689.90D/2–1953
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Jernegan )1
Subject:
- (1) Afghan–Pakistan Relations; (2) the Relationship of Afghanistan and Pakistan to a Middle East Defense Organization.
Participants:
- HRH Sardar Mohammad Naim, Ambassador of Afghanistan
- Mohammad Hashim Khan Maiwandwal, Counselor of Afghan Embassy
- NEA—Mr. Jernegan
- SOA—Mr. Metcalf
The Ambassador called at the Department’s request primarily to be informed of our continuing interest in the improvement of Afghanistan–Pakistan relations, and also of Ambassador Ward’s submission to the Afghan Government of Sir Zafrulla’s proposed formula under which the two governments might reach agreement on the establishment of full diplomatic relations.
I asked the Ambassador first what truth there was in reports to the effect that he was going to Kabul in the near future. He said that he had asked his Government to let him return in late March or early April but that he had not yet received a reply. He added that he told his Government that his increasing deafness, which doctors here said could not be remedied either by treatment or by artificial hearing aids, limited his usefulness, and that therefore he would like to be relieved. He also remarked vaguely that things needed “clearing up” in Afganistan. (He did not amplify this remark, but it suggests that he may be one of the several members of the Royal Family abroad on diplomatic assignments who seem to be converging in the near future in Kabul for what might be an important meeting of the governing clan.) When asked, Ambassador Naim said that he and his uncle, Hashim Khan, former Prime Minister of Afghanistan now in the United States, would stop over in Karachi as guests of the Governor General if they get assurances from Karachi that they will be able to talk to [Page 1394] ranking members of the Government about Afghan–Pakistan difficulties.
Prince Naim then said that he had just received a report from his Foreign Minister to the effect that Ambassador Ward had passed on to the Afghan Foreign Office a statement that Sir Zafrulla Khan gave to Mr. Byroade which the Pakistanis thought might be acceptable as a basis for the naming of an Afghan Ambassador to Karachi. (Sir Zafrulla’s formula reads as follows: “Pakistan is agreeable that it would be discussing with Afghanistan through diplomatic channels welfare of tribal people of two countries on both sides of Durand Line.”) The Ambassador declared that the statement had no relation to the problem, that the welfare of the tribal peoples was a concern of both the Afghan Government and the Pakistan Government, but that the issue at hand is the wish of some seven million Pathan tribesmen freely to express themselves in connection with their political future. Ambassador Naim thereupon launched upon the well-known Afghan line on Pushtoonistan, emphasizing that it was not in the thoughts of any of the members of the Afghan Government to acquire more territory, but that it was their concern in the interests of the security of the area that something be done about the lot of these seven million people.
After his discourse I assured the Ambassador that the Department is fully aware of the differing views on this problem held by Pakistan and Afghanistan, that the Department is interested in seeing those differences reconciled, that we would have to accept the judgment of the Foreign Minister that Sir Zafrulla’s proposed formula for establishing full diplomatic relations could not satisfy Kabul, and that if we should develop any constructive thoughts or suggestions to improve the relations between these two countries, we would certainly pursue them. Meanwhile it is the Department’s belief that it can do nothing more at this time and that indeed an intercession at this time might make matters worse.
Ambassador Naim observed at this point that he did not think that this is necessarily true. He said that given the distance between the positions of his country and Pakistan, a third and impartial intermediary is almost essential to a reconciliation of their differences.
I then told the Ambassador that there was another matter that I would like to speak to him about. As a result of certain newspaper stories in this country on MEDO, and subsequent stories in the Pakistan and Indian and presumably the Afghan press, certain speculation had developed in South Asia, and more recently in Afghanistan. I said that I would like to outline to the Ambassador, for his information and for that of his Government, the facts of the matter concerning MEDO. I then described the concept of MEDO as it is presently envisaged, stressing these two points: (1) that the organization is a planning one, not involving any formal alliance, command structure, [Page 1395] or commitments in either direction; (2) that MEDO is not a going concern, that its actual establishment depends laregly upon the existence of a favorable political climate in the area, the timing of which I could not predict; (3) that no invitations had been sent to any of the governments in the area; and (4) that once the organization is established it might wish to invite other nations in the general area to participate, including, for example, Pakistan and Afghanistan if they were interested.
The Ambassador said that what concerns his Government is the prospect of the participation of Pakistan in any kind of a Middle East defense organization prior to the solution of the Pushtoonistan issue. He opined that India would feel the same way with respect to the Kashmir dispute. He submitted as a second source of concern to his Government, in the event of Pakistan’s participation, the isolation of Afghanistan with its long common border with the Soviet Union.
In concluding the conversation, Ambassador Naim said that he appreciated the problem of getting all the Middle East states lined up to cooperate in a defense organization, and expressed the opinion that the basic obstacle involved is a century-old suspicion among those countries of the motives of the great Powers. Middle East peoples have only recently emerged from a colonial period, he observed. But, he declared, the United States does not bear the onus of this suspicion. It enjoys a unique position in the area; consequently it could only be through clear-cut policy and action by the United States (as distinct from a US–UK operation, he implied) that the countries in the Middle East would whole-heartedly cooperate in a defense organization. He said that he was confident that Middle East countries recognized it to be in their self-interest to participate in a defense organization; they had only their own suspicions to overcome.2