209. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of
State1
Washington, June 14,
1955.
SUBJECT
Discussion
Conditions have changed somewhat during the past couple of months when
our basic thinking on elections in Viet-Nam was developed. This
memorandum and attachments set out some of these changes and recommend a
revised position for your approval.
As I see it, one of our basic objectives in Viet-Nam is to prevent the
Communists from winning any kind of elections whereby they would take
over control of all Viet-Nam by political and legal means. We would not
object to an indefinite but ostensibly temporary division of Viet-Nam as
presently constituted. The logical corollary of this policy is that
neither side would undertake military operations to try to conquer the
other. The real considerations then in such a policy are whether the
Geneva signatories will condone a divided Viet-Nam, whether the
Communists will resort to arms to obtain control of all Viet-Nam, and
what means we have for carrying out our policy with the best chance of
success.
Our preliminary position on free elections in Viet-Nam assumed the
Communist bloc would never agree to genuinely free elections in Germany,
Korea or Viet-Nam. There are some slight warnings that this assumption
may no longer hold true and in any event should be critically tested. It
is conceivable that the Soviets might change their position on Germany
and perhaps even on Korea. If they did, they might certainly come out
strongly for free elections in Viet-Nam where they might have at this
stage a much better chance for winning than in Korea or Germany. It
therefore appears necessary for us to enlarge the scope of our position
on elections so that it can accommodate political developments in Free
Viet-Nam and better provide an opportunity to achieve our
objectives.
Our preliminary views on elections also assumed that the Diem Government would go through with
consultations with the Viet Minh beginning on July 20, 1955, make no
trouble over the Geneva Accords, and advocate generally free elections
with adequate safeguards, etc. This assumption is no longer true.
Diem will not be bound by the
Geneva Accords. He presently opposes consultations or [Page 450] statements on elections until he has
secured certain military agreements from the French and until a National
Assembly has been formed. These conditions of his have much merit and
permit us to shift somewhat the basis for our position. This is
suggested in the attached position paper.
In essence our position would be that the whole subject of consultations
and elections in Viet-Nam should be left up to the Vietnamese themselves
and not dictated by external agreements which one of the parties never
accepted and still rejects. We would continue to stand on the U.S.
declaration at Geneva and continue to favor genuinely free elections for
unification. The position of the Vietnamese Government would be greatly
strengthened if it had the backing and the opinion of a National
Assembly. This position would be strictly in keeping with the
fundamental doctrine of “consent of the governed”. The U.S. cannot be a
party to political acts or decisions which do not reflect the will of
the people validly ascertained and expressed.
This leaves the question of possible resumption of hostilities by the
Viet Minh on any pretext over the failure to open consultations on July
20 or failure to come to an agreement on the unification of Viet-Nam.
The current “peace offensive” of International Communism makes Viet Minh
renewal of hostilities improbable but the U.S. should be prepared for
such an eventuality. We should know how far the U.S. will go in backing
up Diem. We should be able to
tell him that, if he takes a strong position advocating genuinely free
elections, the U.S. would come to his side with military support if the
Viet Minh should resort to aggression. We will also have to face up to
the possibility in the next month or two that the Viet Minh will exert a
tremendous pressure on Free Viet-Nam through threats and terrorism. We
should also be able to give Diem
some assurances of support in this contingency. This whole matter is now
the subject of a review within the NSC.
There may be additional difficulties in our position. The growing
strength of Diem and the
Nationalist forces will compel the Viet Minh to revise their entire
strategy and tactics on Viet-Nam. If the French reject Diem’s position, it may bring about a
serious cleavage between them which will raise a critical policy problem
for the U.S. The French may even demand or try to bring about the
replacement of Diem. The British
and Indians may also oppose the above position and Diem’s policy.
[Page 451]
Recommendation
It is recommended that you approve the attached position papers on (a)
consultations and elections, and (b) the status of the French
Expeditionary Corps, and the French High Command in Viet-Nam.2
[Tab A]
VIET-NAM, CONSULTATIONS AND ELECTIONS
Anticipated French and British
Position
- (a)
- They are primarily concerned now over getting consultations
organized with the Viet Minh beginning on July 20. The French
aide-mémoire May 233
urged a tripartite agreement for presentation to the Vietnamese
in four-power conference in Saigon.
