Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

1.

The Communists’ action today represents the first concession of any importance made by them in the curr negotiations and it can not help but give rise to the hope in the minds of many that they sincerely desire an early armistice. However, I consider it essential that the Communist proposal be examined with great care and in great detail at all levels for it contains provisions that can work to the detriment of the UNC and involve US in extreme difficulty with ROK Government. The many problems that will arise in drafting the terms of ref to place these provisions in effect will prov the Communists with all the obstacles they require if they elect to employ delaying tactics. It is apparent that the Communists are attempting to devise another system designed to insure the eventual return of all their POWs or conform them with the alternate of continued and indefinite detention.

2.

The Communists’ eight-point proposal is similar in many respects to the Indian resolution which the United States supported in the United Nation Gen Assembly’s Political and Security Committee. The Communist proposal appears to differ from the Indian resolution in the following pertinent respects:

a.: Five-state com in lieu of four with an umpire.
b.: Four months custodial pd in lieu of three.
c.: No cutoff date for consideration by political conf of disposition of POWs, i.e. no final solution of the problem.
d.: Contains provisions for support of non-repatriates while in cust of NNRC by the “nations to which they belong.”

3.

My detailed comments on indiv points of the Communist proposal fol in Part 2.

4.

Pnt 1. The Communists meaning of the term “final name lists” is subject to ques. Should they still be referring to the lists exchanged on 18 Dec 1951, this pnt would then be unacceptable. Should they mean [Page 988] that new final lists containing only names of those who desire to be repatriated be exchanged and that repatriation be effected on the basis of the new lists, this would also have some objectionable features. Based on experience in the recent sick and injured opn, it would be highly desirable from our point of view to prepare daily shipping lists only which would be turned over at time of dlvr. This would not affect exchange of round figures of repatriates during negotiations. I consider the foregoing item should be clarified and reworded to remove possible doubt prior to acceptance.

5.

Pnt 2.

a.: This provision parallels proposal 1 of the Indian resolution but by nominating India to be the fifth power of the com circumvents proposals 13 and 14 which provided means for determining the umpire. Considering the proposed composition of the com, India in effect becomes the umpire based on what is now only an assumption that decisions of the com will be by majority vote. I am not familiar with essential facts which I believe must be evaluated at governmental level to determine the desirability of allowing India to be the ultimate umpire.
b.: Note that the Communist proposal reads: “Representatives appointed respectively by 5 nations.” If representatives appointed by India are pro-Communists, our principle of non-forcible repatriation might be compromised. If India is to cast the deciding vote on the manner in which terms of ref will be implemented, then that portion of terms of ref, ref C, pertaining to verification must be given very close attn.
c.: As indicated above, a vital point to be clarified in this provision is the manner in which the com will reach a decision; will it be by majority vote, or will the power of veto be aval to members of the com?
d.: I consider that guidance is required on acceptability of representatives from Poland and Czechoslovakia as members of the repatriation com. In view of the psn India would hold in the com, and considering the proposed composition of the com, I consider that guidance as to the acceptability of India is also required. My initial thoughts are that I would prefer the provisions of proposals 13 and 14 of the Indian resolution to the direct approval of India to be the umpire. If veto is to be utilized in resolving pnts of issue within the com, this pnt of the proposal would obviously be unacceptable.

6.

Pnt 3.

a.

