Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 256
Memorandum of Discussion at the 211th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 18, 1954 ¹

top secret
eyes only

Washington, August 18, 1954

Present at the 211th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Tuttle for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Bolte for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Adm. Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Gen. Pate for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East (NSC 5429 and NSC 5429/1;² Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia”, dated July 19, 1954;³ NSC Action No. 1204; Progress Report, dated July 12 [1], 1954, by the OCB on NSC 171/1;⁴ Progress Report, dated July 16, 1954, by the OCB on NSC 146/2;⁵ Progress Report, dated July 29, 1954, by the OCB on NSC 5409;⁶ Progress Report, dated August 6, 1954, by the OCB on NSC 5405;⁷ Memo for Planning Board from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 13, 1954)⁸

After Mr. Cutler had reminded the Council of its previous action with respect to this paper, he invited their attention to paragraph 8 of Section III, regarding action in the event of local subversion in Southeast Asia, on which paragraph the Council had not acted at its previous meeting.

The President interrupted Mr. Cutler’s briefing to point out that if an instance of subversion which was strictly local in inspiration should occur in Southeast Asia, the United States would not be able to intervene; but that if such subversion were the result of Chinese Communist motivation, the President would be quite right in seeking Congressional authority for the United States to intervene.

Mr. Cutler resumed his briefing by indicating a proposed CIA revision of this paragraph, copies of which⁹ were given to the members of the Council.

Secretary Dulles then stated that he had a number of language changes in the existing paragraph, all of which were designed to reflect more accurately the meaning and substance of the present paragraph. One of the objectives of this language, said Secretary Dulles, was to avoid a fixed or automatic commitment to seek authority to intervene in Southeast Asia.

After further discussion of Secretary Dulles’ changes, the Vice President suggested that it was unwise in the existing text to limit the possible use of U.S. military forces only to action “locally or against Communist China”. The language should be changed, thought the Vice President, to read action against “the source of the aggression”. The Vice President explained his proposal by stating that it was quite possible that the Soviet Union itself directly, rather than through Communist China, might inspire local subversion or rebellion. The Vice President pointed out that there had been considerable argument that Ho Chi Minh was the agent of the USSR rather than the creature of Communist China. Accordingly, the Vietminh might stir up subversion and rebellion in Southeast Asia at the direct behest of Soviet Russia. The broadened language would take account of this contingency.

The President commented that of course if the Soviet Union were the motivating source of the subversion, it would mean general war. Mr. Cutler commented that it was the view of the Planning Board that if such subversion occurred elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Communist China was likely to be at the bottom of it, and the present language was therefore designed to hit Communist China in such a contingency. He did suggest, however, the addition of a phrase to read “if it [Communist China] is determined to be supporting such subversion or rebellion”.

The Vice President replied that the term “locally” obviously referred to the country in which the insurrection or subversion occurred. Supposing this country were Indonesia and the Vietminh was the aggressor. Would the United States then be obliged to attack Communist China? Mr. Cutler pointed out that our military people had been anxious to avoid peripheral wars and to launch an attack on China if that country proved to be the real aggressor in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, he would like to hear from the military advisers to the Council on this subject. After further discussion, the Council reached agreement on an appropriate revision of paragraph 8.¹⁰

Mr. Cutler then reminded the Council that in its previous consideration of the present paper it had not dealt with Section IV, which presented alternative U.S. policies vis-à-vis Communist China. Accordingly, the next order of business was for the Council to discuss these alternatives and, if possible, to make a choice among them. Mr. Cutler also pointed out the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by ODM, that Communist China was the heart of the problem for U.S. policy in Asia, and that this section should therefore come first in the paper. The majority of the Planning Board, however, had not agreed with this proposal, and did not believe that any significance should be attached to the incidence of the several sections of the paper.

The Vice President immediately inquired of Mr. Cutler whether the Planning Board really did not believe that Communist China was the key problem for American policy in Asia. Mr. Cutler assured the Vice President that there was no real disagreement between him and the Planning Board on the top importance of Communist China.

Mr. Cutler then proposed to summarize and characterize the four alternative policies on Communist China set forth in Section IV. These four alternatives had been painted in broad strokes. The Planning Board intended, after securing Council guidance on the general problem of Communist China, to proceed to rewrite the ten country and area policies for Asia.

