the Constitution:

The final steps in the creation of the Federation of Central Africa are rapidly being taken and a new stage in the political development of this area will soon be under way. On July 14 Parliament passed the Enabling Bill under which the Order in Council setting up this constitution was to be promulgated. On July 27 the House of Commons and on July 28 the House of Lords agreed to the Order in Council itself.

The Government expects the Queen to sign the Order in Council on August 1. Shortly thereafter the first Governor General, Lord Llewellin, will be named and he is to leave for Central Africa on August 12. During the interim period—August, 1953 to January, 1954—he will take the necessary steps to set the Constitution in motion. These steps are outlined in the first section of the Order in Council, copies of which [Page 328] are enclosed.2 A considerable number of these provisions have to do with such matters as the transfer of assets to the Federal Government, establishment of a Federal Service etc. During this period he will not be bound by the wishes of the Executive Council but will report to the British Government (presumably the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations). By January, 1954 it is hoped that the permanent provisions of the Constitution will have come in force (by proclamation of the Governor General) and the Federal Elections will be held. The permanent provisions of the Constitution are contained in the Annex to the enclosed Order.

The Annex setting out the Constitution closely follows the Federal Scheme (Cmd. 8754) Embdes 3647 of Feb. 10, 1953;3 on page 55 there is a table showing which sections of the Order refer to the numbered paragraphs of the Scheme.

Of particular interest in the enclosed Order is the item defining “external affairs.” The Commonwealth Relations Office anticipates that at an early date the British Government will present the interested Governments, including the United States, with a note officially informing them of the international position of the Federation. The main interest of the United States is as a participant in the Congo Basin treaties. The Constitution places External Affairs on the Federal Legislative List and defines this item as follows:

“1. External Affairs, that is to say—

  • (“a) such external relations as may from time to time be entrusted to the Federation by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; and
  • “(b) the implementation of treaties, conventions and agreements with, and other obligations towards, countries or organizations outside the Federation affecting the Federation as a whole or any one or more of the Territories, whether entered into—

    • “(i) either before or after the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, by Her Majesty, or by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom on behalf of the Federation or any of the Territories; or
    • “(ii) after the said date by the Federation with the authority of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; or
    • “(iii) before the said date, by any of the Territories with the said authority;

    “but not including relations between United Kingdom and any of the Territories.”

2. The Africans:

The officer who is at present working on Central African problems (a Colonial Office man seconded to the Commonwealth Relations Office) [Page 329] says that there is every indication that the Africans in Northern and Southern Rhodesia will accept the fact of Federation, will run for office under its provisions and will seize the opportunity which it offers for their entrance into political life. Nyasaland is a different story, largely because of Michael Scott 4 and Hastings Banda,5 and no one can predict what the Nyasaland Africans will ultimately do. The officials are fairly well reconciled to Scott’s activities for they consider him a fanatic who, in a sense, knows not what he does, but the results are no less displeasing and difficult.

3. Embassy Comments:

Now that this milestone in the history of Central Africa has been passed, it may be worthwhile to review briefly some of the salient points. Too much of the public discussion on this subject in the UK has been submerged in Party politics and personalities; Labor politicians have exploited Mr. Lyttelton’s alleged insensitivity to the limit while Conservatives have replied with diatribes against Mr. Griffiths’ “weakness.” The fact that Mr. Lyttelton did in the early stages of Parliamentary discussion of this problem handle his case with superb ineptitude and that Mr. Griffiths has conducted himself throughout with at least one eye on the Labor dissidents is not, after all, strictly germane to the question of Federation.

It should not be forgotten that the Colonial Office since early 1951 has been determined to secure Central African Federation. Its reasons were, in brief, (a) the “threat” from South Africa, (b) the impossibility of making the Central African Council work in the face of Southern Rhodesian opposition, and (c) the conviction that the situation in Central Africa could not remain static in the face of steadily mounting pressure from Europeans in the area for increased political rights.

In October, 1951 the then Assistant Secretary in charge of Africa at the Colonial Office told an officer of the Embassy that no matter who won the election the officials hoped that the British Government would make a public statement in favor of Federation. (Embdes 1921, Oct. 5, 1951.)6 The Conservatives did in fact win, but there is a strong probability that if Mr. Griffiths had been returned to the Colonial Office at that time the Labor Government would have pushed on with Federation. Mr. Griffiths seldom went against the advice of his officials.