This pnt has omitted several items which I consider essential and contains several stipulations which are objectionable. These are:

(1): Fails to establish a specific time in relation to the effective date of the armistice by which the NNRC would assume cust of the nonrepatriates.
(2): Does not prohibit further transfer or mvmt while in the cust of the NNRC of those non-repatriates who fail to rqst repatriation.
(3): Specifies that pers to be provided by the members of the NNRC shall be of the armed forces; there is apparently no provision for any civ participation.
(4): Stipulates that non-repatriates be released from the mil control and cust of the detaining side at the original place of detention. If the strict interpretation of this is required by the Communists, we would then turn over cust of non-repatriates at POW installations on the mainland of Korea. It should be noted that a portion of the custodial pers will be from armed forces of two Communist satellite nations. Considering the nationalities involved, there is no doubt that the ROK will violently oppose having mil forces of Communist satellite countries in Korea and probably even on the off-lying islands. In fact, they have already made public statements which, if the threats contained therein were consummated, might make it almost impossible without creating serious disturbances to implement the Communist proposal were we to acpt it. I believe we must realize that we and the ROKs would be faced with aprxly 2500 carefully selected and thoroughly indoctrinated Communist mil thugs, not to mention such others as may be introduced to “explain” to the non-repatriates their rights, at mainland or island installations, all free to engage in espionage and disorder. I have previously set forth in ref B my opinion as to the probable results based on my experience in Austria. With ROK opposition to having mil pers of Communist satellites in their rear areas, my prev experience might be mild in comparison to the sit which could develop. The foregoing sit would be difficult enough if a liberal interpretation were placed on the phrase “at the original place of detention.” As you know, I visualize a neutral state or states assuming cust of the non-repatriates primarily on off-lying coastal islands, ref D. In my tentative plans I realize that considerable difficulty may be encountered in effecting the mvmt of these non-repatriates to off-lying islands during the interval of the effective date of the armistice and the time the NNRC would assume cust. I consider it very undesirable to attempt any mvmt prior to the time that hard-core Communists have been removed from the islands and prior to the time the non-repatriates could be informed of the purpose of this move. I consider it absolutely essential that the detaining power be the auth which determines the place in Korea at which the NNRC receives cust of the non-repatriated POWs. I am considering making arrangements with the ROKs for the use of Cheju-Do as the place to which all non-repatriates would be concentrated. This has many advantages other than its isolated location as the ROK replacement tng camp could be partially phased out and its many fac utilized. Considering their announced opposition to Communist satellite nations having mil pers in their rear areas, I ques whether I will even be able to accomplish this. Our problems would be materially lessened and ROK opposition to Communist pers in rear areas might be reduced if we could in some way achieve Communist agreement to release of Korean non-repatriates as civilians upon the armistice becoming effective.

b.

My comments pertaining to probable results if these 2500 Communist armed forces are allowed access to mainland POW installations should be considered in developing guidance on pnt 2, para 5d above.

7.

Point 4. I consider this point to be sat only if point 3 is modified to set a specific time limit in relation to the eff date of the armistice in which the NNRC will have assumed cust of the non-repatriates and prov the term “original place of detention” is resolved along the lines indicated in para 6a (4) above.

8.

Point 5. There is no particular objection to the proposal as stated, nor is any hidden intent apparent. There is a negotiating factor we can develop in an effort to reach agreement on a shorter period. We can start initially on 2 months and compromise on 3, if possible. In implementing this prov, the neutral nation com would be free to call on either detaining power for trans of “persuaded” pris from the detention site to the exchange point with escorts furnd from neutral state armed forces. “Consultation” with the two sides I interpret to mean mainly coord of dlvr scd.

9.

Point 6.

a.

This is probably one of the most desirable goals from the Communist point of view and reinforces our belief that they intend to do everything in their power to insure the rtn of the great bulk of non-repatriates. Since this involves submitting the ques of disposition of non-repatriates remaining after period of access to the political conf, an element of the Indian resolution, but minus the limitation as to the period of time, disposition can be considered by the conf and the prov for care and maint at the termination of period of discussion by political conf, I am not in a psn to judge the political implications our govt must consider before acptg or rejecting it. However, from the UNC view, there are outstanding disadvantages:

(1): It offers little concrete hope for the future to non-repatriates who successfully resist Communist pressure during the period of “explanations”.
(2): Indefinite cust of Koreans becomes more of an issue to the ROK as times goes on. Trans of cust from the UNC to neutrals, and then final disposition by a political conf will serve only to irritate the ROK.
(3): The four-month period (see para 8 above) applies only to the time allowed for “explanations”. Depending on the life span of the political conf, it is entirely probable that the exercise of cust by the neutrals may extend over many months, if not years.

b.