Mr. Cutler then characterized the four alternatives. The first alternative could be described, he said, as a “soft” policy, representing the objective of peaceful coexistence. Alternative B was essentially existing U.S. policy with respect to Communist China, with the addition of one new thought contained in paragraph 13–a–(2), which directed that the United States should “retaliate promptly and appropriately for any Communist Chinese violation of accepted international behavior, other than armed aggression, directly affecting U.S. security interests.” Alternative C, said Mr. Cutler, presented a tougher policy with respect to Communist China.

Secretary Dulles interrupted Mr. Cutler to inquire whether the statement in Alternative B, paragraph 13–a–(1), was actually a part of our present policy. This paragraph read: “Make clear to Communist China our determination to attack Communist China only if it commits armed aggression.” Mr. Cutler replied that he believed that this was so, and the President added that he believed it was part of our present policy at least by implication, adding that both the President himself and the Secretary of State had said as much. Secretary Dulles replied that he had doubts as to the appropriateness of the word “only” in this paragraph, and the President added that he believed that the thought in the paragraph could be expressed more positively.

Mr. Cutler then resumed his briefing by a further characterization of Alternative C. It was a good deal like Alternative B, except that it called for the United States to prevent by force any further expansion of Communist control in Asia. The last alternative, D, was the toughest policy of all.

Mr. Cutler then said he wished to read excerpts from the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the present paper. Their comments in general, he said, could be divided into three parts. The first were comments generally critical of the paper because it lacked a statement of U.S. objectives and broad courses of action with respect to the Asian area as a whole. Mr. Cutler agreed that there was some substance to this criticism by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but pointed out that if the Council were able to decide on the broad problems raised by the present paper, and could likewise make up its mind with regard to the general U.S. position vis-à-vis Europe and Latin America, the Planning Board would proceed to take a fresh look at the basic national security policy of the United States.

The President said that he saw no particular reason why the present paper must include a lengthy statement of objectives, as the Joint Chiefs seemed to desire. He personally had no objection to the approach to the problem taken in the present paper.

Returning to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Cutler pointed out that three of the Chiefs (Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) had recommended adoption of Alternative C subject to certain amendments. Finally, said Mr. Cutler, he wanted to bring to the Council’s attention the minority view of the Chief of Staff of the Army.¹¹ He proceeded to read General Ridgway’s objection and comment regarding the present paper. Mr. Cutler pointed out his own view that General Ridgway’s comment actually indicated greater dissatisfaction with the basic national security policy (NSC 162/2)¹² than with the present paper on U.S. policy in the Far East. This was indicated by the last sentence of General Ridgway’s comment, which read: “Prompt strengthening of our military capabilities in order that American diplomacy may have that essential military support without which it cannot hope to succeed.” Mr. Cutler then asked the Council to express its views regarding the four alternatives presented in the Planning Board’s draft.

Dr. Flemming expressed the opinion that in view of the action just taken on paragraph 8 of Section III, the Council should examine Alternative C as the logical starting point in the discussion.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether the purpose of the forthcoming discussion of alternatives would be confined simply to an exchange of viewpoints, or was designed actually to achieve a decision among the alternatives offered. Speaking for himself, he said, he did not believe that consideration of the problem of Communist China had reached a point which would warrant decision now. The problem of Communist China he described as very intricate, and its relations with other states changing from day to day. The shifting relations, for example, between Communist China and Soviet Russia were so delicate as to make them extremely hard to appreciate. Nevertheless, all these considerations militated against adoption of any of the four alternatives by the Council at the present time. In addition, there was the problem of our allies. It was obvious that there would be no shred of allied support for Alternative D. We must take into account the fact that the mood of the rest of the free world toward Communist China has materially changed in recent months. United States policy must take this fact into consideration, whether we liked it or not. As a specific illustration, Secretary Dulles cited the pressures which Prime Minister Churchill was bound to feel when the Attlee mission¹³ returned from Communist China and Parliament reconvened. In view of all these considerations, Secretary Dulles said that it was his own conclusion that he must give the problem of Communist China a great deal more thought than he had had time to do up to the present, and most particularly the consequences for U.S. policy of the changing views of our allies with respect to Communist China.

