195. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, July 19, 1955, 1 p.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- Amb. Bohlen
- USSR
- Amb. Zarubin
- Mr. Soldatov
SUBJECTS
- 1. Exchange of Visits
- 2. U.S. Troops in Europe
- 3. Soviet Security Treaty Proposal
I had lunch today with Ambassador Zarubin and Mr. Soldatov, Head of the American Section of the Soviet Foreign Office. For the most part, Zarubin and Soldatov repeated the current line concerning the importance of re-establishing relations of confidence and friendship between the US and the Soviet Union. Zarubin particularly talked about the importance of the exchange of visits, cultural and otherwise, as a means of increasing mutual understanding, etc.
On the subject of the Conference itself, they both stressed the importance of personal contacts and the necessity of reinforcing security in Europe. In reply to my question on Germany, they made it quite plain, as was certainly confirmed this afternoon,2 that the Soviet Government was not prepared to accept the entry of a unified Germany into NATO and that the proper procedure here was to recognize certain “realities” and agree what could be done in the light of these realities to prevent the development of tension and friction between the military organizations in Europe. While they did not depart in any important particular from Bulganin’s speech of yesterday,3 they certainly confirmed that what the Soviets have in mind is [Page 387] some sort of modus vivendi in Europe based on the status quo with particular reference to some form of contact between the two military set-ups along the lines indicated by Bulganin, namely, an agreement not to use force against each other but to settle any disputes by peaceful means and an undertaking not to increase existing levels of troops stationed on foreign soil.
With reference to the three points raised by Molotov this morning for inclusion on the agenda,4 they tended to dismiss those as general questions of principles but did not seem to attach much importance thereto. In reply to my observation that the restoration of the pre-1939 situation in Europe in regard to troops would, in effect, mean a complete departure of US forces from Europe, they took the line that that was a very long term proposition and one that they did not expect to be realized for many years. They maintained, however, that, in principle, this must be a proper long term goal whereby the troops of each country were confined to their own territory.
In discussing the Soviet security treaty as envisaged by them, I pointed out that, in effect, it would merely mean a re-creation of Europe as it was in 1949 before the creation of NATO; that Western Europe would have no cohesive, collective security arrangement of its own and no direct ties with the US, whereas Eastern Europe, whether or not the Warsaw Pact was formally abolished, would still be a tightly-knit monolithic bloc both politically and militarily. As was to be expected, they took great issue of this and attempted the usual line that the satellites were completely independent countries but would not either make a very convincing case or pursue the point very far. The only time any emotion was shown by Zarubin and Soldatov was when they were talking about the destruction that Germany had caused to Russia in two World Wars and that the Soviet Government did not take lightly the re-creation of German militarism. They professed to be completely unimpressed by my description of the safeguards built into NATO and WEU in regard to Germany, and Zarubin made the point that if a unified Germany was in that set-up, it would soon acquire a dominant position—a state of affairs which the Soviet Government was not prepared to accept.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen.↩
- See Document 197.↩
- See Document 184.↩
- See Document 193.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