Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, May 1, 1953—11 a.m.

Instructions for Clark

Mr. Robertson: We have been discussing in the State Department the suggestion of Senator Knowland’s that although Congressional opinion would, he thought, be opposed to India as the neutral to handle POW’s, he wondered whether Indonesia might not be considered. In thinking it over we had just about arrived at the conclusion that by reason of the fact that Indonesia had an unstable government and would obviously be short of the requisite manpower and other resources, that country would probably not be too good as the neutral. But we just heard this morning that the Russians have approached the Indonesians with a query as to whether they would serve as the neutral. I must say it seems odd to have Senator Knowland and the Russians coming up with the same idea. We have reconsidered and it occurred to us that so long as the prisoners are held within Korea it might be possible if the Communists should suggest either India or Indonesia to have the Asian state that they nominate serve together with the Swiss as the neutrals.

General Vandenberg: Our objections to the original draft of the message to Clark² was that it really didn’t give him any clear course of action and in a way left him out on a limb. I think we would be inclined to go along with any instructions that gave him a definite answer.

Mr. Robertson: May I take up the points that we have covered in this new draft of the instructions.³ It is the strong opinion of our Secretary and Under Secretary that we should insist that the neutral be named and agreed on prior to taking up other questions in the negotiations. If the Communists are unwilling to select or agree to a suitable neutral, this might be as good an indication of their intentions as anything else. If they don’t want an armistice, therefore, this would be as good a breaking point as any other. We would like to tell Clark to stick to the question of naming the neutral and if the Communists should continue to refuse to talk to the question of the neutral state we thought Clark should be told that he might recess the negotiation as pressure on them to get ahead on an agreement for a neutral state.

General Vandenberg: I think the main thing is that Clark be given clear instructions.

General Collins: I would agree with that also.

Mr. Robertson: (At this point Mr. Robertson read the remainder of the revised draft telegram which stated that in addition to Switzerland—Pakistan, Uruguay, and Brazil would be acceptable as neutrals and that if the Communists should nominate any of these the UNC was authorized to accept immediately. If the Communists should nominate India, the UNC was to propose that India serve with Switzerland or Sweden. If the Communists nominated Indonesia, the UNC was to suggest that Indonesia serve together with Switzerland. The draft telegram had a sentence to the effect that the UNC negotiators should not impugn the integrity of any country nominated by the Communists but should base their arguments against any country on lack of resources.)

General Collins: How can the negotiators stay away from impugning India if the only argument they can use is lack of resources.

Mr. Robertson: In the case of India they would just back the argument that the Indians and Swiss should act together, that the two opposing sides should agree on the primary nominee of each side.

General Vandenberg: That doesn’t seem to me to be quite clear in the draft as you read it.

Mr. Nitze: I think it would be clear enough if you just put a period after the statement about not impugning any country that the Communists should nominate.

Mr. Robertson: (At this point Mr. Robertson continued to read the remainder of the draft instruction which included the points that no consideration was to be given to physical transportation of the non-repatriates out of Korea and that Clark was authorized to agree to a period of access of up to four months.)

General Vandenberg: That period of time seems mighty long to me.

Mr. Robertson: We ourselves thought that the 90 days which we had given Clark in his original instructions was really ample time, but since Clark has specifically asked for discretion as to a longer period we could see no good reason why he shouldn’t have it.

General Vandenberg: In 120 days there could be a lot of demonstrations organized and there might be real trouble.

General Collins: Clark is familiar with the situation and he will have to handle it himself so that if he feels he wants leeway on the time, I think we should give it to him.

Admiral Gardner:⁴ I think we should be clear as to what the underlying motive of the Communists is. They have really put us on notice in the statement that their negotiators made. (At this point Admiral Gardner read statements that the Communists had made at Panmunjom to the effect that it was universally agreed that after an armistice both sides should return all prisoners, that they were in no way giving up this principle, and that their concession was an important one as to the steps, time, and procedures of arranging for the return of the prisoners.) This shows clearly that the Communists have not changed their position and that what they are talking about is the return of the prisoners to them in two steps rather than one.

General Vandenberg: Is it clear to Clark that the Communists’ underlying motive is to have a two-step repatriation rather than one. Wouldn’t it be well to point out the Communists’ statement to him in connection with the part of the draft instruction which gives him authority to extend the period of access to 120 days.

Mr. Matthews: I shouldn’t think there would be any objection to that.

Mr. Johnson: The really crucial thing is that there be a firm cut-off date after which a neutral will dispose of the POW’s, but there is no reason why Clark’s attention shouldn’t be directed to the Communists’ statement.

General Vandenberg: Is the telegram OK with the other Chiefs? If so, it’s OK with me. (The other Chiefs raised no objections.)

