Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins)

top secret
operational immediate

C 62143. Refs: A. C 62098.1 B. C 62124.2

1.
This supplements my C 62124. I met for over one hour alone with Rhee yesterday afternoon. We discussed the contingencies which might develop as a result of the aide-mémoire dlvrd by Ambassador Yang to the State Dept on 22 Apr3 and the sit which might develop as the result of any ROK action to cont the conflict alone after an armistice. Rhee was calm, dispassionate and unemotional, and his views dlvrd in a friendly manner.
2.
I explained that I was coming to him as a friend to discuss the problem which might arise in the event he took drastic unilateral action. I assured him of my government’s complete understanding of the difficulties which confront him and of its sympathy for the plight of the Korean people, that I had asked to see him alone and informally, and hoped we could discuss these matters on a frank, personal and friendly basis, to which he agreed.
3.
I told him of my grave concern, as the United Nations Commander, privileged to include in my command his magnificent ROK Army, should he resort to unilateral, hostile and disastrous steps with no possibility of success which would divide the UN Command and leave us embarrassed before the world, encourage the Communists to action which might cause us to lose all we had gained.
4.
First he gave me his est of the enemy sit, briefly, that the Chinese Communists were whipped, they wanted to go home, they had been ravaged by disease, which brought about their germ warfare charges against US; that now was the time to defeat them, and he prayed that President Eisenhower would demand that the Russians, who control the Chinese Communists’ actions, withdraw Chinese Commies north of [Page 948] the Yalu as an indication of their good faith in seeking an armistice. Only after that he feels should an armistice be discussed.
5.
He contd to reiterate his oft-rptd psn of the Korean people with regards to a divided Korea which he felt would result from an armistice and that there were no assurances that the political conference to fol would ever reach a sat solution. He contd by stating that the Korean people had endured more than their share of this three year conflict, one year of which, he emphasized, had been devoted to fighting and two years to talking. He rptd several times that he hoped my government would not consider that his words were designed towards blackmail.
6.
After he got his theme off his chest, I pointed out that he well knew the psn of my government towards a unified Korea and that actions of my government would continue to be directed toward that end. I pointed out the futility, under present conditions, of President Eisenhower demanding the withdrawal of Chinese Communists north of the Yalu, for it would only be turned down or met with a counter proposition that the UN forces similarly withdraw. I indicated the time for such action was at an aprop time after a mil armistice.
7.
I made it plain that in the conduct of the armistice negotiations it was the interest of the US to obtain an acceptable and honorable armistice and I knew that he was familiar with the conditions which must be fulfilled before we would acpt such an armistice.
8.
I emphasized, as the UN Commander, my great concern over the wording of his government’s aide-mémoire of 22 Apr, pointing out that perhaps as a result of faulty translation, it was not clear as to the timing of this intention to remove ROK trps from my comd. I pointed out, as I have to you in my msg C 62098, that the wording of the aide-mémoire, as transmitted to me, was susceptible of different interpretation as to the timing that ROK forces might be withdrawn from UN Comd. I pointed out that we had to discuss frankly this subject if he were really serious, for I could not wake up some morning and find myself in the psn of ROK forces and the remainder of the UN Comd running for opposite goals.
9.
Then came the most significant statement from Rhee, to the effect that he was not now even thinking in terms of eventually withdrawing ROK forces from UN control, that if such action were taken, it would only be as a last resort, and then only after thorough and frank discussions with me.
10.
I again indicated to him the futility of such action on his part, for it would be doomed to disaster, that he could not possibly support logistically a unilateral continuation of hostilities after an armistice.
11.
An interesting point developed in connection with the aide-mémoire. Rhee stated for what it is worth that it had not been his intent to have Ambassador Yang present the psn of his government in such a [Page 949] formal manner. He said he had telegraphed to Yang rqstg that the views of the ROK Government on the whole subject of armistice negotiations be made aval to the State Dept.
12.
