791.56/11–552
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)1
Subject:
- Possible release of tanks to India.
Participants:
- His Excellency Mohammed Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan
- Assistant Secretary Henry A. Byroade, NEA
- Mr. Donald D. Kennedy, SOA
Mohammed Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan, called by appointment to say that his Government had information that the US might release 300 tanks to India; that this would adversely affect the balance between the two countries to Pakistan’s disadvantage; that Pakistan believed India had aggressive designs against Pakistan which such US action would assist; and that arming of India by the US would be considered as an unfriendly act.
I first raised the question of intent, pointing out that I was very disturbed by his reference to “designs” on the part of India. I said I had no information on which to base such a conclusion. In fact, the US had an agreement under Section 408(e) with India as it also had with Pakistan, in which that Government assured us that it would not engage in any aggression. As to the specific question of the 300 tanks, I said that in my view this did not constitute a magnitude that would really disturb any balance in the subcontinent. If India had asked for a large number of jet planes, for example, then I would have been concerned as to the implications. Actually, Pakistan had procured from us on a cash, reimbursable basis more in actual quantity than had India. We of course had no program for “arming” India. The Ambassador suggested that we obtain the full details of both India’s and Pakistan’s military establishment and decide in light of all the facts how much each should obtain. I pointed out that we had no arms program for either country, and I did not see how we could undertake such an examination or, in fact, how we could arrive at any judgment as the result of such an examination. Under the 408(e) agreements we proceeded on the requests of the other government. I would find it very difficult to deny the assistance for the amounts of equipment involved because of my own belief that the presence of the communist menace really should impel each country to maintain its ability to defend itself and to improve that ability where possible. The real solution was the establishment of friendly and cordial relations between India and Pakistan.
[Page 1679]The Ambassador asked what he could report to his Government. I said I hoped that he would reflect our position as it has been discussed. In addition he might wish to point out that the number of tanks going to India as indicated by the Ambassador was over-stated and say that it was my belief that the tanks which India might get would not be of a magnitude to really adversely upset whatever balance between the two countries might exist. It was also a fact that Pakistan had obtained more of the item in question than had India, which would seem to indicate that US action had not disturbed any existing balance.
The Ambassador asked if he could come in next week after his return to Washington to discuss this question further. I replied that I would be glad to see him, but that I doubted I could tell him much more than I already had. I would, however, study the question further. The Ambassador thanked me for this consideration.
- This memorandum was drafted by Kennedy of SOA.↩