357 AD/10—2752
The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, October 27, 1952.
Dear Dean: I called General Bradley this morning at
David’s1 request with
reference to your telephone conversation with Mike
Pearson.2 I emphasized to Brad the dynamite
contained in Mike’s suggestion should word of it
get around. I emphasized that you and all of us here are fully aware of
the unacceptable military dangers involved in
Mike’s proposal and said that you were looking for
“ammunition” to be used in your reply to him. I said that Alex Johnson would be glad to work with
anyone he designated on a memorandum giving reasons why we could not go
along with Mike’s proposal. He agreed and I am
enclosing the resulting memorandum which has been cleared with Bob Lovett and General Bradley. I hope it will
meet your needs in talking to Mike.3
Your Korean speech was really magnificent. My heartiest congratulations
and best of luck in the trying days ahead.
Very sincerely,
[Page 565]
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State (Johnson)4
secret
To seek a cease-fire after the proposed UN resolution on Korea has
been transmitted to the Communists and is being considered by them
would be fraught with the utmost danger for the military position of
the UNC and actually jeopardize
whatever possibilities there may be of obtaining an acceptable
armistice. Aside from the serious fallacy that the Communists could
be expected to reach a reasonable agreement on the POW issue in the absence of military
compulsion when they have not done so under military compulsions,
there are a number of other specific objections.
- 1.
- Under the assumption that this suggestion envisages the
putting into effect of a simple cease-fire without any of the
safeguards envisaged in the draft armistice agreement, the
hostilities to be renewed if the Communists do not favorably
consider the UN resolution there would be the following
objections:
- a.
- For the UNC to seek a
cease-fire under such circumstances, and particularly in
the face of the recent stepped-up ground action, could
only be interpreted by the Communists as a sign of
weakness in the UNC
military position, a weakness which, in fact, does not
exist, and would probably lead Communists to the belief
that continued intransigence on their part will result
in the eventual complete and formal abandonment by
UNC of its position
on POWs, thus producing
an armistice on Communist terms.
- b.
- A cessation of air attacks over North Korea would
remove what is probably the principal factor that might
impel the Communists to agree to an acceptable
armistice.
- c.
- A cessation of air attacks would permit the Communists
to repair and rebuild the air fields in North Korea so
that at the end of any cease-fire period the UNC would be faced with a
large and possibly even overwhelming Communist air force
stationed on bases within Korea within easy striking
distance of UNC forces
and installations, which has not been the case thus far.
This charge would subject our front line troops to air
attacks with possible heavy casualties.
- d.
- A cessation of air attacks would permit the Communists
unmolested to rebuild and restore railroads, roads,
bridges and other lines of communication so as to permit
the transportation and support of a military force
considerably larger than that which they are now able to
supply and maintain in Korea.
- e.
- A cessation of air and ground reconnaissance would
enable the undetected concentration of Communist forces,
thereby jeopardizing the security of the UNC. Inability of the
UNC to attack such
concentrations [Page 566]
would constitute further jeopardy to the security of
UNC forces.
- f.
- A temporary cease-fire which does not lead to a
permanent armistice would produce severe adverse
psychological effect upon the UNC forces.
- g.
- Thus, the end of any such cease-fire period could well
mean that there would be a reversal of the present
military situation, i.e., the Communists would have
overwhelming military superiority over the UNC and the UNC would be faced with
agreeing to an armistice entirely on Communist terms, or
stand in danger of forcible ejection from Korea. There
is, of course, the corresponding danger that such a
situation would inevitably lead to an enlargement of the
conflict.
- 2.
- Under the assumption that this suggestion envisages the
putting into effect of all provisions in the draft armistice
agreement except those pertaining to POWs, acceptance of this suggestion would in fact
be a complete capitulation to the oft-repeated Communist
propaganda line that an armistice be entered into without any
agreement on prisoners and that question be deferred to
“discussion in a calmer atmosphere”. The Communists are of
course confident, and perhaps with reason, that, if they
succeeded in obtaining UNC
agreement to such a proposition, the pressures for obtaining
return of UN prisoners held by them would be so overwhelming as
to cause an abandonment of the UNC position on non-forcible repatriation.
The principal factor favorable to the United Nations Command in the
present situation is the air superiority which it holds over North
Korea. The principal factor favorable to the Communists is the
desire of the United Nations Command to obtain the return of United
Nations POWs held by Communists. A
cease-fire without agreement on POWs eliminates the principal factor favorable to the
United Nations Command position and leaves all advantages to the
Communists. Since the Communists have failed to agree to the UNC position on POWs in a situation in which the
military advantage lies with the UNC, it could hardly be expected that the Communists will
agree to the UNC position on POWs in a situation where that
advantage has been lost.