Mr. Cutler commented that in effect Secretary Dulles’ conclusion amounted to a recommendation that Alternative B should be chosen, since this alternative represented existing U.S. policy toward Communist China, which Secretary Dulles did not wish to see changed at the present time. Secretary Dulles asked whether, in fact, Alternative B actually reflected existing policy, and Mr. Cutler replied that the Planning Board intended Alternative B to summarize current policy. In any case, said Secretary Dulles, he did not think we should move away at this time from our existing policy. He agreed, however, that there was much value in the comments of General Ridgway, although he could not bring himself to agree with the last sentence of the comments.

Mr. Cutler then explained why the Planning Board had included Alternative A, representing a “soft” policy toward Communist China. The Planning Board, he said, did not endorse such a soft policy or, indeed, any of the other alternatives set forth in the paper. Alternative A had been included to provide the Council with a rounded view of all the possible alternatives, ranging from the softest to the hardest policy, in order to facilitate full Council discussion.

Dr. Flemming inquired whether the Council had not, by virtue of its decision on paragraph 8 of Section III, already moved from the milder policy set forth in Alternative B (paragraph 13–a) in the direction of the stronger policy set forth in Alternative C (paragraph 14–a). Secretary Dulles replied that this was not necessarily the case, since paragraph 8 of Section III related to U.S. action with respect to the specific situation in Southeast Asia. Indeed, he said, if paragraph 14–a–(1), which called for the use of force to prevent any further expansion of Communist control in Asia, had been in force a year ago, the United States would have been obliged to go to war to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking control of Tibet.

Mr. Cutler then referred again to the majority view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicating his own belief that the revised wording suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Alternative C actually constituted an improvement over the language of the Planning Board draft.

Dr. Flemming agreed with Mr. Cutler’s opinion, and suggested the desirability of basing the discussion on the JCS language. If adopted, their revised Alternative C would provide the Government with a better basis for planning, both military planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and mobilization planning by the ODM.

Admiral Radford said that he did not believe that the question of a planning basis was of prime importance. One thing at least that all the Chiefs agreed upon was the undesirability of getting into war on a piecemeal basis. The heart of the problem confronting U.S. policy in Asia was how to handle Communist China. A solution of that problem by all odds provided the best planning basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President interrupted Admiral Radford to inquire whether the Admiral did not, after all, believe that what we really must do was to build up our position on a basis of military readiness. It was extremely hard to lay down in advance precisely what course of military action we would follow, but at least we know that we must be ready with a respectable level of military preparedness and thereafter decide what we ought to do if the contingency confronted us. Was not this, inquired the President, sufficient to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an adequate basis for military planning?

Admiral Radford did not reply specifically to the President’s question, but pointed out that owing to the fact that he had just returned from leave, he had not had an opportunity to digest fully the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the present paper. Off-hand, however, he said he was inclined to agree with the majority view (Navy, Air Force and Marines). On the other hand, he did not really understand General Ridgway’s position, and had had no opportunity to discuss the matter with General Ridgway. Nevertheless, he was very skeptical of any policy based on trying to split Communist China and the Soviet Union. We had been trying to do precisely this ever since 1950, and with very scant success. He thought that the tie-up was something religious in nature, and he doubted the possibility of breaking it. Accordingly, if China continued to be Communist and continued to increase its power in mainland Asia, Japan would soon have no other course than to accomodate itself to Communism. In short, there would be no way to prevent all Asia from going Communist if Communist China’s power continued to expand. With regard to our allies, it was, said Admiral Radford, obviously important to have them with us, but it might be necessary, in defense of vital security interests of the United States, to act without our allies.

As for the soft policy in Alternative A, continued Admiral Radford, this appeared to him as merely an invitation to Communize all Asia. As for Alternatives B, C and D, so far as he could see they really didn’t differ a great deal from each other, since if the United States undertook to carry out the policies in Alternative B or C, the situation envisaged in Alternative D would almost certainly come to pass, whether we liked it or not. After all, Communist China had the initiative and would bring this situation into being. In short, if the Council adopted Alternative B or C, the United States would nevertheless be confronted with clear-cut cases which would call for the active intervention of the United States in Asia if we actually adhered to our policies. In illustration of his argument, Admiral Radford cited the fact that the Vietminh were not living up to their commitments under the armistice agreement. It was almost certain that within the next six months the Vietminh leaders would promote a situation in Vietnam which would call for action by the United States against them if we adopt the policies set forth in Alternatives B, C or D.

