396.1 GE/5–2254: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

confidential
niact

Dulte 95. Eyes only for the Secretary. Your Tedul 99.1 Last night I dictated a message to you sharing your indignation regarding British statements and agreeing that Aldrich should act in accordance with your suggestion. However, after sleeping on the matter, and because I hope and expect that Eden will insure British support of the peace observation plan while in London over this week end, I think now we should withhold any protest until after this is done. I agree these things are hard to swallow, but you know how pettish both Eden and Churchill can be at times, and if we stir them up at this moment they may again back-pedal on support of the Thailand proposal, [Page 887] which I now believe they are prepared to accept. Also, cannot forget that British are equally concerned and upset by President’s statement regarding possible Southeast Asian pact “without Britain”.2

Smith
  1. Dated May 20, p. 869.
  2. At his news conference on May 19, the President, in response to a question whether “we could build an effective pact back there [in Southeast Asia] without Great Britain’s support”, answered: “Well, after all, you must remember that Australia and New Zealand are the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations that are directly involved. I should say that with the proper Asiatic nations, which of course I lay down as a sine qua non, and Australia and New Zealand, we might possibly work out something that would be maybe not as satisfactory or as broad as you would like it, but could be workable.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, p. 497.)