It would be to our great advantage to insist on release of all nonrepatriates still in cust of the neutrals at the end of the four-month period.

10.

Point 7. The phrase “shall be borne by the nations to which they belong” requires clarification and the proposal may be fraught with various possibilities that would work to our disadvantage. It would seem more logical, from purely admin and log points of view, that each detaining power cont its responsibilities for the non-repatriated pers in its respective territories until such time as their disposition is decided. [Page 991] Equally it would appear logical that each detaining power assume support responsibilities for the elements of the neutral states operating within its respective area. As I see it now, this should be our psn in discussing details with the Communists, and should be included in our terms of ref for the neutral state. However, I would appreciate further guidance in this matter.

11.

Point 8. Publication of the exact procedure to be fold as agreed to by both sides and the manner in which the neutral com will operate should be of minor interest to repatriates but of maj interest to non-repatriates. As pointed out in prev comms, the eventual fate of non-repatriates, as we explain it to them will have decisive effects on their courage to resist rtn to Communist control. Whatever the final terms are, we will plan on conducting a concentrated orientation program prior to the date the neutrals actually take over.

12.

There can be no question but that the Communists’ proposal contains a firm basis for further discussions, but I do not consider it advisable that we enter into any detailed discussions prior to having developed the firm psns that the UNC will take on every maj item that must be resolved in conf.

13.

As pointed out in detail in part 2 above, I have grave misgivings concerning:

a.: The manner in which decision will be made in the neutral nations repatriation com, especially if India exercises the controlling voice.
b.: The reception which the ROKs will accord the assorted group of Nationals composing the NNRC, especially when it will probably contain as a min 2500 carefully selected and indoctrinated Communist armed pers. I will discuss this matter with Pres Rhee within next few days and obtain his views which in all probability will not be favorable.
c.: The effect on our bargaining psn caused by our govt’s apvl of the Indian resolution in the UNGA.
d.: Our ability to have written into the specific terms of ref the many safeguards essential to protect our vital principles. This will not be an easy matter to resolve and may well result in long drawn-out discussions which the public will find difficult to understand.

14.

In view of the above and present guidance, I will require further guidance on the folg items:

a.: The acceptability or the nonacceptability of Poland, Czechoslovakia and India as a member of the NNRC.
b.: The consideration I must accord to the fact that the United States has apvd in principle the former Indian resolution.
c.: The psn the UNC must take in considering point six of the Communists’ proposal.
d.: In all probability the provisions contained in point seven can be clarified during the discussion of specific terms of ref. However I would appreciate advice on the legal aspects and such additional guidance as you consider nec.
e.: If the decision is to acpt the Communists satellite nations as members of the NNRC should a firm psn then be taken in the negotiations to effect the relief of Korean non-repatriates to a civ status upon the armistice becoming eff.

15.

There are 2 courses of action that I can foresee in the immediate future:

a.

At the conclusion of the present 48-hour recess rqst another short recess in order to permit the receipt of additional guidance rqstd above and on which I can develop a firm psn.

b.

(1): To meet at the termination of the present recess pd devote 2 or 3 days to exploring the Communist proposal without revealing our psn or giving any indication of an acptance of the principles involved in the eight point proposal.
(2): Upon the receipt of the guidance rqstd, to develop and present as a single unit a firm concrete counter-proposal which will include in detail the complete terms of ref along the lines of ref c, modified to reflect the Communist eight point proposal and your guidance and which will include all the safeguards essential to protect our vital principles.

16.

I prefer the latter course of action, para 15b above, as it will be difficult to retain public support if we rqst additional delays.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1