What will help the Chiefs of Staff most, said Admiral Radford in conclusion, will be to know clearly whether it is the national aim of the United States to have a friendly non-Communist China, or whether it is the aim of the United States to accommodate to a Communist China over a long period of time. The important thing for the National Security Council to realize is that unless it should adopt the soft policy in Alternative A, the rest of the paper was a “guessing exercise”.

Mr. Cutler replied by pointing out to Admiral Radford that while language was difficult, the Planning Board had thought that there were very marked differences between Alternative B and Alternative D.

The President stated that he was in complete agreement with everything that Admiral Radford had said. There was no argument in his mind at all. In his view, it was hopeless to imagine that we could break China away from the Soviets and from Communism short of some great cataclysm. In any event, we should not count on such a split, although history did seem to indicate that when two dictatorships become too large and powerful, jealousies between them spring up. Then, and only then, is there a chance to split them apart.

Secretary Dulles said that he was inclined to believe that over a period of perhaps 25 years China and Russia would split apart because of the pressure of basic historical forces and because the religious fervor of Communism would have died down. The Chinese were very proud of their own history, and Chinese did not like Russians. In the end, therefore, they would split apart: the problem for us was whether we could play this thing for 25 years. Could we afford to wait that long for a split between these two enemies?

Governor Stassen answered Secretary Dulles’ question by pointing out his own fear that the Chinese Communists were going to attempt to capture certain of the offshore islands near Formosa in a very short period of time—perhaps even before the November elections in the United States. This should be kept in mind, for while it might be true that dictatorships collapse after a certain period of years, such a collapse was by no means automatic, and would not occur unless the dictatorship were confronted by some great force. The basic fallacy in Alternative A, continued Governor Stassen, was the idea that you could split Communist China from Soviet Russia by wooing the Chinese. Actually, what we really should do is, when the Communist Chinese make their next aggressive move, to “take on” Communist China and make every effort to keep the USSR out of the ensuing war.

The President commented that he completely disagreed with the views expressed by General Ridgway with regard to Communist China. The idea, explained the President, that the destruction of the military power of Communist China was not in accordance with the long-range interests of the United States “scared the hell out of him” in view of the firm alliance between China and Russia. Secretary Wilson attempted to explain General Ridgway’s position by pointing out that General Ridgway feared that if Communist China’s military power were completely destroyed, the result would be a power vacuum into which Soviet Russia would surely move.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out the particular interest of the Vice President in the Asian area, and asked him to express his views. Initially the Vice President expressed his agreement with Secretary Dulles’ view that any decision to change existing U.S. policy toward Communist China should be postponed for the time being. The Secretary of State and other experts in this field ought to cogitate on this problem for a long time and then bring the subject back to the Council for more discussion. Personally, however, and without any claims to being an expert, the Vice President said that he was at least convinced that China was the key to Asia. It was the great dynamic force in Asia and for that reason we could well afford to take a month to make up our minds finally on how to handle Communist China. The Vice President added that he felt that the policy set forth in Alternative A was wholly academic. This soft policy represented the official British position toward Communist China, but it was also the position shared by a number of non-Communist Americans, as was indicated by a recent speech by John Cowles. What, precisely, was involved in this position? What did it mean? It involved how much we were willing to trade with Communist China; whether or not we would recognize Communist China; whether and when Communist China should be admitted to the UN. Why, asked the Vice President, do the British think the way they do on this subject? Answering his own question, the Vice President believed that part of the explanation was a defensive reaction on the part of the British. They had recognized Communist China early in the game, and they now hated to admit their mistake. It was also significant that when one talked to Britishers out in the field in Asia, many of the most able of them, such as Templer ¹⁴ and MacDonald, would freely admit that there wasn’t a chance in the world that Mao would become a Tito.

Ultimately, said the Vice President, we would have to face the final decision whether to adopt a hard or a soft policy toward Communist China. Personally, he did not believe that any soft policy would work over the period of the next 25 or 50 years. On the contrary, he believed such a soft policy would result in complete Chinese Communist domination of Asia. All that, however, was a problem for the experts to decide. Let the current policy stand as it is until Secretary Dulles and other experts in the field can come up to the Council with a considered judgment, perhaps in a month or so.

Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with the Vice President’s view that there was no necessity to choose between these alternatives at this time. What preoccupied him, continued Secretary Dulles, was to avoid getting the United States into a war which the whole world would believe we were wrong to be in. This did not mean, of course, that we should run away from anything or everything that might involve us in war with Communist China. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles reiterated that he did not wish to see the United States become involved in a major war where world public opinion would be wholly against the United States, because that, he said, was the kind of war you lose. World public opinion was a tremendous force which must be reckoned with.

The President reinforced Secretary Dulles’ point by adding his own view that the United States could not afford to become involved in such a war even if the rest of the world would declare simply for neutrality.

The Vice President said that it seemed to him that there was an invariable tendency, when we discussed China or Russia, to assume that there were only two alternative courses of action open to us. In reality, the choice was not confined to war or coexistence. There was a third course.

The President asked if he could interrupt to inquire what the Vice President meant by the term “coexistence”. The Vice President replied that a great many people meant by this term the policy which was reflected in Alternative A of the present paper. It meant putting your arms around the enemy and clasping them to your breast. Certainly the course we are thinking about is not the course that, rejecting war, we must appease Communist China. There was an area of action in between war and appeasement which we should explore, on the basis that in the long run Soviet Russia and Communist China can and must be split apart. If we were to follow Alternative A, Communist Chinese power would sweep over Asia. Coexistence in that sense we certainly reject. This, however, did not mean that we must go to war with Communist China. In fact, a tough coexistence policy may be in the long run the best method of driving a wedge between China and Soviet Russia.

Secretary Wilson commented that as he saw it, the Vice President was attempting to make a distinction between cohabitation and coexistence. Amidst laughter, the President said he thought Secretary Wilson had something there, and added that he was going to stop using the word coexistence because there was no real definition of its meaning. Secretary Wilson added that despite the terrific growth in the strength of Communist China, he had not given up hope that a free civilization could be created and maintained on the offshore island chain of Asia.

Governor Stassen said that he had one more point to make with respect to the discussion of world public opinion and the attitude of our allies. Whether or not the United States kept its allies would depend in large degree on whether these allies judged that the United States was proving successful in carrying out its policies, whether we were actually winning the struggle in Asia. In this connection, Governor Stassen warned of the extreme danger of any relaxation by the United States of its defense posture because the Communists elected to pursue a soft tactic.

Mr. Cutler then inquired whether the Council would act to request the Secretary of State to bring back his views on policy toward Communist China in a month’s time, accepting meanwhile as U.S. policy Alternative C of the present paper as amended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President endorsed this suggestion, and expressed the opinion that when the Secretary of State had studied the matter further we should very likely end up with essentially the views of Alternative C.

Mr. Cutler said that before the Council ended its meeting he had one or two questions to raise with respect to Formosa. In the first place, should the military defense of Formosa by the United States be extended to include other offshore islands than the Pescadores? The President turned to Admiral Radford and asked his opinion on Mr. Cutler’s question.

Admiral Radford replied that it was his personal feeling that the United States simply could not afford to lose any more ground in the Far East, and that we should accordingly hold these islands. There are about six such islands presently held by Chinese Nationalist forces. Admiral Radford said he would hold all of these, including the island of Quemoy, despite the fact that this latter island was only five miles from the Chinese mainland. Mr. Cutler then suggested that the Council request the Department of Defense to provide a report on U.S. policy with respect to these islands. The Council concurred in this suggestion. The President commented that he had imagined that these islands were vital outposts for the defense of Formosa, and that we should go as far as possible to defend them without inflaming world opinion against us.