- (b)
- French will oppose Diem’s position of delay. They may also oppose
negotiations with Vietnamese over FEC as a prior condition to consultations with the
Viet Minh.
- (c)
- The British will side with the French and urge strict
compliance with Geneva Accords.
Vietnamese Position
- 1.
- Diem has not declared
himself finally on consultations or elections. His present
position appears to be:
- (a)
- He and his government did not sign the Geneva Accords
and protested them. Therefore he feels he is not legally
bound by the provisions on elections, and will
dissociate Free Viet-Nam completely from the Accords. He
does not feel compelled to meet with the Viet Minh
beginning on July 20th.
- (b)
- Free Viet-Nam cannot consider the question of
consultations and elections until after a National
Assembly has been elected and convoked, and has declared
its views. He has no mandate to talk with the Viet Minh
about elections until he has the backing of some
representative body.
- (c)
- The status and responsibilities of the French
Expeditionary Corps and the French High Command must
first be settled before determining his policy on
consultations and elections. Free Viet-Nam must have
unquestioned and complete sovereignty prior to adopting
any public position on free elections.
- (d)
- While the principle of genuine and adequate safeguards
for elections is acceptable, international pressures may
compel the Vietnamese to compromise with the Viet Minh
and so lose Free Viet-Nam. Diem reportedly believes the U.S. will
back him in insisting on full safeguards for truly free
elections but is doubtful of British and French support
if the Viet Minh offer seemingly reasonable
counter-proposals.
U.S. Position
- 1.
- We sympathize with Diem’s position outlined above which seems logically
and morally correct. He has not rejected the concept of free
national elections. He is only registering a desire to proceed
differently than prescribed at Geneva and with assurance of a
popular and legal mandate from the free Vietnamese. Diem seems in a strong position
to make these claims.
- 2.
- We will continue to urge Diem to take a vigorous public stand in favor of
genuinely free elections for Viet-Nam with all necessary
safeguards to ensure a true expression of the will of the
people. However, we will not press him to begin consultations on
July 20 if he can claim valid reasons for following another
course and obtain Vietnamese support in his stand. Paragraph 7
of the Geneva Declaration does not seem to us to be a binding
requirement to begin consultations exactly on the day of July
20, 1955.
- 3.
- We should tell Diem:
- (a)
- His attitude will provoke strong international
pressures from the ICC,
the UK, France and the
Communists, on both Free Viet-Nam and the U.S. to
implement the provisions of the Geneva
settlement.
- (b)
- If the Vietnamese find themselves alone on this issue
and if they appear to be the violators of the Geneva
Accords, the U.S. Government would be put in a very
difficult position to come to their aid should the Viet
Minh attack. U.S. public opinion might find support hard
to justify if it seems Diem is against free elections.
- (c)
- Should the Viet Minh now oppose Diem’s position with
strong terroristic action throughout the South, possibly
including semi-military operations, Free Viet-Nam’s
capability for counter-action would be less this year
than probably will be a year from now.
- 4.
- We believe Diem will
have considerable support in Viet-Nam and the U.S. for his
stand. Our own position on free elections would stand greater
chances of implementation if the Vietnamese Government had the
firm backing of a National Assembly before and during
negotiations with the Viet Minh. This might also reduce the
effectiveness of Viet Minh pressures.
- 5.
- We recognize that Diem’s postponement of contacts with the Viet Minh
in the South might engender very serious Communist
counter-actions—possibly including renewed terrorism in the
South [Page 453] and open
rebellion and guerrilla warfare by Communist elements, and
conceivably even resumption of hostilities across the 17th
Parallel. There is also the problem of ICC and Indian diplomatic pressures, as well as
that of the signatories of the Geneva Declaration. All these
parties will probably reject Diem’s position because of the very serious
risks inherent in it. However, we believe on balance the
position of the free world would be stronger if Diem’s plan were supported
rather than frustrated:
- (a)
- There probably will be pressures upon the Viet Minh by
Moscow and Peiping to avoid actions which might
precipitate world conflict;
- (b)
- Viet Minh capabilities in South—while great—are
probably insufficient at this time to overthrow the Free
Viet-Nam regime without direct Viet Minh military
support from across the 17th Parallel;
- (c)
- Diem’s position
will be approved by the majority of his nationalist
supporters in the South, and his courageous resistance
to Viet Minh blandishments and threats may well make him
increasingly popular and hence strong;
- (d)
- We believe that if Diem now can develop wide popular
support for his position on elections he might be in a
better position later to resist pressures from the
British, French and Indians to accept what will probably
seem to be “reasonable” Communist proposals for
elections, although in fact such proposals would be
cleverly designed to deliver all Viet-Nam to the Viet
Minh.
