Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

321. Telegram From the Delegation at the Conference of Foreign Ministers to the Department of State ¹

Geneva , November 3, 1955—2 p.m.

Secto 147. Following may be helpful to Acting Secretary in NSC.

After first week’s discussions of Item I,² conference has carried discussion on European Security as far as Western Powers deem advisable. It will be Western tactic henceforth focus attention as exclusively as possible on German reunification which they have emphasized throughout is indissolubly linked to European security.

Discussion of European security question has resulted in forcing Soviets to make some concessions to Western viewpoint. Thus, they have, as Secretary pointed out yesterday,³ incorporated in their latest proposals most of political and military commitments contained in Western proposals. At same time, they have also dropped their earlier demands that agreement must be reached on dissolution of NATO and WEU within definite period. This apparent progress does not, however, obscure the fundamental fact that their security proposals are premised on division of Germany, reunification of which Western Powers have consistently emphasized, is the essential premise for any system of European security.

We have now reached point of identifying and driving home to German and world opinion basic issue dividing East and West on Item I. By emphasizing similarity Eastern and Western views on European security, we have in fact forced Soviets to place their emphasis on political and ideological considerations which prevent them from making progress on this question. This, we feel, constitutes the weakest ground for them to defend. Molotov has in effect served notice that Soviets will not risk jeopardizing their position in East Germany. By stressing necessity for maintaining “social gains” of GDR and by pointing out contribution which free elections made to rise of Hitlerism, he is taking a position in favor of an imposed German settlement at an indefinite future time without benefit of any genuinely free elections.

It will be Western tactic at sessions ahead to hammer at free elections and at freedom of German peoples to make own domestic and international decisions. A same time, we will continue, as we have consistently, to quote directive with respect to decision of Heads of Government that Germany shall be reunified under free elections and to point up failure of Soviet proposals to carry out this decision. We shall also keep in forefront fact that reunification of Germany in freedom is basic premise for any system of European security.

Molotov has given no indication that he will yield on position he has taken on Germany. We think unreasonableness and deviousness of his position can be readily demonstrated to our benefit and his detriment. We shall try to sharpen this picture as much as possible.

We must expect that Soviets will make every effort in Germany to exploit following themes:

1. That it was Western Powers who prevented German participation in conference;

2. That a natural solution of German problem would be for two Germanies to get together;

3. That Western military groupings and West German participation therein are major obstacle to German reunification.

There has been no discussion as yet on Item II,⁴ but this likely reached middle next week.

On Item III,⁵ the Soviets today accepted Western procedural proposal. On substance their tactic is to try to break down system of strategic controls. Three Western Powers have stood firmly in refusing discuss these controls and have placed emphasis on freedom of communication, which Soviets have resisted as interference in domestic affairs.

In general, tone of conference has been moderate. Molotov has kept polemics to minimum. In this respect, atmosphere resembles the Heads of Government meeting more that that of Berlin. Offsetting this, of course, has been consistently stubborn and negative attitude of Soviets towards German reunification. On Western side unity and vigor of our allies have been especially noteworthy.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated verbatim to the Denver White House on November 4 as Toden 11. Copies were also sent to Sherman Adams, Vice President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, and Attorney General Brownell. (Ibid., 396.1–GE/11–455)
2. European security and Germany.
3. See Document 315.
4. Disarmament.
5. Development of contacts between East and West.