Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/1–552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India¹

secret

Washington, January 5, 1952—6:36 p.m.

1335. Re Kashmir. Dept’s further reaction Bajpai’s suggestion Deptel 1295 Dec 31, contained Embtels 2224 Dec 26,² 2273 Dec 29, 2299 Jan 2 follows:

1. Dept suspects Bajpai’s proposals may be motivated by GOI desire delay SC res further and allow contd consolidation Ind position Kashmir. GOI may well have in mind a further spinning out process in which additional delays will be sought. If this true Bajpai’s suggestions will provide mechanism for further delay and avoid possible SC action at this stage.

2. Nevertheless we do not wish pass over any possible opportunity afforded by GOI to reach settlement and in view strong Emb recommendations contained Embtel 2299 Jan 2 Dept suggests fol informal approach to Bajpai by Amb with implication clear that approach being made under instrs:

a) During long history negots on this issue Dept has been frankly disappointed in past that after being led believe more conciliatory attitude was developing on part of Ind, attitude had stiffened. FYI Bajpai strongly intimated to Dept officials in Oct 1949 that Ind wld agree to partition with a plebiscite in the Vale³ which Ind subsequently rejected when presented by Dixon.⁴ End FYI.

b) US wld be prepared support Bajpai’s suggestion re continuation Graham’s mediatory activities until Mar first if we have clear assurance re change of GOI attitude to indicate more responsiveness to Graham proposals. Minimum indication along this line wld be agreement to pt 10 of Graham proposals in Dec 18 report (appt of PlebAd).⁵ We believe such undertaking wld be conducive to quicker settlement re nr troops to remain at end demilitarization period.

c) If GOI reaction negative we see likely end utility Graham in a mediatory role. In this event there wld seem to be no alternative but for SC to take further action which might well have unfortunate effect placing India in unfavorable light.

3. While Dept does not intend discuss foregoing approach with UK until after your reply recd, Dept leaves your discretion whether you discuss matter with Nye before or after your talk with Bajpai.

4. FYI only, if GOI reaction negative we have in mind, provided UK agrees, urging Graham make final appeals in person to Nehru and Nazimuddin for acceptance his proposals prior tabling SC res. In this connection we wld hope Graham visit wld last approx 10 days in which he wld visit both capitals. Dept believes best time Graham approach Nehru wld be about Feb 1 after Ind elections and before convening Ind Parliament. In event Graham unsuccessful Dept wld join UK in sponsoring SC res which wld presumably recommend parties accept Graham proposals.

5. In using phrase “if India were not asked to compromise too large nr of troops” (Embtel 2274 [2273]) Dept assumes Bajpai meant withdraw. In this connection Graham of opinion Ind figures much too large and he continues believe highly desirable have minimum mil forces on both sides. Presence large nr of troops wld in Dept’s view lessen chances fair plebiscite. Re Bajpai statement India “might allow PlebAd to have final decision on placing these troops” GOI has already agreed per sec 4a Jan 5 1949 Res:⁶ “PlebAd will determine in consultation with GOI the final disposal of Ind and State Armed Forces…”⁷

6. Dept believes inadvisable future conversations with Ind officials to make any ref to “pressure from Pak.” Only pressure officially acknowledged by US is obligation work for just solution this dispute accordance with UN principles.

7. Re para 2 Embtel 2224 you may in your discretion ask Bajpai what he meant specifically by “extending Graham’s terms of ref as far as possible.” Re para 3 Dept believes question Graham’s mtg both Prime Ministers might well be left Graham’s decision.

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated for information to Paris (for the delegation at the General Assembly), Karachi, and London.
2. Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, p. 1925.
3. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 1686 ff.
4. Sir Owen Dixon of Australia had been appointed UN Representative for India and Pakistan by the Security Council on Apr. 12, 1950, in accordance with the Council’s resolution of Mar. 14, 1950 (UN doc. S/1461). Dixon reported to the Security Council on Sept. 15, 1950 that no agreement had been reached between India and Pakistan for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or on other preparations for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite and requested the formal termination of his position. (UN doc. S/1791)
5. UN doc. S/2448.
6. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolution of Jan. 5, 1949, which set down the conditions and basic principles of the proposed plebiscite (UN doc. S/1196).
7. Ellipsis appears in the source text.