We discussed the possibility of the armistice agreement itself, including specific provisions for the withdrawal of both Chinese Communist and UN trps from Korea within a reasonable time after the signing of the armistice agreement. He felt this would be very desirable and indicated that although his people, who had developed such admiration for the Americans, would be concerned over their departure before real peace had been established. He thought he could handle that sit and explain it to his people, provided his government had been given assurance by my government that the US would fly to his assistance should the terms of the armistice agreement be violated by aggressive action on the part of the enemy.
13.
I discussed other points with regards the armistice negotiations as fols:
a.
That the psn of my government is to insist upon the neutral state, agree upon [?] to handle non-repatriated POWs, taking them over in Korea, that we would not be a party, as the Communists have demanded, to removing the Korean POWs to the neutral state. I emphasized this particularly true in the case of North Korean POWs whom the ROK Government had indicated its willingness to accept as its citizens. Rhee commented that his people would never permit, nor would the North Korean POWs themselves submit to removal from ROK soil. With ref to the removal of non-repatriated Chinese Communist POWs, I told him our psn initially was the same for them, but that we might be willing in their case to agree to their removal to a neutral state. I told him, however, that if it was agreed to retain them in Korea under the auth of the neutral state that I hoped his government would facilitate their contd use of Chinese POW fac on Cheju-Do. He agreed to this.
b.
He felt that the armistice agreement should prov that the political conf get underway in much less than 90 days.
c.
I raised with him a statement made in Ambassador Briggs’ msg 1271 to State Dept and rptd to Tokyo in msg 357, of 26 Apr,4 which was to the effect that Rhee had felt in the past there had not been adequate consultation between the UNC and his government. Rhee clarified this point by stating in the past facs did not exist by which the views of his government could be made known to the chief armistice delegate, but that now with the apt of Gen Choi he felt ROK is more adequately represented. I told him that I personally had discussed with Gen Choi his duties and obligations as a member of the armistice delegation, that first he is a UN member, secondly I expected him to rec from Rhee his views and that Gen Harrison and I would always rec them, if submitted objectively and helpfully, however without any obligation on our part to acpt them. I also pointed out that I had info that Choi had been directed to walk out of the delegation meetings should an armistice develop containing terms unacceptable to the ROK. I told him that if my info was correct, it would be a most embarrassing [Page 950] incident and give great comfort to the enemy. He promised me that would not happen, that if the negotiations took a course so repugnant to ROK, he would ask Choi ahead of time not to attend that meeting.
14.
In conclusion I believe that:
a.
I was able to enlighten and clarify Rhee’s misunderstanding of the distinction and difference between the mil armistice agreement which we are seeking to achieve and the agreement which would eventually result from the political conf.
b.
Rhee has been bluffing in spite of his rptd statement that he hoped we would not consider his actions a form of blackmail.
c.
Rhee will not take the unilateral action of fighting alone or withdrawing his trps from UNC without taking a good long look at the consequences of his actions and discussing the matter with me prior to such action.
d.
Rhee feels definitely that the armistice agreement should prov for the withdrawal of all non-indigenous trps from Korea, and that a security pact or strong statement from the President should be made indicating US determination to support Korea militarily should the armistice be broken.
15.
I saw Ambassador Briggs after my meeting and gave him the gist of my conversation. I will cont to keep in close touch with Rhee on this subject.
16.
With ref to visit of Gen Paik to the United States,5 I now feel he should carry out contemplated itinerary, for to cancel trip now would create suspicion as to our motives in the mind of Rhee.
  1. Dated Apr. 26, p. 940.
  2. In this telegram, dated Apr. 27, Clark provided Collins with a brief preliminary report on his conversation with Rhee which is reported on herein in greater detail. (Department of Defense files)
  3. The aide-mémoire is printed as an attachment to a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Apr. 24, p. 935.
  4. Ante, p. 938.
  5. The possibility of Rhee sending Acting Prime Minister Paik to Washington to discuss economic matters was first broached in a conversation between Rhee and Briggs on Jan. 31, 1953. A report of that conversation is contained in a memorandum of conversation by Briggs, Feb. 1, 1953, attached to a letter from Briggs to Allison, Feb. 1, 1953, not printed. (795B.02/2–153)