[Tab B]
THE STATUS OF FEC AND THE FRENCH
HIGH COMMAND IN VIET-NAM
Anticipated French
Position
- 1.
- The French will probably seek our views in the light of the
Vietnamese request of June 6 for negotiations on this subject.
The French reaction is not yet definitely known.
- 2.
- However, French might react negatively to the Vietnamese
proposal for negotiations and to the Vietnamese desire for a
military agreement defining the responsibilities of the FEC and the French High Command in
Viet-Nam. On the other hand, the French may not oppose
Vietnamese desire for total withdrawal French ground forces and
retention of only naval and air forces. However, the French may
ask us to permit withdrawal of two squadrons of B–26’s to
Algeria, which would nullify the Vietnamese desire to retain
some French air power.
- 3.
- The Acting French Commander in Chief, Saigon, has informed our
Embassy that all French forces are now concentrated in the area
of Saigon and Cap St. Jacques except for a
battalion of “symbolic value” near the 17th Parallel. Presumably
the French intend to continue to concentrate the FEC far in the South rather than
maintain forces near the 17th Parallel to deter or meet
aggression.
United States Position
- 1.
- In general, it is better from the political viewpoint for
France and the free world if France negotiates with the
Vietnamese regarding the status of the FEC and French High Command in Free Viet-Nam rather
than to face nationalistic demands for an immediate and
necessarily precipitate withdrawal of all French forces.
- 2.
- We hope the French will accept the Vietnamese request for
negotiations in a friendly and constructive spirit and the
negotiations will be quickly and effectively concluded in an
agreement. Such negotiations would enhance the Vietnamese
position. We see much political advantage in having the command
responsibilities clarified so that there would be no doubt that
the Government of Viet-Nam is fully responsible for internal
security in Free Viet-Nam and is not dependent upon an outside
power.
- 3.
- We would think that pursuant to Article IV of the Manila Pact
and its Protocol France could negotiate a status of forces
agreement with Viet-Nam regulating the responsibilities,
obligations and location of residual French forces for the
purpose of joint undertakings in meeting external aggression
against Free Viet-Nam and a threat to the treaty area of a Viet
Minh attack.
- 4.
- From a political point of view it would seem advisable for the
concentration of French forces in the Saigon area to be reduced
or eliminated in an orderly manner as soon as possible. The
French Prime Minister made this suggestion during the Paris
talks and the Secretary of State concurred. It would be
preferable for majority of residual French ground forces to be
stationed near the 17th Parallel if the FEC is to retain any deterrent effect
whatsoever.
- 5.
- If the Government of Viet-Nam desires the total withdrawal of
French ground forces, the U.S. would not object. The Vietnamese
Government is in a stronger internal position than two months
ago. The increasing political liabilities of the presence of
French forces in Viet-Nam may outweigh the military advantages,
which were previously anticipated. If the French Government
accepts this Vietnamese proposal, the U.S. would hope it would
be carried out in an orderly manner and that French instructors
would remain as an essential element in reorganizing, training,
and providing logistic support for Vietnamese armed forces. At
the same time there would be no political reason for opposing
the retention, as a deterrent, of a small nucleus [Page 455] of French ground
forces with adequate air support stationed near the 17th
Parallel for patrolling the demarcation line and occupying
strategic or tactical bases in that area.
- 6.
- As to command relationships between French and Vietnamese,
this is a matter for them to work out on the basis of the best
possible mutual relationships by joint Vietnamese-French
arrangements. If the responsibilities for external defense are
settled, we see no need for the French to hold the position of
commander in chief over Vietnamese forces, except in the event
of aggression.
