891.00 TA/2–2152: Telegram

The Ambassador in India ( Bowles ) to the Department of State

top secret
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3003. For President Truman. You were kind enough ask me write or cable directly to you if I ran into difficulty so here goes.

Latest information from Washington indicates 1953 India aid program unlikely be increased despite the fact that I believed top officials all agencies concerned during my Washington trip agreed with our analysis of extreme urgency and danger present situation here. Discussed with MSA, ODM, CIA, Pentagon, Bureau Budget and all levels State Department as follows:

Survival democratic Indian Government over next 5 years definitely unlikely unless bold steps are taken now to sharply increase food production [Page 1636] and strengthen economy. Recent Communist successes South India indicate how rapidly political and economic situation here could disintegrate. Failure of Indian democracy would in all probability result in disaster substantially greater than Communist victory in China since Southeast Asia and Middle East would become impossible to hold once India is lost. Communist sweep in Asia would gravely undermine our position Europe and convince hundreds of millions our friends all over world they are betting on wrong horse. Soviet Union is well aware of dynamic possibilities of this situation. If we succeed in stabilizing lines of Europe through NATO their efforts in Asia, already great, will surely be stepped up considerably with India as principal target.

Proposed economic aid program is minimum effort which can enable us begin meet this situation. American aid by itself will not guarantee that Communism will be stopped in India and democratic government survive but combined with determined effort on part Indian Government it can greatly increase chances of success. Looking at situation positively, India through wise handling, adequate aid and good luck can be built into solid dynamic democratic bastion with results far-reaching not only in Asia but world-wide. We face choice of acting now with reasonable chance of success or finding ourselves faced 2 or 3 years from today with potentially catastrophic situation which is rapidly getting out of hand.

This analysis represents combined judgment all top people our Embassy … British, French, other experienced observers. However Department’s telegram 16311 indicates dangers and opportunities of this situation are being largely disregarded in setting 1953 budgets. Basic reason seems be not disagreement over what is needed but alleged difficulty getting Congressional action. Even if this appraisal Congressional situation correct it would be serious blunder to follow timid course.

Greatest single strength your administration has been fact you have taken each critical situation as it arose, figured out what was right thing to do and then gone ahead and done it regardless of opposition. In this tradition a positive proposal to Congress and the people to stop the disintegration of India would seem the right course even though Congressional agreement seems impossible.

However I seriously question supposition that Congress would reject this program. Have received letters and reports from Hill and many people of standing in public life indicating keen understanding urgency and promise of support. Believe United States people though convinced great need rearmament understand Communism cannot be successfully defeated by arms alone and that positive efforts to make democracy effective in under-developed areas is essential. The applause [Page 1637] that greeted your reference to India Point IV aid an indication of this. Also response to my own speeches in the States.

India perfect test Point IV concept. Second largest country in world in a key strategic position in Asia. Present government devoted democratic way, sound development program ready to go, great natural resources, willing people. Short on food, capital, technical know-how. Half measure can result disintegration present democratic government, despair of people, open invitation to waiting Communists take over.

Your proposed program aimed to reach 120 million village people India in 4 years time and make India wholly self-supporting in food and probably cotton within that period. Our entire emphasis on making dollars produce several times their value in production here. Total 4-year cost for 360 million Indian people no more than amount spent on economic aid Greece and annual total economic and military aid committed to Formosa, an island of 8 million which symbolizes Communist victory in China, a nation of 400,000,000.

If Republican party refuses support this program for India then the basic political motivation and dishonesty of their criticism past Chinese policy will be dramatically evident to all concerned. I believe this program is not only minimum on an economic basis but also sound politically and truly vital if we not to share responsibility India going way of China.

Believe me I wld not send this urgent cable to you unless I earnestly believed that situation required it. If you were here I am absolutely confident you would see it as we see it. What I have proposed is establishment of some basic new strategic values in our foreign policy. Many sincere individuals while accepting our reasoning reject logical action that must follow because they believe total amount of economic aid cannot be changed and no one wants to see his own budget cut. Only you can put this situation in balance and thus enable us to cope successfully with the constantly growing Communist tide in India and in Asia. Regards.

Bowles
  1. See footnotes 2 and 4, pp. 1634 and 1635, respectively.