396.1 GE/5–1654: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Secto 227. Repeated information Bangkok 4, Paris 277, London 170, Saigon 82. Discussed with Prince Wan and Sarasin contents of Department’s telegram to Geneva 761.1 Prince Wan said that he agreed in principle and that he would submit suggestion to his government. He felt his government would also agree in principle but there might be some reservation as to timing, that Cambodia’s complaint was already before UN and that it might be advisable to wait until there had been [Page 823] an actual invasion of Laos before submitting to UN as reaction might be that there was no good reason for request.
I stressed that in my opinion there was better case to be made now than last June, that there was mounting tension throughout area, and no one knew what would happen or when. It was particularly important to get action started promptly on account of time factor involved in getting action through Assembly and POC on ground. Prince Wan seemed to be impressed and stated that he would communicate with his government immediately.
With Prince Wan’s approval, I discussed subject with Bidault and Eden stating we thought time had come to bring in UN, preferably through revival of Thai appeal and that conditions were so different now that I strongly hoped French would find advantages now outweighed disadvantages. I believed “colonial” complications could now be avoided. I told them Wan agreed in principle but was not sure about timing and that we believed effective action could be gotten without too much delay in General Assembly after Soviet veto in Security Council. Eden referred to Cambodian appeal but I expressed belief Thailand more suitable as experienced independent UN member.
Bidault said it would be difficult to reply quickly but he would try to give answer early next week.
Thai appeal to UN also subsequently discussed with Chauvel and Allen. Chauvel stated he saw no objection in principle but questioned only timing and peg on which to hang appeal. He thought next week or two might provide peg either through further invasion of Laos or Cambodia, Communist refusal to agree to Viet-Minh evacuation of Laos and Cambodia or further insistence on representation phantom governments.
Allen indicated generally favorable view although both he and Chauvel raised question whether such action would prejudice conference efforts separate problems Laos and Cambodia from Vietnam.