790D.5 MSP/7–2754

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Byroade ) to the Secretary of State

secret

Subject:

  • Your Appointment with the Afghan Ambassador 2:30 p.m., July 27.

The Afghan Ambassador called on me today to say good-bye before leaving for Kabul in pursuance of instructions to return for consultation. In some recent conversations he has explored our attitude toward a possible Afghan request for military assistance. His Government’s apparent position now is that it would be willing to consider U.S. military assistance on a bilateral basis, without reference to a regional organization, with the avowed purpose of bolstering its internal strength and of improving its capacity to resist aggression from whatever direction it should come. The Ambassador asked me today if there were any messages he could carry with him to Kabul. He may put the same question to you.

I replied that the U.S. does not have an answer to the question of military assistance to Afghanistan. It was my own belief that the Middle East is a vulnerable area, is threatened by increasing Soviet interest, and the conclusion of a U.S.–Afghan military aid program might provoke a very strong Soviet reaction. The consequence might be serious for Afghanistan, and the interests of neither of our countries [Page 1480] would be served thereby. I said that I had confidence in the possibility of the Turkish—Pakistan agreement as a basis for a wider and stronger regional defense organization in the not too distant future. It seemed to me that it would best serve Afghanistan’s interest to receive military assistance at some future date within an established regional organization which would command the respect of the USSR. Conversely, it probably would not be wise for Afghanistan to associate itself now with the Turkish–Pakistan accord, or to consider aid on a bilateral basis. This was particularly true now, since we have only limited appropriated funds to devote to Middle East military programs and could not embark on a large program for Afghanistan. Finally I told the Ambassador that I hoped that Afghanistan and Pakistan would soon solve their Pushtoonistan issue.