194. Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State, at Geneva 1
191135Z. Our analysis of the four opening statements while perhaps not presenting basic new ideas which have not already occurred to you leads us to suggest the following:
Throughout the Soviet statement repeated references are made to the banning of atomic weapons but no suggestion is made as to the practical accomplishment of this objective which obviously can not [Page 385] be realistic merely from the standpoint of international declaration. It would seem desirable to emphasize as a matter of amplification of the President’s statement the necessity for exploring the possibilities of effective inspections by the principals involved as a necessary prelude to any armaments control, emphasizing also that armaments control of necessity includes the whole of conventional and nonconventional weapons which separate parts can not be isolated. The establishment of an appropriate group to explore inspection mechanisms perhaps proceeding from the most elementary to the more complex would appear to be an affirmative proposal designed to determine the good faith of all concerned and is much more realistic than the Faure proposal of budgetary control which would always be subject to national systems of accounting which are both unique to the several countries and which are susceptible to change and manipulation. We believe that the Soviet statement regarding the satellite countries having elected their own systems of government should not go unchallenged. The Soviet statement declaring discussion of the activities of political parties as inappropriate is in fact an integral part of the same problem involving the satellite countries since one of the foremost aspects of what is described as the Cold War is in reality the subversive efforts of international communism to impose unwanted systems of government upon people who because of economic or social problems and unrest have not yet established adequate machinery to combat subversion or to achieve for themselves a form of govt acceptable to all people.
We are impressed with the negative attitude of the Soviet statement which seems to us an effort to couch in conciliatory language the basic unrelenting attitude of the Soviet Govt. Essentially what they are willing to concede is the superficial fruits of their own recent efforts such as the Warsaw Treaty to counter such organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Paris Accords. Their other efforts at easing world conditions seem to be conditioned on the relinquishing by Western powers of the measures involved over a long period for their own security. We might also suggest with reference to the acceptance by the Soviets of the President’s proposal for an international pool of fissionable material for peaceful purposes that consideration be given to a progressive increase in the rate of contributions. In this connection, the United States might challenge Soviet good faith by suggesting the exploration of a formula whereby nations which produce fissionable material would be required to progressively increase their contributions to the pool of peaceful fissionable material on an increasing scale. The negative approach of the Soviet statement with reference to the unification of Germany, international Communism, and the unwillingness to provide a forum for the discussion of the problem of the satellites suggests to us that if [Page 386] this position remains throughout the conference the attitude of the Soviets, then thought should be given to a sufficiently dramatic statement by the United States as to make plain to the world the real willingness and desire of the United States to make a sound and enforceable arrangement vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which could result in a peaceful world.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret.↩