772.00/3–2652

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert McBride, Office of Western European Affairs

secret

Subject:

  • Tunisian Situation

Participants:

  • Mr. van Laetham, French Embassy
  • Mr. McBride, WE

Mr. van Laetham called at his request this morning to bring us up to date on today’s events in Tunisia. He said that the French Government had decided to carry out measures against Prime Minister Chenik and his Cabinet because of the impossibility of getting the reform program under way by any other means.1 He added that the goal of the French was to put in the reform program and that they did not propose to be stopped by the difficulties of negotiating with Chenik. He stressed that there was no intention of removing the Bey. He said that the Bey was a weak character who was terrorized by the Neo-Destour and was under the influence of his Cabinet which was in turn dominated by the Neo-Destour Party. Since the Tunisian Prime Minister was a prisoner and could not make any move, the French believed the measures which they have taken represented the only solution.

Mr. van Laetham said that there were plenty of ministerial candidates who would be acceptable to both sides and that it was very much hoped the operation would be a success. He said that the French Government had considered very seriously before it took these measures and that there was no thought of going back on them. He said that all parties in France except the Communists supported the arrests, the de Gaullists because it showed that France retained firm control of the situation and the more liberal parties because the obstacle to the reform program had been removed. In conclusion he said that the Resident General has asked the Bey for another interview and that it was conceivable that in fact the recent French action was not unpalatable to the Tunisian ruler.

He said that the French Embassy very much hoped that the Department would understand the reasons which had impelled the French Government to make these moves. He added that he hoped public statements which might be made on the problem would take all sides into account. I told him that the Department had as yet received no official reports and until his call had only the news agency reports to go on. I said that any views we might have could not be [Page 699] formulated until we had received some additional word on the situation.2

  1. See Tunis telegram 127, Mar. 26, supra , for an account of the measures taken by the French.
  2. In a memorandum dated Mar. 26, McBride presented a summary of French actions and an analysis of their effect on the U.S. position to Perkins and Byington. The memorandum suggested that negotiations would now be out of the question because of bitterness toward the French on the part of the Tunisians and other Moslems. The final paragraph of the memorandum read, in part: “In view of the latest developments in Tunisia it is no longer seen what we can do to hold off the Arab-Asian bloc.” (722.00/3–2652)