Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 331
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Head of the Delegation (Smith)
- 1.
- Bidault, through Chauvel, says he sees no objections to your calling on Bao Dai.
- 2.
- I do not believe in view of Bidault’s objection, (see attached memo)1 we should attempt to persuade Bao Dai to return to Vietnam at this precise juncture.
- 3.
- As Bidault suggests, you might mention alarming reports of political deterioration and suggest urgently that Prime Minister Buu Loc return forthwith.
- 3.
- [sic] You might also ask Bao Dai’s views on the alleged conflict between the Defense Minister Quat and Vietnam Chief of Staff, General Hinh.
- 4.
- You might smoke him out as to his plans for the conference. Evidently the Vietnam Delegation intends to stall for time without openly opposing the French, hoping the conference will break up without reaching a “solution” acceptable to the Communists, the French and ourselves and that the French will, therefore, have to keep on with the fight, with increased assistance, perhaps intervention from the U.S. If a conference solution is reached acceptable to the Communists and the French, he is considering the idea of keeping up the fight with the Vietnamese army alone provided we will come through with arms and financing. (The chances of any successful Vietnamese resistance unsupported will be very dubious to say the least.)
- 5.
- Another thing he hopes to do is to use the conference as a platform to help persuade the non-communists elements of the Vietminh supposedly in the majority, to break away and rally to the Bao Dai Government. (His chances of success in such an enterprise at this time seem to me to be very dubious.)
- 6.
- Without “protesting too much” you may wish to correct any misapprehension which may have arisen in Bao Dai’s mind as a result of press conferences and statements over the past week, stressing to him the efforts being made by the President and by the Secretary to create further military and political assets on our side.
- 7.
- Finally you might refer with appreciation to Bao Dai’s statement to me that he would be glad to receive any suggestions we might make as to what he might do or say that would aid the U.S. Government in its policy of helping Inderchina.
After saying that you might inquire as to the plans and prospects for building a stronger and more efficient government and army capable of arousing unified national support. This is a first meeting so should not, I feel, start taking him sternly to task for his deficiencies as a ruler. He is still the best trump we have. But in discussing his willingness to do or say anything which would help us help him we can get across our thought that marked improvement in the performance of his Government and himself is necessary.