771.00/8–2153: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State1

secret

695. Embassy telegram 672, August 20.2 Embassy believes that suddenness and pace of recent Moroccan developments ending in deposal (or as French describe it publicly “eloignement”) of Sultan actually did take French Government somewhat by surprise and that [Page 623] situation brings to fore problem French have faced for some time of implementing French policy in North Africa in face of opposition thereto by French colons and certain protectorate officials. Schuman, after his resignation as Foreign Minister, pointed up this problem by stating publicly that important reforms effecting French relations with Morocco or Tunisia impossible without a return to sense of responsibility and obedience on part of subordinate officials in protectorates. Pro-government Figaro on August 18 was even more specific in front-page article re Moroccan problems. This article charged government policies decided upon in Paris were ignored and not carried out by French officials in Morrocco and that maneuvers by French officials in Morocco confronting government with fait accompli were serious threat to Franco-Moroccan amity.

Responsible Foreign Office officials confidentially expressed to Embassy their concurrence with this description of situation. They also pointed out that Glaoui’s campaign to unseat Sultan had been going on for some time, that it was supported by both colons and by certain Residency General officials, who were actually named in the above-mentioned Figaro article, and that latter apparently expected to present government with what in effect would have been fait accompli. These Foreign Office officials said that government was not kept fully informed by Residency General officials and that in absence of General Guillaume, Glaoui’s movement made such headway that at time of crisis it was practically “too late” for government to take necessary action. Thus situation developed to point where French Government could not follow compromise policy nor could it mediate successfully between Sultan and Glaoui. In the end decision had to be taken to adopt course representing lesser of two evils, course which French Government considered would be best designed to prevent outbreak civil strife and to maintain order. French have made point that immense majority of Moroccan people favored Glaoui movement and government decisions at critical moment had to be made in light of Guillaume recommendations and estimate of situation, which must have included appraisal of opposing forces.

We do not believe that French Government itself was guilty of any duplicity in this matter although its officials in Morocco and influential non-official elements both there and in Paris must have been involved. Both France-Soir and Le Monde have spoken of part that Juin may have played in these developments and Le Monde states that in Cabinet meeting certain Ministers have raised Juin’s name in this connection. Except for Aurore, non-Communist press had generally been critical and both Figaro and Le Monde call for accounting and appropriate penalties against officials found responsible for Moroccan developments. There are also unconfirmed reports that several Ministers, notably Faure and Mitterand, were strongly opposed to taking [Page 624] action depose Sultan but that in final analysis all were unwilling to take decision use force to impose solution which was considered to be necessary if Glaoui movement stopped.

There have already been indications that government will undoubtedly face questions on its Moroccan policy at National Assembly if it reconvenes next week. Socialist Party has issued statement denouncing “insolvency” of government policy in Morocco and Le Monde has commented that Moroccan problem really more serious than strikes situation in France due to its effect on French position throughout North Africa. Foreign Office at least is aware of international repercussions in Arab-Asian world, although it, as well as French Government will not take such attitudes as matter of grave concern. While there will be questioning of government policy, it must not be forgotten that in eyes most French Sultan has been obstructive force in Morocco for several years and strength of attack on government for recent developments should not seriously threaten it unless, of course, situation in Morocco got completely out of hand by time National Assembly reconvened.

Dillon
  1. This telegram was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, Frankfort, and Casablanca.
  2. Ante, p. 621.