General Collins: Has anybody thought of the legal complications that might be involved in having two neutral states rather than one. Supposing the two neutrals should disagree or supposing there should be trouble with the prisoners, then which neutral does what to whom? It seems to me that we might run into a lot of difficulties and maybe a further delay. Perhaps it would be desirable for you to discuss the possible complications with your Secretary before this message actually goes out.

Mr. Johnson: It would depend primarily on the terms of reference which the neutrals received.

General Collins: I think those terms of reference will require careful thought if we are going to have two neutrals.

General Vandenberg: I think Clark should have the benefit of whatever thoughts you have on the question.

Mr. Robertson: This formula of having two neutrals was arrived at really only this morning and was primarily in response to the possibility that the Communists might nominate Indonesia or India. Indonesia would probably not be capable of performing the functions of the neutral alone and as to India there is some doubt as to how neutral it really is.

General Collins: But what about India as the neutral? Supposing the Indians would take over the POW’s and then eventually let 90 per cent of them go back to China. It still would be the act of a neutral country and of an Asian country at that. I personally am one of the Chiefs who has been in favor of this position of non-forcible repatriation. I have thought that it was valuable to hold to that position but if we turn over the POW’s to India and if as a neutral and an Asian country they should let them get back to China, this might be a face-saving way for us.

Mr. Robertson: We can’t avoid the moral obligation that we have towards these people. To put them in a position where they would eventually be turned over to the Communists would, in effect, be to deliver them to liquidation.

General Collins: I am still bothered by the practical difficulties that we might run into with two neutral countries.

Mr. Nitze: If the two neutrals were an Asian country and Switzerland their disagreements or difficulties would probably not be about the actual housekeeping or handling of the POW’s. Their only difficulties might arise on deciding as to the final disposition of the POW’s. India or another Asian country would probably veto the handing over of the POW’s to Formosa. The Swiss for their part would undoubtedly veto handing over POW’s to Peking, so even if there were disagreement between the two neutrals, we could be sure that the prisoners would not be forcibly returned to Communist China.

General Collins: As I understand it, we are not going to give on the question of physically transporting the prisoners outside of Korea.

Mr. Robertson: That is correct.

Mr. MacArthur: I believe that Senator Knowland’s idea of Indonesia was to some degree based on his idea that the prisoners could be transported to one of the Indonesian islands and that it would be practical to move them from there.

General Collins: Then if we are not going to physically transport them, the basis of Senator Knowland’s idea doesn’t seem to have much validity.

Colonel Matthews: We have apparently decided on two breaking points. The first is on the naming of the neutral and the second is on not moving the Chinese out of Korea. Under these circumstances I have a question as to what India could do if it had to maintain the custody of the POW’s without moving them out of Korea. I don’t see how they could forcibly turn them over to the Communists.

General Collins: This is really a political question which I think is purely up to State. If State doesn’t want India as the neutral then I think we should just go along.

General Vandenberg: As I understand it now we are agreed that the message should go out with two changes. One, the omission of the part of the sentence which appears to instruct Clark to use lack of resources as an argument against India and two, the addition of a reference to the underlying Communist objective as it seems to come out of their statement at Panmunjom.⁵

General Collins: Then you will also look into the practical questions that would be involved in having two neutral states so that Clark can have your guidance.

[Here follows discussion of aid to France in Indochina.]”

1. A note on the source text read as follows: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the JCS, Generals Collins and Vandenberg were present. General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense and Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. General Cabell represented the CIA and Gleason and General Gerhard the NSC. In all, 19 persons attended this meeting, where, in addition to Korea, Indochina was discussed.

2. Presumably Vandenberg was referring to JCS objections to instructions to Clark concerning selection of the neutral state; for more information, see footnote 3 p. 924.
3. The draft was revised by State after the State-JCS meeting. The first paragraph of the revised draft was transmitted separately at the direction of the President as JCS 938003 on May 1. For text, see footnote 5 below. The remaining paragraphs were transmitted as DA 938041, G–3 to CINCUNC, May 2, p. 962.
4. Vice Adm. Matthias B. Gardner, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

5. According to Vandenberg, President Eisenhower at a meeting at the White House the afternoon of May 1 directed the dispatch of the first paragraph of the revised draft telegram prepared by State after the State-JCS meeting that morning. Johnson read the paragraph over the telephone to Cams, Deputy Secretary, JCS, who had it transmitted to CINCFE as JCS 938003, May 1, 1953. (Memorandum for record by Cams, May 1; JCS records, CCS 383.21 (3–19–45))

   It read: “From JCS for CINCUNC. Reur C 62180 and CX 62150. Continue to insist on settlement of question neutral state prior to proceeding to other matters. Further guidance on additional questions raised by ref msgs will follow ASAP.” (Dated Apr. 29 and 30, respectively; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)