689.90D/2–1753: Telegram
The Ambassador in Afghanistan ( Ward ) to the Department of State 1
501. (1) I have impression Foreign Minister’s rather categoric rejection Pakistan proposal for negotiation Pakistan-Afghan differences Pushtoonistan issue (Embtel 494 Feb 14, repeated Karachi as 99)2 may have reflected hardening GOA attitude as result Pakistan bombing Afridi tribesmen last December. Fact that Foreign Minister, who certainly one of more moderate GOA leaders, insisted adamantly on formula for bilateral discussion virtually certain unacceptable today GOP augurs ill for early settlement what Foreign Minister himself termed “disastrous” situation both governments. Despite Foreign Minister’s expression gratitude for US efforts bring about solution, I see little advantage injecting ourselves this quarrel pending tangible indication GOA genuinely interested in settlement.
(2) During conversation week ago with Aziz, Deputy Foreign Minister, discussion included Pushtoonistan and I inquired whether more favorable atmosphere for discussion and settlement could not be created by lessening radio press campaign. This touched off Aziz (who [Page 1392] had been most rational in previous discussions Pushtoon issue) in fiery outburst damning British and their Pakistan successors for dismemberment of Afghans and treatment of orphaned Pushtoons, and pledging unceasing Afghan support Pushtoon self-determination. These two outbursts by normally rational Pushtoon proponents cause me believe Pakistan bombing of Pushtoons has either (1) affected “brother” Afghans more than has been openly evident or (2) GOA in trouble with Pushtoons for not having taken action beyond presentation protest to GOP. If latter assumption correct, actions Foreign Minister and Aziz, which somewhat out of character, may have been staged to (a) re-emphasize importance in Afghan eyes of Pushtoon issue, (b) convey to us that we should withhold taking overtly active role for time being, or (c) serve as forewarning of adverse GOA reaction to Pakistan accession to MEDO. Which of these or other possible motivations may have been uppermost is not clearly evident now.
(3) It may well be GOA presently in process some form governmental change which may be reflected in foreign policy shifts. Arrival yesterday of Shah Wali,3 who old and ailing and hence unlikely lightly undertake arduous mid-winter trip from London, suggests council of royal family in prospect. As earlier reported (Embtel 484, February 11, repeated Karachi as 96),4 elder statesman Hashim Khan, and Ambassador to US Naim, also expected Kabul next month, after stay Karachi as guests Governor General. At this stage, difficult to predict direction foreign policy changes attendant upon possible top-level governmental reorganization. Obviously much will depend upon future position Daud,5 who perhaps most zealous and capable Pushtoonistan advocates, and whether Shah Mahmud succeeds in his recently-reported efforts to be reconciled with Abdul Madjid and bring latter back into government.
(4) In reassessing our policies regarding Afghan, consideration necessarily must be given to effects possible accession to MEDO of Pakistan might have. From Foreign Minister’s conversation with me February 14 (Embtel 500, February 16, repeated Karachi as 11)6 which tends confirm what Deputy Foreign Minister told Embassy officer several days before, seems clear GOA seriously concerned this regard. Following upon initial attitude real or feigned indifference to press reports GOP would be invited join MEDO, GOA now apparently realizing this development could entail crystallization of Durand Line, and resultant exposed position Afghan between MEDO and USSR. In reporting almost certain adverse Afghan reaction to Pakistan membership [Page 1393] in MEDO, and influence thereof on US–Afghan relations, I do not imply that overall political and military policy, which Department in best position judge, would not be best served by inclusion Pakistan into MEDO none-the-less.
- This telegram was repeated for information to Karachi, London, Moscow, and New Delhi.↩
- Supra .↩
- Shah Wali Khan, Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom.↩
- See footnote 2, supra .↩
- Mohammad Daud Khan, Minister of National Defense.↩
- In telegram 500 from Kabul, Ambassador Ward reported the Foreign Minister’s concern that Pakistan would be invited to join the Middle East Defense Organization. (689.90D/2–1653)↩