85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

3948. Bonn’s 2171.2 As indicated Deptels 2050, 2008, 1974 and 1973 to Bonn,3 we have serious reservations about establishing any Working Group on East-West questions or announcement of intentions before completion ratifications. Since Adenauer seems generally optimistic about ratification prospects now and this confirmed by other reports, we strongly hope he will not make any Working Group proposal at this time. Point might be made to both Adenauer and Mendes-France that even announcement of intention convene Working Group after ratifications involves much the same risk as actual meeting in providing Soviets with opportunity reassert more firmly that conference after ratification purposeless. Such an exchange [Page 131] might serve more to stimulate than calm opposition to Paris Agreements in Paris and Bonn and provide new excuses for seeking delay.

FYI. If some announcement must in last resort be made for political necessities either Mendes or Adenauer, we should prefer them to say that they were “considering with the three other Governments preparations for meeting with Soviets, on matters of direct concern to Federal Republic, US, UK and France, after Paris Agreements enter into force”. Such general statement less easy for Soviets to exploit than reference to Working Group.

We agree UK Foreign Office thinking (London’s 33544) that it would be difficult even announce plans for eventual study group without some notion of agenda. This another reason for avoiding premature study group or announcement. French Embassy has informed Department that Adenauer mentioned German reunification and European security pact as topics for quadripartite study group. While we agree Adenauer may reasonably feel Federal Republic should be in on anything affecting German reunification, other questions such as Austrian Treaty or European security arrangements involve other states which would feel entitled to be consulted as much as Federal Republic and would certainly not wish Federal Republic to act as spokesman for them. Similar difficulty would arise in connection French proposal for initial tripartite study group if either German or European security questions to be discussed. For these reasons we wish to reserve approval of announcement proposal until more compelling evidence of need. In any event would not wish either Adenauer or Mendes to jump gun on announcement without informing other three. Decision on announcement should also not be made until certain Mendes-France will survive North African debate. End FYI.

Paris if queried by French whether US considering alternative suggestions should limit responses to statement that various proposals under study but basic US position remains unchanged.

London discuss foregoing including FYI with Foreign Office.5

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–3155. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared with Jones, Palmer, Thurston, and Merchant; and signed for the Acting Secretary by Lyon. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris and Moscow.
  2. Telegram 2171 reported that Hoyer Millar told Adenauer the reasons for U.S. and British opposition to the idea of a study group. The Chancellor then suggested that the four governments might announce their intention of convoking a study group before ratification, but indicate that its work would not begin until after the Paris Agreements came into effect. (Ibid., 396.1/1–2955)
  3. Telegram 1973 is printed as Document 83. Telegrams 2050, 2008, and 1974 reiterated in one manner or another U.S. reservations about the establishment of any working group. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–2655, 1–2055, and 1–1855, respectively)
  4. Not printed. (Ibid., 396.1/1–3155)
  5. On February 2 and 4, the Embassies in Paris and London replied to this telegram. Achilles stated that the guidance provided would be used if needed, but that Mendès-France was absorbed in other matters and was unlikely to press the issue. (Telegram 3242 from Paris; ibid., 396.1/2–255) Aldrich reported that the Foreign Office was in complete agreement with Department of State thinking and was in no haste for the study group to reach any decision. (Telegram 3455 from London; ibid., 396.1/2–455)