Secretary Dulles said he hated to introduce difficulties, but had any member of the Council given thought to the problem of Congressional authority in this matter? Admiral Radford expressed the thought that Congress had already acquiesced in our intention of defending these offshore islands, but Secretary Dulles insisted that the defense of all these islands would involve a material change in the existing orders to the Seventh Fleet. He added that President Truman had never taken Congress into his confidence with respect to the precise area involved in the defense of Formosa. If this area were to be enlarged, the risk of war would naturally be increased, and Congress should be aware of the situation.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the problem raised by Secretary Dulles should be included in the forthcoming report on the subject from the Defense Department. Admiral Radford explained the reasons why he believed that it was essential that we continue to assist in the defense of these offshore islands, including Quemoy. In the first place, most of these islands contained radar and other installations which greatly facilitate the defensive task of the Seventh Fleet. Secondly, and more general, the United States could not afford, psychologically and otherwise, to see more territory pass under the control of Communist China.

[Here follows discussion concerning a proposal for the creation of an International Voluntary Air Group for Southeast Asia.]

The National Security Council: ¹⁵

a. Continued the discussion of the subject on the basis of the statement of policy in NSC 5429/1, the comments thereon of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 13), and the reference reports by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Adopted paragraph 8 of Section III of NSC 5429/1, revised to read as follows:

“8. Action in the Event of Local Subversion. If requested by a legitimate local government which requires assistance to defeat local Communist subversion or rebellion not constituting armed attack, the U.S. should view such a situation so gravely that, in addition to giving all possible covert and overt support within Executive Branch authority, the President should at once consider requesting Congressional authority to take appropriate action, which might if necessary and feasible include the use of U.S. military forces either locally or against the external source of such subversion or rebellion (including Communist China if determined to be the source).”

c. Agreed to accept Alternative C of Section IV of NSC 5429/1, subject to the following changes, as a basis for further consideration in the light of the review referred to in e below:

(1) Revise subparagraph a, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to read as follows:

“a. (1) React with force, if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.

“(2) React with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China.”

(2) Revise subparagraph b, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to read as follows:

“b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including the progressive development of the military strength of Japan to the point where she can provide for her own national defense and, in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East.”

(3) Revise subparagraph e, as recommended by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, to read as follows:

“e. Create internal division in the Chinese Communist regime and impair Sino-Soviet relations by all feasible overt and covert means.”

d. Agreed that Section IV of NSC 5429/1 should be transposed as Section I, and subsequent sections renumbered accordingly.

e. Agreed that the statement of policy on Communist China should be considered as a basis for further consideration in the light of a review by the Secretary of State and report to the Council within approximately a month.

f. Agreed that the Department of Defense should submit for Council consideration on September 9, 1954, recommendations as to U.S. policy in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands held by Chinese Nationalist forces.

g. Adopted the recommendation of the Operations Coordinating Board, contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of July 19, 1954, that the plan for an International Volunteer Air Group be held for possible future use not only in Southeast Asia but in any part of the world where required.

Note: NSC 5429/1, as finally adopted, approved by the President, who directs its use as a general guide in the implementation of pertinent policies toward the Far East by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. NSC 5429/1, as adopted and approved, subsequently circulated as NSC 5429/2.¹⁶ The action in e above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State. The action in f above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense. The action in g above subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Gleason on Aug. 19.
2. For NSC 5429, see Document 248. NSC 5429/1, Aug. 12, consisted of NSC 5429 as amended by the National Security Council in NSC Action No. 1204 on that date; no amendments were made in Section IV, which was not considered at that meeting. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, Aug. 12; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)
3. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5405 Series)
4. Scheduled for publication in volume xii, Part 2.
5. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 146 Series)
6. For text, see vol. xi, Part 2, p. 1136.
7. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5405 Series)
8. This transmitted to the Council a memorandum of Aug. 11 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, commenting on NSC 5429; for the JCS memorandum, see vol. xii, Part 1, p. 719.
9. Not attached to the source text.
10. This was the action taken by the Council at the conclusion of the discussion.
11. General Ridgway’s comments were incorporated in the JCS memorandum cited in footnote 8 above. He disapproved of all four alternatives with regard to China in NSC 5429, stating, “it seems axiomatic to me that one principal objective … [of U.S. foreign policy] should be to split Communist China from the Soviet Bloc.”
12. NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy,” Oct. 30, 1953; for text, see vol. ii, Part 1, p. 577.
13. A British Labor Party Delegation headed by Clement Attlee was then in the People’s Republic of China.
14. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, British High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya.
15. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1206. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)
16. For text of NSC 5429/2, Aug. 20, see vol. xii, Part 1, p. 769.