Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/5–953

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret

[ Washington ,] May 9, 1953.

Subject:

• Reply to Points Raised by British Government Concerning Issuance of Greater Sanctions Statement on Korea.

Discussion:

The British Government, in a memorandum dated May 4, 1953, appears to have reversed its support for decision to issue the Greater Sanctions Statement on Korea immediately following the conclusion of an armistice. The British Government now suggests that no decision on the issuance of the Statement should be made until after an armistice is concluded. The British Embassy today requested the views of the Department as soon as possible. A copy of the British Memorandum, together with a Memorandum of Conversation with the Counselor of the British Embassy, is attached as Tab A.²

The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs considers that the reservations expressed in the British Memorandum concerning the issuance of the Statement are most serious. They could affect our whole position with respect to the armistice, with particular reference to the question of the construction or rehabilitation of military airfields in North Korea during the post-hostilities period.

I believe that an oral reply should be made at the earliest possible time to the British Embassy along the lines set forth in Tab B.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you approve the comments in Tab B and that I deliver them orally to the British Embassy.³

[Tab B]

Comments on Points Raised in British Memorandum of May 4, 1953, Concerning Greater Sanctions Statement on Korea ⁴

The Department of State has carefully considered the points raised in the memorandum of the British Embassy dated May 4, 1953, concerning the Greater Sanctions Statement on Korea, and has the following comments to make:

1. Despite the reservations concerning the Greater Sanctions Statement expressed by the British Government in its memorandum of December 12, 1951, in the light of subsequent discussions between officials of the British and American Governments it has been the understanding of the United States that all United Nations Member States participating in the military action in Korea have engaged in a firm agreement to participate fully in the issuance of the Greater Sanctions Statement immediately following the signature of an armistice in Korea.

2. We can not accept the thesis that a decision on the issuance of the statement now should be deferred until after the armistice is signed, since we consider the Greater Sanctions Statement to be, in effect, an important integral part of the armistice arrangements. It was solely as a result of the agreement by all the participating governments to join in the Greater Sanctions Statement that the United Nations Command delegation at Panmunjom made certain important concessions in early 1952 to the Communist side regarding the construction and rehabilitation of military airfields in North Korea. It is perfectly clear that the construction and rehabilitation of military airfields in North Korea will have a great effect on the security of the United States and other forces in Korea. If the Greater Sanctions Statement is to be weakened by withdrawal of any one of the participating governments or if the decision on its issuance is now to be reviewed and possibly deferred, the United States Government would immediately have to reconsider its position on acceptable terms of an armistice, with particular reference to this grave question of military airfields in North Korea. It is obvious that to reopen a discussion of this phase of the armistice agreement would result in a serious delay and might even render impossible the achievement of an armistice under present conditions.

3. Since we consider the Statement as closely related to the armistice agreement, we consider it essential that it be made at the time that the armistice is signed. We can not imagine that the circumstances prevailing at that time would be different in any material respect from those anticipated when agreement to issue the statement was reached. Indeed, if the issuance of the statement is delayed after the armistice it might appear gratuitous. If issued at the time of the armistice, it cannot be considered provocative since it will appear as associated with the armistice agreements.

4. Accordingly, the United States Government firmly believes that such a statement should be issued immediately by all participating governments on conclusion of an armistice in order to demonstrate our collective determination to the Communists to meet any new aggression in Korea promptly and effectively.

1. This memorandum was drafted by Emmons and Young and cleared with Matthews, Merchant, Bonbright, and Henkin.
2. Tab A was not attached to the source text; for a text of the memorandum of conversation by Johnson with Tomlinson, dated May 4, see p. 968; the British memorandum is not printed, but is summarized in footnote 2, ibid .
3. Acting Secretary Smith approved the comments and called the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, to express extreme concern that if the British insisted on reworking the Greater Sanctions Statement, “a crisis of serious proportions” would arise between the two nations. (Memorandum by Gilman of S/S to Johnson, May 9, 1953, 795.00/5–953)
4. These comments were drafted by Emmons and Young. According to a covering memorandum of conversation, Johnson saw Tomlinson on the afternoon of May 9 and read to him this paper stating that it represented the considered views of the Department of State on the subject. Johnson then provided Tomlinson with a copy of these comments.