6. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Secretary of State1
In connection with the attack on January 10 by the Chinese Communists on the Chinese Nationalist held Tachen Islands, Admiral Carney, following a telephone conversation last night, sent to me a memorandum, copy of which is attached.
I had an opportunity after lunch today to discuss the substance of this memorandum with the President and Admiral Radford.
With the President’s approval, this question will be discussed as a part of Item 3 at the NSC Meeting on Thursday, January 13, “U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China”. Because of the sensitive nature of Admiral Carney’s memorandum, I am sending a copy before the Meeting only to you, so as to afford time for consideration before the Meeting. Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford have received a copy of the memorandum direct from Admiral Carney.
In our informal discussion, the President was inclined to feel that it might in practice be difficult to apply the last clause of paragraph 5c of NSC 5429/5,2 and that perhaps CINCPAC should be [Page 10] authorized to permit Chinat retaliation in the case of any Chicom attack on a Chinat held off-shore island deemed by CINCPAC to be significant, and to meet criteria established by CINCPAC for feasibility and likelihood of success.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–1155. Top Secret. Notes attached to the source text indicate that the memorandum was circulated on January 12 to Under Secretary Hoover, Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, Policy Planning Staff Director Bowie, and Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson in preparation for a meeting in the Secretary’s office that afternoon.↩
- The last sentence of paragraph 5–c of NSC 5429/5, December 22, 1954, reads as follows: “However, refrain from assisting or encouraging offensive actions against Communist China, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from such actions, except in response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President.” (See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 1062)↩
- This memorandum is Top Secret.↩
- In telegram 031925Z from CNO to CINCPAC, November 3, 1954. The substance was quoted in telegram 278 to Taipei, November 3, 1954: for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 854. Admiral Felix B. Stump was Commander in Chief, Pacific.↩
- In telegram 110145Z from CNO to CINCPAC, January 10, not printed. (JCS Files, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Sec. 16)↩
- Printed here as italics.↩