Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

661.89/10–252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan ¹

secret

Washington , October 11, 1952—2:20 p.m.

141. Your comments have been considered most carefully and sympathetically (Embtel 176 Oct 2). In addition considerations reflected Deptel 112 Sept 29 fol factors have been considered in formulating statement advice and support to GOA:

1) It wld be virtually impossible obtain funds from present appropriated moneys for increased econ assistance along lines urtel 147 Sept 23;

2) Dept unable say in advance what size Afghan 1954 TCA program will be. Unlikely that exec branch submission to Cong will exceed presently projected figure $11/2 million;

3) As you know GOA plans within few weeks submit loan application to Exim Bank for $20 million to carry forward program internal development now near completion under $21 million loan of 1949. Dept cannot make prior commitment Exim Bank but will lend its own sympathetic support as it has in past to GOA application.

Therefore you shld make oral statement to FonMin closely along lines fol text which gives our moral support to Afghan but does not preclude further action which may become desirable in light developments and your future recommendations:

1) tell FonMin US applauds GOA rejection Sov protest which is in Afghan tradition of firmly resisting fon interference in Afghan internal affairs;

2) express hope that Afghan will continue econ development in north as before, not only for intrinsic econ and polit advantage but also to avoid appearance capitulation to USSR—appearance of capitulation inevitably wld lead to further Sov attempts at interference in Afghan internal affairs;

3) reaffirm contd US interest in Afghan econ development and cite work done by private interests and TCA as well as benefits from 1949 Exim Bank loan and Dept’s sympathy proposed application new loan;

4) reiterate US Govt earnestly hopes GOA in its own interest and interest regional stability will make effort settle outstanding disputes with GOP—such effort cld begin with sending Amb to Karachi and reducing anti-Pak propaganda.²

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated for information to Karachi, London, New Delhi, Paris, and Moscow; drafted in SOA; and cleared in draft with OFD, ED, TCA, and the Export-Import Bank. The message was approved by both Byroade and Bruce.
2. The Mission delayed conveying the message contained in this telegram to the Afghan Government until after Ambassador Angus Ward presented his credentials to King Mohammed Zahir Shah on Nov. 8. In telegram 266 to Washington, Nov. 13, Ward stated that he had made the statement specified in telegram 141 to the Foreign Minister on Nov. 12, and that Ali Mohammed Khan had replied that economic development of Trans-Hindu Kush would continue as vigorously as physical and financial circumstances permitted, but that early renewal of petroleum exploration was not contemplated. However, in the same telegram Ambassador Ward reported on a conversation held with the Prime Minister on the morning of Nov. 13. “He stated petroleum explorations suspended ‘for these days only’ and will be resumed shortly because urgent need country bolster its earning power.” (689.00/11–1352) For full text of telegram 266, see p. 1381.