771.00/12–1452: Telegram
The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the Department of State1
240. I flew to Rabat yesterday to call on General Guillaume at his request before his scheduled departure for Paris today. Background and causes his recent action in outlawing Istiqlal and Commie Parties and making arrests was subject of portion conversation.
Guillaume said that French attempt change backward country of Middle Ages into a Twentieth Century nation in matter forty years was responsible for their present difficulties (we have moved too fast). [Page 605] I suggested that developments elsewhere since World War II had accentuated these difficulties by stepping up tempo of Nationalism. He said that when he came here something over a year ago he realized that he was faced with very serious situation that he had feared outbreaks, but that he had hoped patience wld bring about a détente. He had attempted improve relations with Sultan, but Sultan was unresponsive, encouraged Nationalists and wld not cooperate in making reforms. (On several occasions in past I have expressed to Guillaume my feeling that closer relations between Sultanate and Residency General might do much offset Nationalist agitation.) He cited fete of Mouloud which I had attended with him Dec 1 as example demagogery incited by Sultan. On that occasion organized groups Moroccans had shouted Istiqlal slogans, as well as the usual praises for Sultan and his son, Moulay Hassan, much to disgust and discomfort of French. He said Moulay Hassan was working with Nationalists. This recalled to my mind conversation I had had with the General when he first arrived in autumn 1951. He had said then that he hoped to work closely with the young Moroccans and with that thought in mind he expected gain confidence of Moulay Hassan. I asked Guillaume whether he felt that Sultan was now completely in camp of Istiqlal. He did not reply directly, but inference I got was that he still hoped Sultan cld be brought to reason. It is interesting note here his expression of hope toward end of conversation with John Gunther, now in Tangier, wld not ask for an interview with Sultan when he visited Rabat.
With regard to recent interdiction of Istiqlal and Commie Parties, Guillaume said that he had absolute proof of connection between the two. They aided and abetted each other. Riots at Casablanca were an example. His patience was exhausted. He had decided that force was weapon to use. He cited cases of Egypt and Syria where he said force had restored order. It is somewhat characteristic of Guillaume, who has spent 25 years in Morocco, that he shld consider action taken here by a Fr ResGen as comparable to that taken in Egypt by Naguib. I feel that he is at times carried away by his emotions and sense of drama which may give idea that he is insincere. He is not. He is mistaken at times, but I do not believe he is insincere. Continuing, he told me that the Pashas and Caids were in full agreement with him and were prepared support and implement his policy. He said as he had said before that mass of Moroccans was not in sympathy with Istiqlal. He seemed to have some doubts as to reactions in Paris, but he had done his duty as he saw it and he wld continue fol a firm and forceful line action. He allowed that other Moroccans might take the place of those arrested and that they might go underground, but that he was determined put end to extremist agitation in Morocco, using whatever means he had at his command.
[Page 606]General Guillaume will be in Paris for several days this week. I suggest that Secy may wish arrange through FonOff have General call on him discuss Moroccan problem.
- This telegram was repeated to Paris, Casablanca, and Rabat.↩