[Page 330]

He would not, however, have handled his political opponents and the Africans with Mr. Lyttelton’s brusqueness and probably would not have consented to a private meeting with the Governors of the two territories7 and Sir Godfrey Huggins as did Mr. Lyttelton in January, 1952. Colonial Office officials have always felt privately that the Central African Europeans wanted Federation so badly that no real concessions to them were necessary. As it is, they still believe firmly that the concessions made have not wrecked the original plan.

Among non-Governmental people with deep knowledge of Africa the weight of opinion has come down narrowly against Federation. Miss Margery Perham8 after many months of indecision came to the conclusion that the Government’s ruthlessness in pushing Federation through had deeply damaged the United Kingdom’s reputation on that continent. Lord Hemingford, a Conservative peer who served for many years as a missionary, is equally critical for much the same reasons. There is a deep distrust of the Southern Rhodesian Europeans in liberal informed circles in the UK; even a Conservative MP who is strongly pro-Federation remarked privately to an Embassy Officer that the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia he knew “were nothing but bloody fascists.” Expert opinion is not unanimous, however, for Lord Hailey,9 after a prolonged silence, said that he had decided to support Federation. The Churches which were for many months vocally anti-Federation modified their stand to qualified support; the qualification was that the Europeans in the area demonstrate their good will and willingness to accept African advance. Much the same point of view has been taken by the independent serious press, notably The Times. (The independent Observer has remained fiercely opposed.)

The Colonial Office insists, however, that Federation does present opportunities. After all, they point out, it is a tremendous step in that area to permit any African representation in the Central Legislature. Their fear is that there are not enough able Africans to use these opportunities and to exploit them successfully; they admit, however, that in Northern Rhodesia the Africans are learning quickly.

Basically, in the Embassy’s view, the Colonial Office has always been motivated by what it considers the policy best suited in the long run to serve the interests of the United Kingdom. More than any other group in the United Kingdom, Colonial Office officials realize the difficulties which Britain is going to meet in holding and developing the [Page 331] African Colonies. Without these colonies, the British Empire as such will amount to little; furthermore, the loss of one section of Africa would set off a chain reaction in Britain’s other African territorities. To accuse the Colonial Office and the British Government of sacrificing African interests for the advantage of the few Southern Rhodesian Europeans is to underestimate their intelligence and their devotion to the interests of the Empire. These officials are too realistic—humanitarian principles aside—to believe that a handful of Europeans of uncertain skill and motives could successfully maintain for long a position designed completely to repress over four million blacks. There are no supporters of apartheid in either the Colonial or the Commonwealth Relations offices. They realize that a Central Africa in which the Europeans would have to be constantly buttressed by British troops would contribute little either to Britain’s or to Africa’s security.

Undoubtedly the officials would feel more confident of the ultimate success of Federation if all of the Rhodesian Europeans had the high ideals and racial tolerance of members of the Fabian Society or if all of the Rhodesian Africans had the sense of responsibility found among leaders of British Labor Party. But deferring Federation will not help either the Europeans or the Africans in the area to the early achievement of these goals. Admittedly Federation is a gamble and there are many rocks in the road ahead. It is the Embassy’s conviction, however, that the responsible leaders and officials of the British Government would not have been convinced of its necessity if they had not seen in Federation the possibility of creating in Central Africa a stable society which would ultimately strengthen Britain’s position throughout East and Central Africa.

Margaret Joy Tibbetts
  1. This despatch was approved by the Counselor of the Embassy in London, James K. Penfield.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed; it included the text of the Federal Scheme prepared by the London Conference of January 1953 as published on Feb. 5, 1953 and the text of the supplemental report by the Conference on Federation. (745C.00/2–1053)
  4. Rev. Michael Guthrie Scott was a strong critic of South Africa’s racial policies which he had denounced before the United Nations.
  5. Kamazu Banda received his higher education in the United States and Great Britain and practiced medicine in London and Kumasai before returning to Nyasaland in 1958.
  6. Not printed; it contained a summary of the remarks of Andrew B. Cohen, the British Assistant Under-Secretary of State in Charge of African Affairs, concerning the Victoria Falls Conference which discussed the proposed Central African Federation. (745C.00/10–2551)
  7. Sir Gilbert Rennie of Northern Rhodesia and Sir Geoffrey Colby of Nyasaland.
  8. The author of, among other works, Native Administration in Nigeria, Lugard: The Years of Adventure, 1858–1898 and Lugard: The Years of Authority, 1899–1945.
  9. The author of the five-volume Native Administration in British African Territories and the massive An African Survey, which was issued in 1938 and then revised in 1956.