320/1–2552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1

secret

Gadel 840. Re Kashmir. Gadel 766, London’s 1550 to Paris Jan 25.2

1.
Dept has received fol info from Brit Emb today.
a)
Conversations in London by CRO and Zafrulla and Mohammad Ali resulted in Zafrulla’s reluctant agreement preferred course of action outlined in Gadel 719 Jan 15.
b)
UK Del Paris has been instructed concert with USGADel re early SC meeting carry out preferred course of action.
c)

UKDel instructed approach Bajpai as fol:

“Indians will know that resumption of negots without a council res endorsing Graham’s views created difficulties for Paks. We have however persuaded the latter to give this course a chance and have told them we expect a sincere effort on their part to make the negots a success. We have done this in good faith because of what Bajpai has told us and the Americans about the readiness of the Indian Govt to resume negots under the aegis of Graham and because we are anxious not to jeopardise any chances of agreement. Pak Govt are facing risks in agreeing to this course. We are not asking for any undertakings; but we expect Indian Govt to respond with a sincere effort which in nature of things must involve significant concessions on their side if agreement is to be possible. We shall feel bound to regard their attitude in the forthcoming discussions as a crucial test of the sincerity of their expressed desire for agreement. In particular it will be difficult for us to avoid the impression that they are not sincere if they do not prove ready to modify their present proposals for the composition of Azad Kashmir forces on the Pak side of cease fire line which seems to us unreasonable as also the overwhelming disparity in the nr of armed forces in India’s favour.”

2.
Dept notices London’s instr UKDel Paris leaves to its discretion introduction res if GOP presses. This wld indicate uncertainty in London’s mind as to extent of Zafrulla agreement re preferred course of action. USGADel may wish assess for itself this conjecture and if correct indicate concern any res at this time may be vetoed by USSR. Draft res such as transmitted to UKDel if vetoed wld certainly terminate Dr. Graham’s activities, and raise acute question re next step.
3.
USGADel, if it has not already done so, shld approach Pak Del indicating preferred course of action and reasons, therefor, i.e., possibility veto; US appreciates reluctance with which GOP may agree to preferred course of action and of firm belief this must be Graham’s final effort; US will indicate in SC general endorsement Graham proposals.
4.
Indian Del shld be approached along lines indicated likely UKDel approach except emphasis final sentence shld be on firm necessity Indians agree appoint PlebAd per Graham’s proposal. FYI this designed support Bowles-Bajpai conversations and increase pressure on Indians.
5.
In concert other SC Dels shld be approached as suggested Gadel 766 para 3.
6.
Dept believes it necessary be certain Fr and Grk Dels consulted concerning Council procedure in view possible necessity President SC ruling it opinion of SC that no res continuing Dr. Graham role necessary since it shld be anticipated Sov Rep will state belief res is necessary. Dept presumes challenge of Sov Del to ruling of President re consensus of Council wld be supported by members of the Council. Any doubts this course action from Fr Grk Dels shld be reported immediately.
7.
Dept suggests fol as basic elements US statement in SC:
a)
US notes report as clear indication progress, though slow, being achieved in increasingly favorable atmosphere for settlement.
b)
US endorses concept of Graham approach i.e., 12 point program and believes program likeliest, most logical approach to ultimate determination fate Kashmiris through plebiscite.
c)
Basic issues remaining unsolved are agreement PlebAd appointment prior to end of demilitarization period, and nr of troops remaining on each side cease fire line at end of demilitarization period. Clearly these points shld not remain obstacles settling Kashmir question. Neither India or Pakistan can afford allow history indicate these points stood in way mtg their obligations under UN Charter i.e., peaceful settlement of their dispute.
d)
Graham shld make final effort over period approximately 2 months to get parties agree remaining unsettled point for demilitarization program. This clearly within his auth under res Mar 30, 19513 and Nov 10, 1951.4
e)
US wishes Dr. Graham success; urges parties cooperate fullest extent with him.
8.
Date next SC mtg left to discretion USGADel and UKGADel.
Acheson
  1. This was repeated to London, Karachi, and New Delhi.
  2. Telegram Gadel 766 and London’s 1550 to Paris are repeats of London’s telegram 3230 to the Department, supra.
  3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, p. 1758.
  4. Ibid., p. 1904.