Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/2–553: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations ¹

secret

Washington , February 6, 1953—7:53 p.m.

292. Re Korea, urtel 484.²

1. Department agrees entirely with aims and general strategy outlined paragraphs 1 and 2 reftel. As you indicate our goal in present circumstance is to stand on GA resolution Dec. 3 and to avoid whittling away at substance that resolution, and at unanimity of support for UNC position among GA members.

2. We believe that these objectives could best be achieved by avoidance any further GA resolutions at this time. It is extremely unlikely that any resolution acceptable to us could command same measure of support as achieved by Indian resolution. “Neutrals” would probably be reluctant to support even mere reaffirmation Indian resolution and in light of their apparent embarrassment over their identification with West on Dec. 3 resolution, might seek to find some pretext for abstaining on new proposal. There appears little point in struggling to obtain their reluctant concurrence in reaffirmation, and risking obtaining a lesser vote for principle which obtained 54 votes in Dec. Further, any resolution introduced runs danger of amendment, particularly by Asians anxious to achieve some compromise, which might result in less acceptable resolution or at least in additional abstentions.

3. Department recognizes propensity among GA delegates to propose resolutions and particularly desire of Asians and others to do something which might lead to peace in Korea. If further Asian efforts were in fact forthcoming, a resolution acceptable to us might become tactically desirable to forestall these efforts. We are hopeful, however, that in present instance it might be possible to persuade Asians not to press other resolutions; our own willingness not to seek condemnatory resolution should be strong bargaining counter. You will have noted favorable Indian reaction to our preliminary thinking that no resolution might be necessary (New Delhi’s 3085 Feb. 2³). Indonesians also might perhaps be persuaded desirability this posture, particularly if US makes it clear we are not pressing for GA action. Perhaps Indians and other Asians could help persuade Indonesians that efforts along lines Palar has tentatively indicated would be counter-productive. We do not believe there would be serious problem in avoiding vote on 21 power, Mexican or Peruvian resolutions, and we would expect that LA delegates would not press new proposals in face US objection.

4. In general, therefore, we are inclined to see disadvantages in proposing or stimulating any resolution at all at this time. We recognize, however, that consultations might reveal that tactical situation, which US Delegation will best be able to judge makes necessary some affirmative step in order to forestall undesirable efforts by other Dels. In those circumstances, points indicated your paragraph 4(a) seem entirely reasonable and Department will be sending you shortly draft position paper⁴ which will include also draft such possible resolution.

5. As to desirability of linking economic measures with such a political resolution, and, in any event, substance of GA action re Korean Reconstruction, Department’s comments will follow in separate telegram.⁵

Matthews

1. This telegram was drafted by Henkin and cleared by Allen (EUR), Hickerson, McClurkin, Bacon, and Wainhouse.
2. Dated Feb. 5, p. 733.
3. Not printed (795.00/2–253).
4. The draft position paper is not printed; for text of the position paper, Feb. 13, see p. 779.
5. See telegram 301 to New York, Feb. 13, p. 777.