Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 141st Meeting of the National Security Council Tuesday, April 28, 19531
eyes only
Present at the 141st meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central [Page 946] Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary,”NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.
[Here follows discussion of these items: the recent NATO Conference in Paris; Indochina; Formosa and the National Government of China; sale of modern aircraft to Latin American nations; the Mutual Security Program in relation to its cost; and the Presidential address of April 16.]
Secretary Humphrey raised the question as to why, by way of background to this follow-up on the President’s address, it wouldn’t be practicable for the United States to go ahead and build up its forces as rapidly as possible in Korea. There seems to be no point, said Secretary Humphrey, to relaxing pressures and allowing the Communists to think that they can string out the negotiations.
The President answered that there was no good reason why the Defense Department couldn’t promptly look into the possibilities raised by Secretary Humphrey. We might at least appear to be increasing our build-up in Korea even though we sent out only skeletonized units or headquarters units in place of the real thing.
Secretary Dulles observed that it was certainly clear to him that we were much more likely to get a suitable armistice out of the Communists in Korea if they did not calculate that we were desperately eager to obtain one.
The President said that it would also be only common sense to give some kind of publicity for what we send out there. This could be done either by deliberately spreading false reports or giving up the secrecy with which we generally try to disguise such movements. It would not matter much, in any case, since the Communists would be bound to detect a real build-up.
Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that it might well be possible to initiate some kind of deception tactics to meet the President’s point.
Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that they would be considering at next week’s meeting a paper from the Planning Board setting forth the various alternatives open to the United States with regard to the situation in Korea.
At the very least, Mr. Stassen added, the United States could well publicize the fact that we are about to set up the 15th and 16th Republic of Korea divisions.
[Page 947][Here follows a brief discussion of the transfer of finished atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Defense]
- This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on Apr. 29.↩