Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

86. Memorandum by the Director of Political Affairs, HICOG (O’Shaughnessy)¹

Bonn, March 9, 1955.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH HERBERT BLANKENHORN

I called on Blankenhorn yesterday, after being called for consultation, and asked him if he or the Chancellor had any views which might be helpful in my conversations in the Department. Also, I gave him a list of questions which I told him I thought might be asked me, although I was not acting under instructions in so doing and this was a purely personal approach which I was making to him—Blankenhorn.

Tonight I saw Blankenhorn again who told me he had had a long talk with the Chancellor, and also had put the questions (see attachment²) to him. He said that before addressing himself to the questions, the Chancellor had the following general observations to make:

1. Any negotiations with the Soviets would be very difficult. No guarantee which could be offered to them would satisfy them, short perhaps of an Austrian-type solution, which the Chancellor found completely unacceptable.

2. Any offer made in connection with a European security system would have to contain the following elements:

a. The military potential of the Federal Republic could not be diminished.

b. The furthest Adenauer would go would be to accept no increase over the twelve-division potential in the event of reunification.

c. Reunification should not involve giving up the Oder-Neisse territories. He maintained that the German frontiers be fixed at the peace treaty. (Article 7 should not be altered.) No restriction of German sovereignty should be made by any new unilateral controls.

Adenauer added that the Soviets’ sole interest was the withdrawal of U.S. forces and bases from the European continent, and that there can be no price for this. He feels it essential that U.S. forces and bases remain.

Referring to the questions asked him yesterday:

1. Should any modifications be made to the Eden Plan?³

The Eden Plan should be “sharpened and strengthened”. Stronger guarantees were needed, for instance, with regard to the holding of free elections.

2. Is it considered tactically advisable to discuss other points in addition to the free election point? If so, what?

The status of Germany should be discussed. (See the five points of the Bundestag Resolution of June 10, 1953.⁴)

a. Should the military status of a united Germany be discussed? What would be the minimum acceptable size for a German national army? What types of controls, inspection, and limitations over German rearmament would be acceptable? Would it be possible to reduce the size of German armed forces as now planned as the price for reunification if Germany remains in NATO?

There should be no reduction from present contemplated levels. Western Union controls should be maintained. He thinks German membership in NATO should carry with it a full troop contribution.

b. Would there be tactical advantages in appearing to be willing to discuss a proposal to limit the freedom of a future all-German government to conclude treaties or a proposal for a quadripartite agreement to refrain from entering into one-sided military alliances with Germany?

Emphatically not.

c. Should any consideration be given to the establishment of a neutralized zone along the eastern border of a united Germany?

A demilitarized German East Zone could be considered only if Poland and Czechoslovakia were likewise demilitarized. Since this would mean a Soviet request for Allied withdrawal from Western Germany, this is obviously not an acceptable solution.

d. How should the question of the withdrawal of occupation troops be handled?

No answer.

e. To what extent for negotiating purposes would the Federal Republic agree to the continuation of four-power controls over a united Germany?

This represents the Austrian solution which he has already declared unacceptable.

3. Would the Federal Republic agree to the participation of the GDR in a conference on German unity with a status equal to that of the Federal Republic?

Only if absolutely necessary, and then under protest, and if it did not mean recognition of the Pankow Government.

4. What is the Federal Republic’s thinking re mutual East-West security arrangements to which Adenauer has made allusions in the past?

Chancellor now believes that a general agreement on nuclear weapons should now be the point of departure of any security arrangements, but beyond this Blankenhorn reports that Adenauer is rather vague on the subject of security systems in general.

The Chancellor considers that the Soviet attitude has now sharpened and hardened; that they wish to maintain the status quo in Germany and to stay in the East Zone. Therefore, he concludes, it will be very difficult to set up any plan to negotiate with the Soviets.

The Chancellor also asked that sympathetic consideration be given to his request for a study group or study commission as outlined in his letter of January 30 to Secretary Dulles.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/3–955. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Lyon to Merchant, dated March 14, which briefly summarized its contents.
2. Not found attached to the source text. Another copy of this memorandum indicates that the questions in the second number and letter series below was the attachment.
3. For text of the Eden Plan, FPM(54)17, dated January 29, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1177.
4. The five points included: (1) free elections throughout Germany, (2) formation of a free government for all Germany, (3) conclusion of a freely negotiated peace treaty with that government, (4) settlement of all territorial questions by that treaty, and (5) guarantee of freedom of action to the all-German Government consistent with the United Nations principles. For full text of the resolution, see Deutschlandfrage, pp. 171-172, or Documents on German Unity, vol. iv, p. 15.