711.56346E/3–1952

Memorandum of Conversation, by William Witman II of the Office of South Asian Affairs

top secret

Subject:

  • Ceylon Proposal for US Military Installations in Ceylon

Participants:

  • Ronald H. Belcher, First Secretary, British Embassy
  • SOAWilliam Witman II

References:

  • Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Belcher December 21, 1951.1 Despatch No. 604 from Colombo January 11, 1952.2

Mr. Belcher called at his request to convey to us his Government’s answer to the informal inquiry made to him on December 21, 1951 regarding the possible interest of the Government of Ceylon in defense arrangements with the US.

Citing a letter dated March 14, 1952 from London, Mr. Belcher stated that the general conclusion of the British Chiefs of Staff was that the Ceylon approach should not be taken too seriously. It was feared that possible steps in our direction might have rather unfortunate effects.

The British Chiefs of Staff, according to Mr. Belcher, have already sent to their representatives here views regarding the strategic importance of Ceylon, to be communicated to our Chiefs of Staff for discussion.

From the political point of view, the British considered that as long as the present Government remained in power, there was no danger of its ceasing to align itself with the West. This was based upon the UK–Ceylon Agreement of November 1947 regarding defense, and also upon discussions in January 1952 with the Ceylon Prime Minister who said that the UK could count on continued use in peace and war of the facilities and establishments in Ceylon now occupied. On the assumption that the US were allied with the UK, these facilities would be available to us. (On checking his files, Mr. Belcher was unable to ascertain whether the reference to US use of these facilities was quoted [Page 1515] from the Prime Minister’s statement, or whether it was the comment of the British Chiefs of Staff.) The situation would be entirely different if the present Government of Ceylon should fall. For this very reason, it would be unwise to go ahead with US–Ceylon discussions, for this was precisely the sort of thing which would be likely to upset the opposition.

I replied to Mr. Belcher that we had not taken the informal suggestions of Sir Oliver too seriously, but could not ignore them. I said that I felt that the views of our military establishment, which I had communicated to him on December 21, 1951, had clearly indicated that while we might be interested at some future date, we had no intention at the present time of pressing forward in the matter. In the meantime there had been other developments, such as rubber shipments to China, that made it even more advisable to postpone any possible discussions.

  1. See Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, p. 2081.
  2. Despatch 604, not printed, described a discussion of the bases question between Rupert Metcalf, British Deputy High Commissioner to Ceylon, and Bernard Gufler (711.56346E/1–1152).